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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

A THEORETICAL MODEL OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN NEW AND DEVELOPING STATES *

INTRODUCTION

NATIONALISM in new and developing states is a complex problem of increasing concern to both political scientists and economists. To the political scientist, nationalism appears on the one hand as an integrative ideological force facilitating the establishment of a viable and cohesive nation-state; on the other hand, ethnic groupings, especially when they coincide with geographical, linguistic, and religious differences, generate the phenomenon of nationalism within the state and constitute a threat to the political stability of the state and the prospects for its survival. In addition, nationalism is a factor fundamental to the understanding of the ideological role of the concepts of "colonialism" and "imperialism" in the political life of ex-colonial states. Equally, to the economist, nationalism appears on the one hand as a driving force responsible for the urge of less developed countries (of which the majority are new states) to accelerate their economic development by economic planning, and on the other hand as the major political influence responsible for the fact that many features of the policies, concepts, and methods of economic development planning in such countries either do not make economic sense, or else would make economic sense only in certain specific and rather exceptional economic circum-

* This article originated as a paper to the Seminar of the University of Chicago Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations, and owes a great deal to past proceedings of that Seminar and to discussions with members of the Committee.

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stances the actual presence of which no one has felt it necessary to establish by empirical economic research.

This last point may be illustrated by a variety of examples. In the first place, both public pronouncements in developing countries and the literature on economic development are pervaded by an emphasis on industrialization as the necessary path to economic development, despite the fact that many economists, looking either to past economic history or to the current situation in the less developed countries, have concluded that the development of agriculture or of exports of certain natural resource products constitutes their logical path to economic development. Secondly, in regard to the choice of industries to be fostered by development policy, there is a marked tendency to regard certain industries as strategic, almost regardless of the size of the country, its location, or its available skills. Which industries these are depend in large part on the stage of development. In the earliest stages of development, a steel industry is generally regarded as the *sine qua non* of economic development, even though steel requires a massive investment of capital and the world steel industry has tended to suffer from chronic over-capacity rather than excessive pressure of demand. In more advanced countries, such as Canada, Australia, the Union of South Africa, Mexico, and Argentina, the *sine qua non* of development is a domestic automotive industry, even though the establishment of such an industry involves essentially the local production of American or European models at costs substantially above the prices of imports. In countries that are generally regarded as advanced, other than the United States, a comparable emphasis has been placed on the production of atomic energy, even though the commercial profitability of that form of power is not yet firmly established. As indicated, an economic justification for regarding the specific industrial activities mentioned as strategic is difficult to provide; instead, the selection of what activity is strategic seems to be governed by rivalry with and imitation of other nations that are regarded in some sense as superior.

A third example, different in nature, is the almost universal prevalence of a preference for public enterprise over private enterprise. Such a preference is not necessarily a question of nationalism—it may be a consequence of political

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philosophy—but it frequently seems to be dictated by nationalism rather than by socialist political principle. The problem for the economist here is to explain what, if any, advantage a country with limited managerial skills and limited administrative capacity derives from organizing industrial activities under governmental control rather than through reliance on the competitive market place.

Two other examples are drawn from the area of international economic relations. In commercial policy, developing countries generally place great emphasis on policies of substituting domestic production for imports, when the economics of the situation would indicate that economic efficiency would best be served by reliance on the principle of comparative advantage. And in almost all the developing countries and new nations, there is strong opposition to the investment of foreign capital and to the employment of foreign scientific, technical, and managerial personnel, even though capital and professional people are scarce and their scarcity frequently constitutes the major bottleneck in the process of economic development. Both phenomena are clearly derived from nationalism.

The problem these examples pose for the economist as social scientist is to explain the tenacity with which these policies are followed and the regularities of behavior that can be discerned among countries, in terms of an underlying logical connection running from nationalism to economic policy. The purpose of this article is to provide such an explanation, in the form of a theoretical model of economic nationalism in new and developing states; the intention is not to pass judgment on the wisdom or otherwise of nationalist policies, but rather to explain such policies as a rational and economic response to certain types of situations.

I

The theoretical model presented derives primarily from three recent applications of economic theory to problems hitherto not generally considered to fall within its range.[1]

[1] The model also owes something to the writer's earlier attempts to understand the origins of the particular policies recommended by Canadian nationalists in recent years; see his "Problems of Canadian Nationalism," Chap. 2 in *The Canadian Quandary* (Toronto, 1963), and "Nationalism in Canadian Economic Policy," *Lloyds Bank Review*, LXIV (1964) 25–35.

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The first of these is Gary S. Becker's study of discrimination against Negroes in the United States.[2] The key concept of this work is the "taste for discrimination," the notion that people who discriminate are willing to sacrifice material gain—by paying higher prices or accepting lower prices in their economic transactions—in order to enjoy a psychological gain derived from avoiding contact with the group discriminated against. The model of nationalism presented here adopts from Becker's work the notion that individuals seek—in accordance with the postulates of economic theory—to maximize their satisfaction, but that this satisfaction includes enjoyment of both psychic income and material income; it simply substitutes for the taste for discrimination a taste for nationalism.

The second source of the model is Anthony Downs' application of economic theory to the processes and practices of democratic government.[3] Downs' basic hypothesis is that political parties seek to maximize their gains from office; but that they win office by catering to the preferences of the voters, and can only continue in office by satisfying the voters' preferences for various types and quantities of governmental activity. In other words, power is exchanged for desired policies in a political transaction between party and electorate. A strategic element in Downs' theory of the workings of democracy is the cost of acquiring information. Downs uses this cost to explain the reliance on persuasion in arriving at political decisions; the inequality of political influence; the role of ideology; electoral apathy; and the bias of democratic government toward serving producer rather than consumer interests.

The third source of the model is Albert Breton's analysis of the economics of nationalism.[4] Breton identifies nationality with ownership by nationals of various types of property, and regards it as a type of collective consumption capital that yields an income of utility and can be invested in by

[2] Gary S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago, 1957).

[3] Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXVI (1957), 135–50, and *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957).

[4] Albert Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXXII (1964), 376–86.

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spending public funds on the acquisition of such capital. Using this framework, Breton produces a number of specific and testable propositions about nationalism: nationalist policy is mainly concerned with redistributing income rather than increasing it; specifically, the redistribution is from the working class to the middle class; consequently, where the working class is poor, there will be a tendency to resort to confiscation rather than purchase of property. Furthermore, nationalism will tend to favor investment in national manufacturing, since manufacturing jobs and ownership are preferred by the middle class; its collective nature will appeal to socialists; and its emergence will be correlated with the rise of new middle classes who have difficulty in finding suitable career opportunities.

II

The development of the model of economic nationalism starts from Downs' model of the working of democracy. It is posited that political parties are engaged in the business of exchanging governmental policies and services, from which a party in power derives benefits in the form of psychic and material gains of various kinds, for votes from the electorate. The party's success in gaining and keeping power depends on its success in furnishing what the electorate desires from the government in exchange for its votes. The main obstacle to efficiency in this exchange stems from ignorance on both sides about the prospective gains from the policies offered, and the cost of acquiring the information necessary to make the exchange efficient. This obstacle forces the political party to depend for its information about voter preferences on pressure groups and lobbyists, and on the communications media. Also, though Downs does not develop the point because he is primarily concerned with established democracies, this dependence gives the political parties a strong incentive to establish control over communications media as a means of establishing political control.

The average voter, however, is motivated by his own rational self-interest not to acquire much knowledge about the policies of political parties and their consequences for his economic welfare, because whether or not he is well informed he will have a negligible influence on which party is elected.

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It is this that gives ideology a crucial role in political life. The establishment of a distinctive party ideology simplifies the party's problem of communicating to the electorate by enabling the party to summarize all of its policies in one general symbolism; and it simplifies the problem of the voter, who can vote by ideology instead of being obliged to weigh up each party's record and promises on the whole range of specific policy issues. Parties will therefore compete largely through their ideologies.

In well-established democracies, the type of party system that emerges from this competition will depend on a variety of features, including the distribution among voters of ideological preferences, whether election is by proportional representation or by plurality, and the geographical distribution of voter preferences. Proportional representation will tend to foster a multiplicity of ideologically differentiated parties, whereas plurality election will promote a two-party system, except where ideological difference is associated with geographical region. Actual policy in a multi-party system will, however, represent a compromise among ideologies, owing to the necessity of forming coalitions to command power. In a two-party system, the relation of party ideologies will be determined by the distribution of voter preferences for ideologies: if voters tend to group around a central ideological position (the distribution of voter preferences is unimodal), party ideologies will tend to be virtually indistinguishable. If, on the other hand, voter preferences group around two or more typical positions (the distribution of voter preferences is multi-modal) and voters refrain from voting if party ideology departs too far from their own ideological preferences, party ideologies will be significantly differentiated; such a situation, however, may make the country politically unstable, and threaten political disintegration.

Where democracy is not well established, there will be a strong incentive for a party to attempt to create a comprehensive and preclusive ideology to enable it to enjoy exclusive control of government; this will be especially so in an underdeveloped economy and society. The change of office from party to party in a normal democracy is an economically wasteful process, and relies on the capacity of the sociopolitical and economic system to reabsorb ousted political

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office-holders without imposing great private losses on them. In an economically underdeveloped country, the change of office between parties is likely to impose substantial economic losses on the individuals who have to wait their turn in office, by comparison with the power and the material gains they would enjoy if they controlled the government permanently. The acceptance of normal democracy depends on acceptance of the rules of the game; but the acceptance rests not only on a democratic tradition but also on an economic and socio-political system that does not impose severe economic losses on political losers.

Nationalistic feeling provides a foundation for the establishment of a preclusive ideology as a prerequisite for one-party government; and there is an evident connection between the stridency of nationalism in the new nations and their propensity to establish one-party government. Even where the two-party system is maintained, the competition in ideology would tend to make both parties stress nationalism and nationalistic policies if there were widespread nationalistic sentiment among the electorate. Only if there were a sharp division of voter preferences, some voters envisaging advantages in nationalistic policies and others envisaging serious disadvantages, would there be significant political division on the issue; and in this case the political stability of the country would be seriously threatened.

Finally, one of Downs' important conclusions is that the working of political democracy will display an asymmetry with respect to economic issues. This asymmetry arises from the concentration of producer interests and the dispersion of consumer interests, which makes it easy to organize lobbies for producer interests and difficult to organize them for consumer interests. The relevance of this asymmetry for nationalism is that nationalist policies tend to concentrate on specific producer interests, whereas their costs are dispersed thinly over the mass of consumers, so that it is not too difficult for nationalist policies to win political support on the basis of the producer gains they promise, even though the net benefits, taking consumers and producers together, are negative.

III

The foregoing argument has outlined an approach to the

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working of political democracy and party government and has attempted to integrate nationalism in developing countries with it. The next problem is the nature of nationalism as an ideology, and of its political action program.

As an ideology or state of political feeling, nationalism can be conceived of, along the lines of the Becker analysis of discrimination against Negroes, as attaching utility or value to having certain jobs held or certain property owned by members of the national group rather than by non-members of the national group. (The difference between the two concepts, though this is a difference largely of degree rather than of kind, is that the utility accrues to members of the national group whether or not they themselves hold the jobs or the property in question; the consequences of this difference are elaborated subsequently.) In this context, it is most useful to employ a broad definition of property ownership, one including in property not merely the ownership of physical or financial assets but also rights to certain kinds of jobs, since job opportunities are property in the sense of yielding a stream of income to the holder. Nationalism can accordingly be conceived of as a state of social psychology or political sentiment that attaches value to having property in this broad sense owned by members of the national group.

The question that immediately arises is, To what kinds of property does this utility of nationality become attached? Clearly, in some sense it is the "important" or prestigious or socially relevant kinds of property that acquire this added value. One such, obviously, is the result of cultural and artistic activities—the national literature, music, and drama. Another is positions of authority in the governmental apparatus and in the social structure. Still another comprises particular types of economic activity and economic roles that carry superior status (and usually superior income also).

A related question is, What determines which specific items of property acquire added value from nationalism? There seem to be two major ways in which nationalistic utility can be acquired. One is internal, through observation within the country of foreign operations there; the property yielding income and status to the foreigner becomes the property valued by the nationalists. This mechanism of

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generating nationalistic utility is particularly important in ex-colonial countries or countries where foreign investment and alleged "economic imperialism" have been significant, where nationalism seeks particularly to replace the officialdom of the colonial power and the executives and shareholders of the foreign enterprises with nationals. The other mechanism is external, through contact with and observation of other nations, which provides knowledge of what forms of property are highly regarded in such societies.

Both of these mechanisms involve the determination of the nationalistic values of specific forms of property by imitation or emulation of other countries, either of their actual practices or of the "image" of themselves they project abroad. The importance of international emulation in determining nationalistic objectives is evident in a variety of areas. Examples in the field of economic policy have already been provided. Examples in other fields readily spring to mind, such as the importance frequently attached to the winning of Olympic medals by a country's athletes, or the tendency of the allocation of resources for scientific research in the more advanced countries to be dominated by the spectacular accomplishments of other countries.

IV

The next step in the analysis is to recognize that the benefits from the gratification of nationalist sentiment are of two sorts, particular and general, or tangible and intangible. The particular benefits are the incomes and prestige that accrue to those nationals who acquire the property rights or the offices and employment opportunities in which nationalism invests. The general benefits consist of the psychic satisfaction derived by the community at large from gratification of the taste for nationalism. It is important to notice here the concentration of the tangible benefits on the subgroup of nationals that is eligible to hold the property or to fill the positions, as distinguished from the dispersion of the intangible benefits, which presumably accrue to the whole national society in so far as its members share the taste for nationalism. It is the intangible benefits that give national ownership of property the character of a collective consumption good—one for which consumption by one in-

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dividual does not preclude consumption by another—and for the economist raises the difficult problem of how to determine the optimal quantity to supply.

The tangible benefits are directly or indirectly economic, and are of considerable value to the individuals who may receive them; thus the bias of the democratic process toward producer interests becomes relevant. These individuals have an economic incentive to pursue these prospective benefits through the cultivation of nationalism. Further, given the mechanisms by which nationalistic utility become attached to specific items of property, these items will tend to be such as to yield tangible benefits primarily to the educated, the entrepreneurially qualified classes, some at least of the wealthy, and other elite groups, so that there is an inherent class slant to the economic interest in pursuing nationalism.

There is, moreover, a natural consilience of the strictly economic interests in nationalism and the cultural interests in nationalism. Both the intellectuals engaged in cultural activities and the owners and managers of communications media have an interest in nationalism, particularly when it can be combined with a linguistic difference, but even when it cannot, because nationalism creates a monopolistic barrier to competition from other countries' purveyors of the same sorts of cultural products. Thus cultural nationalism complements economic nationalism, both involving tangible benefits in the form of protection of the market for the services of individuals. This consideration suggests also that the strength of economic and cultural interests in nationalism will vary with the threat of competition and the need for protection of the market. One would expect to find nationalist sentiment strongest where the individuals concerned are most vulnerable to competition from foreign culture or from foreign economic activities; conversely, one would expect to find that the nations that are leading culturally and economically will tend to be internationalist and cosmopolitan in outlook, because this would tend to extend the market area for their cultural and economic products. These expectations accord broadly with experience.

V

We now turn from nationalism as a political ideology

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to nationalism as an economic program. As such, nationalism seeks to extend the property owned by nationals so as to gratify the taste for nationalism. There are a variety of methods available for accomplishing this objective.

One obvious method is confiscation, that is, the forced transfer of property from foreign owners to nationals. Here it is important to notice a certain ambiguity in the concept of confiscation, extremely useful to nationalists, which arises because what appears to be confiscation may not really be confiscation in the fundamental economic sense of the term. For example, nationalizing the civil service, or nationalizing the administrative and executive jobs in a particular enterprise, may appear to transfer property of value from the foreigners to the nationals. But in so far as the foreigners were receiving a fair price for their skilled qualifications, and nationalization involves replacing them with nationals of inferior skills at the same salaries, the effect is primarily to transfer income within the national group, toward the individuals favored with promotion at the expense of the general community which must bear the costs of poorer administration, inferior economic efficiency, or deterioration of the qualify of the service that results.

The result of nationalizing jobs is not, of course, necessarily merely a transfer of income among nationals. If previously there has been genuine discrimination against nationals, for example, where the civil servants have been of a foreign nationality even though their jobs could be performed as efficiently or more efficiently by nationals available at lower salaries, there will be a genuine transfer of income from foreigners to nationals, since discrimination against nationals in employment gives foreigners a source of monopoly gain at the expense of nationals. It is always difficult to determine, however, whether the employment of non-nationals represents discrimination against nationals or reflects their inferior quality; under competitive conditions there is a presumption in favor of the latter assumption. The possibility of discrimination apart, nationalizing jobs is a matter of transferring income among members of the national group, with side-effects in reducing aggregate real income by reducing the efficiency of performance. Genuine confiscation, which transfers valuable property from foreign-

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ers to nationals, is therefore largely confined to property in the narrow sense, that is, to the tangible wealth—cash, securities, real property, and enterprises—owned in the country by foreigners.

The alternative to confiscation is investment of resources or purchase, that is, the use of wealth or savings that otherwise would be available for other purposes to purchase material property or job opportunities for nationals. This may be effected directly through public investment, or indirectly through various policies influencing private investment. The public investment method includes both the nationalization of existing foreign enterprises with fair compensation and the use of development funds or public revenue to create new enterprises. The method of influencing private investment involves using tariffs and related policies to stimulate industries of the kind desired; these policies also entail public investment, in the sense that the use of the tariff, for example, involves imposing a tax on the consumer in the form of higher prices, the revenue from which goes to subsidize the creation of the protected enterprises by the private entrepreneurs who then receive the higher prices.

VI

It must be recognized, of course, that nationalism is not the only reason why a government may choose to adopt any of these policies. There are many economic arguments as to why such policies might be beneficial in terms of increasing the national income, rather than serving purely to gratify the taste for nationalism. The relevant economic analysis is quite elaborate. It runs in terms of divergences between the private and the social costs of or returns from various kinds of investment, and includes such possibilities as rationalizing the system of production by consolidation of control, training the entrepreneurial and laboring forces and so obtaining social benefits that private competition would not produce if left to itself (the infant industry argument), and obtaining cost reductions through exploiting economies of scale. These arguments are frequently effective in attracting support for nationalistic policies from non-nationalists, and especially socialists, who are inclined to believe implicitly that competition is inherently inefficient and susceptible of im-

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provement by governmental action. The real question, however, is whether the facts of the situation conform to the possibilities of theoretical reasoning. Typically, little or no effort is devoted to confirming that this is so, the theoretical possibilities being employed instead to provide a plausible and apparently scientific defense of policies that are adopted for essentially nationalistic reasons.

With respect to the method of nationalization, it is necessary to realize that, provided compensation is fair, there is no transfer of wealth from foreigners to nationals, and no net gain in national wealth, because fair compensation involves paying the previous owner the present value of the future income he would have earned from the enterprise.[5] The only exception occurs when nationalization permits efficiency-increasing changes in production methods that the previous owner would not have introduced. The gain (or loss) from nationalization does not result from the mere fact of nationalization; instead, gains or losses are the result of changes in management methods and policies introduced after nationalization. In so far as the objective of nationalization is to provide jobs for nationals, presumably people are employed in larger numbers or are of a lower quality than previously were employed, and this obviously involves economic waste.[6] Alternatively stated, potential national output is sacrificed in return for the psychic income obtained from greater employment of nationals. The same is true of public investment in the creation of new industries when such investment is influenced by the desire to provide high-income and high-status jobs for nationals.

The desire to provide more, and more worthy, jobs for nationals will influence the selection of industries for nationalization in certain ways, and this may incidentally provide a means of distinguishing nationalistic from socialistic nationalization.[7] "Nationalistic" nationalization, aside from the obvious tendency to concentrate on industries employing a high proportion of foreigners, will tend to be aimed at

[5] Breton makes unnecessarily heavy weather of this point.

[6] Again, there may be an economic gain rather than a loss, if previously nationals were discriminated against in the employment practices of the nationalized industry.

[7] I am indebted for this point to Professor A. D. Scott.

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industries with a well-established and fairly static technology, that can be managed by bureaucratic routine, and at industries that enjoy a monopolistic position in the domestic market rather than competing actively in the domestic or especially the foreign market, since these characteristics will permit the employment of larger total numbers, and the substitution of lower-quality nationals for higher-quality foreigners, without risking the breakdown and bankruptcy of the industry. In any case, public ownership of industry, whether achieved by nationalization or new investment, permits losses incurred in consequence of the pursuit of nationalistic policies to be underwritten, within limits, by the taxing and borrowing powers of the government.

The alternative to investment or purchase of industry is the use of tariffs, tax concessions, and special privileges to promote the establishment of the kinds of industries that are desired. This method involves a much more clearcut possibility of economic loss, through higher costs of production paid for by consumers in the form either of higher prices or of lost tax revenue that has to be made up either by other taxes or by reduced governmental services, and an overt transfer from the general consumer, who pays the higher prices or taxes or loses governmental services, to the favored producers who are given a protected position in the market. The use of the tariff or of tax concessions to induce the local establishment of particularly desired industries, however, frequently has the paradoxical result of increasing nationalist dissatisfaction rather than contributing to satisfaction, by inducing the foreign producer of a product previously imported to establish domestic production facilities in the country, with the result that the country exchanges the dissatisfaction of not having the industry in the country for the dissatisfaction of having its industry owned and staffed by foreign enterprises.[8]

VII

The major implications of the theory of nationalist eco-

[8] This consequence of the tariff has been an important factor in the exacerbation of nationalist sentiment in Canada in recent years. The formation of the European Economic Community similarly has fostered American investment within the Community's boundaries and thereby provoked nationalist complaints.

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conomic policy presented in this article may now be briefly summarized.

One implication is that nationalism will tend to direct economic development policy along certain specific lines; these lines might represent economic optimality, and would do so if the conditions posited by some familiar economic arguments were present. Failing empirical validation of those arguments, however, the consequence will be a reduction of material production below the economy's potential.

In the first place, nationalist economic policy will tend to foster activities selected for their symbolic value in terms of concepts of "national identity" and the economic content of nationhood; in particular, emphasis will be placed on manufacturing, and, within manufacturing, on certain industries possessing special value symbolic of industrial competence (such as the steel and automotive industries). Secondly, nationalist economic policy will foster activities offering prestigious jobs for the middle class and/or the educated class; the nature of such activities varies with the stage of development, very underdeveloped countries favoring bureaucratic jobs offering steady incomes for routine work, more advanced countries favoring managerial and professional jobs suitable for the products of the educational system, fairly mature countries favoring jobs in higher education and research.[9] Thirdly, nationalism will tend to favor both extensive state control over and extensive public ownership of economic enterprises: state control provides employment for the educated directly, in the central control system, while both the control system and public ownership give the government social control over the allocation of jobs to nationals.

A second implication is that nationalism will tend to direct economic policy toward the production of psychic income in the form of nationalistic satisfaction, at the expense of material income. If attention is confined to material in-

[9] The emphasis on education in contemporary development tends to produce a rat-race in which a country first invests a great deal of scarce capital in educating people, and then is obliged to invest a great deal more in providing suitable employment opportunities for them, the consequence being a double waste of resources. Sometimes needs both for more education and for better jobs for the educated are urged simultaneously, despite the implicit economic contradiction.

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come alone, a third implication is that nationalism will tend to redistribute material income from the lower class toward the middle class, and particularly toward the educated middle class; in this respect, nationalism reinforces the trend of modern society toward the establishment of a class structure based on educational attainment.[10]

This last implication relates to material income only, and does not necessarily imply that the lower classes are worse off because of nationalism when both real and psychic income are reckoned into the account. It is quite possible that the psychic enjoyment that the mass of the population derives from the collective consumption aspects of nationalism suffices to compensate them for the loss of material income imposed on them by nationalistic economic policies, so that nationalistic policies arrive at a quite acceptable result from the standpoint of maximizing satisfaction. It may even be that nationalistic policies are the cheapest and most effective way to raise real income in less developed countries; [11] in some cases, one suspects, the prospects for genuine economic growth are so bleak that nationalism is the only possible means available for raising real income.[12]

It would seem, however, from the economic analysis of government presented earlier, that the lower classes are unlikely to be net gainers from economic nationalism, due to the effects of ignorance and the costs of acquiring information in concentrating political power in the hands of pressure groups, and the general tendency for producer interests to dominate over consumer interests that results from the natural response of voters to the high cost and negligible value of acquiring political information. The tendency for the mass of the population to suffer losses from economic nationalism is probably reinforced in the new nations by the

[10] It is one of the paradoxes of modern social philosophy that redistribution of income from the intellectually poor to the intellectually rich is regarded as desirable and proper whereas redistribution from the materially poor to the materially rich is regarded as utterly inequitable.

[11] This point was suggested by Professor Burton Weisbrod.

[12] Field research by members of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations suggests that this may in fact be the case in some of the new African nations. Nationalism may itself create such a situation, nationalistic economic policies blocking economic growth so effectively that it becomes necessary to resort to ever more extreme nationalistic sentiment and policy to maintain the illusion of economic development.

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prevalence of systems of one-party government, in which the party is based largely on urban support and frequently exercises a virtual monopoly over the country's communications system.[13]

Even though nationalism may involve a substantial redistribution of real income toward the middle class at the expense of the mass of the population, this redistribution may perform a necessary function in the early stages of forming a nation, in the sense that the existence of a substantial middle class may be a prerequisite of a stable society and democratic government. In other words, an investment in the creation of a middle class, financed by resources extracted from the mass of the population by nationalistic policies, may be the essential preliminary to the construction of a viable national state. This problem, however, belongs in the spheres of history, sociology, and political science rather than economics.

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[13] Both dependence on urban support and control over communications media are logical consequences of the economic theory of government as applied to such countries. Dependence on urban support in turn reinforces the bias of development policy toward promotion of manufacturing, and in general fosters policies favoring the city-dweller at the expense of the agricultural population. A particular aspect of this, important especially in Latin America, is the maintenance of low urban transport rates by direct or indirect subsidization, which in its turn fosters urban population growth and increases the political importance of urban residents.

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POLITICS, THEATER, AND THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE: THE THEATER AS A CULTURAL BRIDGE IN WEST BERLIN, 1948–61 *

IN THE divided city of Berlin, lines betwen politics and other aspects of daily life have become quite blurred. Such apparently innocent matters as a conference of Protestant ministers or the control of air traffic assume a significance that extends far beyond the city limits of Greater Berlin. And this is no less true in the field of the arts, particularly the dramatic arts.

The intimate relationship of the theater to politics is a subject that has long intrigued devotees of art and men of affairs alike. But perhaps in no previous generation have political considerations more completely dominated the world of the theater than in postwar Berlin. The performance of an artist in a certain section of the city, or even an American diplomat's attendance of a certain performance, become incidents of international importance. And staging plays by Bertolt Brecht in cities as far away as Ulm raises the cry of national treason among West Berliners. Politics has become the bottleneck through which all considerations of art in the divided city must pass.

It is in the Soviet sector, comprising almost one half of the city's territory and containing about one third of its population, that the fusion of the theater with politics has become most complete. East German theater policy, briefly summarized, aims at the fulfillment of three goals. First, it has sought to increase popular participation in the arts, encouraging amateur theatrical groups and playwrights as well as making the professional theater more accessible to the working man. Second, and perhaps more important, has been the effort to bring the arts, as Minister-President Otto Grotewohl

* I would like to thank Miss Irene Dalis, formerly of the West Berlin Municipal Opera and now of the Metropolitan Opera in New York, for first arousing my interest in this subject; the Social Science Research Council and the Carnegie Corporation for their generous support; and many city and theater officials in East and West Berlin for hours of interesting and, for me, fruitful discussion.

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expressed it in 1951, "into line with politics." [1] In practice, this has meant emphasis upon the content rather than the form of art media, and the creation of a theater repertory politically acceptable to the state and artistically accepted by the theater-going public. A third (and generally implicit) goal of East German theater politics has been the enhancement of the prestige of its performing groups: to demonstrate the potentialities and capabilities of the socialist system in the arts, and through its artistic successes to secure informal and perhaps even formal recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state.

A primary objective of West Berlin's cultural policy has been to establish itself as the leading theater-city of modern Germany. Who can guess the motives of those most ardently championing this demand? For some, no doubt, the chief desire is strictly artistic: to restore the Berlin stage to its bygone brilliance. Others may base their demands upon nostalgia, or upon a cosmopolite's fear of being thought provincial. Some are interested in the economic side-advantages that accompany the successful establishment of an entertainment or theatrical business. And still others are no doubt strictly political ideologues, bent upon turning Berlin into a showcase of democracy, or at least to prevent West Berlin cultural life from being overshadowed by the art of a Helene Weigel, a Walter Felsenstein, or some of East Berlin's other luminaries. Whatever the motivation, they have been able to coalesce their claims and wishes into a powerful demand for support of artistic life in West Berlin.

In the comments of politicians and critics alike on the cultural mission of the West Berlin theater, one image stands out in sharp relief: the theater as an integrative bridge between the two halves of the city, between East and West Berliners.[2] The purpose of a bridge, as we all know, is to

[1] Cited in "Ostzonale Kunst—und ostzonale Propaganda," *Blätter der Freien Volksbühne Berlin*, V (Oct. 20, 1951), 4.

[2] See G.O., "Theater auf der anderen Seite," *General-anzeiger der Stadt Wuppertal*, May 5, 1950; City Councillor Walter May's report on "Kulturarbeit und Bildungswesen," in *Berlin 1949: Jahresbericht des Magistrats* (Berlin [1951?]), 47–48; Mayor Ernst Reuter's comments at the opening of the Schiller Theater, reported in *Die neue Zeitung* (Berlin edition), September 6, 1951, and in *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 6, 1951; Willy Brandt, *Von Bonn nach Berlin* (Berlin-Grunewald, 1957), 159; and Heinz Kersten, "Sozialistische Gegenwartsdramatik vor leerem Parkett," *Der Tagesspiegel*, August 16, 1962.

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facilitate the flow of persons, goods, or even ideas from one point to another. It is a link of social communication between two points or groups.

How well did this image of the West Berlin stage as a cultural bridge correspond to the realities of the years before 1961, the era before East German barbed wire and concrete physically separated East Berliners from the West? In trying to answer this question I shall look at the measures taken by Western governments to realize the image of the cultural bridge, the effect that such measures actually had upon East German attendance at Western theaters, and the cost of the program—psychological as well as economic—to the West.

EFFORTS TO RAISE THE ECONOMIC "IRON CURTAIN"

Two major obstacles prevented East Berliners from attending theatrical and operatic performances in West Berlin. The first of these we might label political: the fear of harassment by East German authorities. Although the "People's Police" seldom subjected passengers of the intra-city subways and elevated railroads to strict controls, the possibility, reinforced perhaps by reports of friends or neighbors arrested for excursions into West Berlin, that they would do so always remained. In a land where political justice is sometimes arbitrary, and where social and economic well-being may rest upon a person's good political behavior, it is not difficult to understand that many persons might be unwilling to accept the onus of association with the enemy camp. It seems highly likely—a fact that refugees from East Germany bear out—that such persons would be willing to forego theater attendance in West Berlin rather than risk any possible unpleasantries. West Berlin officials, unwilling to place East Germans in jeopardy, generally did not encourage these people to subject themselves to such cross-pressures.

If an East Berliner were willing to cross the border into West Berlin, however, he faced still another obstacle: the currency problem. Indeed the currency problem can be cited as one of the main factors leading to the division of Berlin and Germany. On June 18, 1948, the Western Allies introduced a currency reform in the three Western zones of occupation. The Soviet response came five days later, when a currency reform for the Soviet zone of Germany and *all*

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four Allied sectors of Berlin was announced. The Western commanders in Berlin denied the validity of the Soviet move in the Western sectors of the city and, on the same day, extended the currency reform in West Germany to West Berlin. This step was the pretext used by the Soviet commander on June 24 to impose a full blockade on West Berlin.

Nominally the Eastmark was the equivalent of the Westmark, and for a short period of time this was indeed the case. In Berlin, if not in Germany as a whole, the two currencies were used side by side. For a variety of reasons, however, the value of the Eastmark began to slip. By the end of 1948, when the unofficial value of one Westmark was four Eastmarks, the latter became an anathema in West Berlin. As more and more merchants refused to accept them as legal tender, the population searched ever more diligently for ways to dispose of Eastmarks.

The theaters did not escape this chaos of conflicting currencies. Accepting Eastmarks became a genuine hardship for the theaters of West Berlin, all of which purchased materials from West Berlin suppliers, paid wages to West Berliners, and faced tax bills payable in Westmarks. It was not until March 1949 that the situation was resolved. After the eighteenth of that month West Berlin's private theaters refused to sell tickets for Eastmarks. A week later came the announcement that the municipal theaters would follow suit.

But what about bona fide residents of East Berlin and East Germany? Were they to be required to pay for their tickets in Westmarks? Since it was impossible to exchange Eastmarks for Westmarks at banks in East Berlin, and since money changers in West Berlin were currently buying Eastmarks at the rate of four or five to one Westmark, East Germans faced the possibility of exclusion from the West Berlin stage. But the loss was not theirs alone. Because of the dearth of West Berlin theatergoers during the blockade months, the larger theaters had a financial interest in retaining their Eastern clientele.

What actually happened during the remainder of the 1948–49 season has become clouded with the passage of time. A number of schemes were proposed, and some were tried. One plan permitted people possessing East German identity papers to pay for one half of their tickets in Westmarks, the

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rest in Eastmarks. In other cases such people had to pay twice the Westmark price of the ticket in Eastmarks. The financial reports for the municipal theaters do not reveal the precise procedures followed; these few months are hazy in the minds of the theater officials and city financial officers with whom I spoke in 1961 and 1962. We do know, however, that as late as May 1949 the municipal theaters were selling tickets to East Germans for Eastmarks.[3]

Beginning with the 1949–50 season the municipal theaters followed a standardized procedure: selling tickets to East Germans for double their Westmark price in Eastmarks. But as the value of the Eastmark continued to fluctuate at West Berlin exchanges, often dropping to a rate of six or even seven to one Westmark, it was necessary to adopt a new system. After September 1952 East Germans received a fifty per cent reduction in the price of tickets, but had to pay for them in Westmarks.

How may we gauge the effectiveness of currency accomodations in keeping an East German public for the West Berlin stage? One means would be to look at the flow of visitors from the East during the postwar years. Unfortunately, however, we have no way of knowing what the share of visitors from the East would be in "normal" times. As far as I know, no statistics were kept and no studies made of the residential distribution of theatergoers in prewar Berlin. We might nonetheless guess that, since a third of Berlin's population lives in the East, one third of the theatergoing public would normally come from the area now comprising the Soviet sector of Berlin.

It was only after the problem of keeping account books in two currencies arose that it became possible to differentiate Western from Eastern visitors. Through the courtesy of the financial department of the city's administration and the directors of the three municipal theaters, I had an opportunity to analyze their monthly reports on ticket sales for the years 1949 to 1961. Although I was unable to get similar data for the eight private theaters in West Berlin, I would suggest that the information on the municipal theaters is a reliable indicator of trends in total theater attendance. For one thing the municipal theaters—the Municipal Opera, the Schil-

[3] *Die neue Zeitung* (Berlin edition), May 7, 1949.

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ler Theater, and the Schlosspark Theater—are the largest houses in West Berlin, accounting for forty-seven per cent of the city's theater seats and forty-nine per cent of its annual theater attendance.[4] Further, the few available figures that we do have for two of the private theaters reveal that the proportion of their Eastern visitors did not differ significantly from the proportion attending the municipal theaters.[5]

During the first eight post-blockade seasons, the number and percentage share of visitors from the East to West Berlin theaters declined steadily. Whereas one quarter of the visitors to the Municipal Opera and the Schlosspark Theater came from the East in 1949–50 and 1950–51 (the Schiller Theater was not completed until September 1951), by 1956–57 this share was less than one half as high. In fact, from 1950–51 to 1956–57 the proportion of Eastern visitors dropped by an average of one-eighth each year.

What was true for the municipal theaters as a whole was also the case for each individual theater. The Municipal Opera, twenty-six per cent of whose visitors came from the East during the first two post-blockade seasons, dropped to ten per cent in 1956–57. The Schlosspark Theater fell to eleven per cent by the summer of 1957 from its high-water mark of twenty-eight per cent in 1950–51. And the Schiller Theater dropped from eighteen per cent in its first season (twenty per cent during the 1952–53 season) to less than fifteen per cent in 1956–57.

If we suppose that, in the absence of political and economic barriers, one third of the visitors to West Berlin theaters would normally have come from East Berlin alone, it is significant that, by 1957, less than twelve per cent came from East Berlin *and* the surrounding territories in East Germany. This trend affected the theaters financially, of course, but not too much so. By 1957 the *Wirtschaftswunder*—the economic miracle of postwar recovery in West Germany—had reached West Berlin. The theaters did not have to beg for customers as they did during the blockade months of 1948 and 1949. In fact, it may even have seemed sounder from

[4] Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, *Statistisches Jahrbuch Berlin, 1960* (Berlin, 1960), 99. This was before the construction of the new Deutsche Oper Berlin, even larger than the older Municipal Opera.

[5] *Berliner Statistik,* XII (January 1958), inside back cover; *ibid.,* XII (September 1958), back cover; and *ibid.,* XIII (1959), 23.

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an economic point of view to sell tickets at full price to West Berliners than at half price to East Germans.

The trend of declining East German participation in West Berlin's cultural life was more important politically. On the one hand there was a genuine desire on the part of some to maintain ties of community among Germans and, more particularly, among Berliners in both East and West. To them the trend of decreasing participation may have represented the weakening of the ties of community within Berlin. And on the other hand this trend represented a loss of propaganda material for the political activists in the West. It may have seemed fine for a West Berlin official, trying to impress the city's importance in the international struggle against communism upon the rest of the world (or upon potential sources of economic aid), to state that 115,000 East Germans crossed the Iron Curtain to view politically untainted drama and opera in free West Berlin's municipal theaters in 1956–57. But, if he had wanted to achieve his propaganda purpose, he had better not have mentioned that 121,000 East Germans had done so during the previous season, or that 171,000 had crossed this same Iron Curtain in 1952–53. Thus the propagandist as well as the person interested in community development in the whole of Berlin would probably have favored anything facilitating or possibly increasing the flow of visitors from the East to the West Berlin stage.

THE ALL-BERLIN CULTURAL PROGRAM

No significant action in this direction took place until 1957. In its budget hearings in April of that year the West German Federal Parliament (*Bundestag*) agreed to underwrite a program to encourage East Germans to attend cultural events in West Berlin. Its initial grant of five million Westmarks ($1,200,000) for the 1957–58 fiscal year formed the basis of what came to be called the All-Berlin Cultural Program. Although aimed primarily at the theaters, this program also subsidized East Germans' visits to West Berlin zoos, museums, parks, beaches, concerts, art galleries, industrial exhibitions, and other cultural events. A year later it was extended to cover movie houses.

Beginning in September 1957 the East German visitor,

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by presenting his identity papers at the box office, could purchase tickets for any West Berlin theater, municipally or privately owned, for the same amount in Eastmarks that his West Berlin contemporary was paying in Westmarks. In one sense this was unfair to West Berliners. Since the purchasing power of the Eastmark in East Berlin was considerably less than the purchasing power of the Westmark in West Berlin, it placed the East Berliner, at least as far as theater attendance was concerned, in a position of economic superiority over the West Berliner. But this, as we shall see later, was more than balanced out by the economic superiority enjoyed by the West Berliner in East Berlin theaters.

More to the point is that the All-Berlin Cultural Program afforded the East Berliner willing to undertake the subway trip into West Berlin the opportunity to attend performances without paying a surcharge. In this way the economic obstacle to his theatergoing in West Berlin was completely eliminated.

The mechanics of the All-Berlin Cultural Program, as far as the theater managements were concerned, were not too complicated. At certain intervals, perhaps once a week, the business officers would take their entire Eastmark income to a bank for exchange at the (officially regulated) unofficial rate of four or five Eastmarks to one Westmark. A bill for the difference between the Eastmark income and the amount of Westmarks received in exchange would be submitted to the West Berlin Department of Education and Cultural Affairs (*Senatabteilung für Volksbildung*). This office in turn would submit the bill to the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs, and arrange for its payment into the bank account of the individual theaters.

It was generally thought that the All-Berlin Cultural Program would reverse the trend of declining East German attendance at West Berlin theaters. And indeed this was the case for the next two years. Again considering the total sales of tickets to East Germans by the three municipal theaters, the proportion of East Germans in the total audiences rose from 11.8 per cent in 1956–57 (before the program was put into effect) to 12.6 per cent in the following season, and 13.4 per cent in 1958–59. But the reversal of the trend was short-lived. By 1959–60 it had dropped to 12.6 per cent

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again, and to 12.3 per cent during the following season. We do not know how this trend might have continued. The construction of the wall between East and West Berlin by the East German authorities in August 1961 stopped the flow of East Germans to the West Berlin stage altogether.

In 1960–61, the last season before Ulbricht's wall went up, less than one visitor in eight to the West Berlin municipal stages came from the East. This proportion we may compare to the theoretically postulated one out of three that might come from the area comprising East Berlin if the city were "normal." Or we might compare our figure of one out of eight for 1960–61 to that of the first two seasons after the blockade, 1949–50 and 1950–51, when one out of four visitors to the municipal stages came from the East. Whichever way we look at it, however, the trend is devastating to the hopes of those who meant to maintain community ties in Berlin by means of the theater.

What caused the decline is a matter of conjecture. One reason has been hinted at before, the political dangers of association with Western culture and politics. Although the extent of the danger waxed and waned, I do not think it unfair to say that, from 1949 to 1961, as the East Germans consolidated their control over the country, the danger increased. A second possible reason is that the people who were most active in maintaining their ties with the West (as indicated by their willingness to attend the theater in West Berlin) were also the people most inclined to flee from East Germany. Each refugee to the West was one less potential East German visitor to the West Berlin stage. Third, there may have been growing apathy among East Germans toward theater in the West. As the Communist regime withstood the test of years, a degree of sophistication about the political role of the theater seemed to emerge: the theaters' repertories included more plays; the less popular propaganda pieces disappeared from the stage; experience raised the artistic level of the performances. By 1961 there was almost always something worth seeing at one of East Berlin's ten theatrical, opera, and operetta houses. To these facts must be added another: in the East German network of day-to-day communications flowed ample information about the local theaters and little or none about those in West Berlin. Unless a person had

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contacts in the West or other means of keeping informed, it was often difficult for him to know what plays were being performed where and when. In short, we cannot with any measure of certainty state exactly why East Germans crossed the border less and less often. The important point as far as we are concerned now is that the trend was steadily downward, and that not even measures placing the cost of tickets on a par with the price of tickets to East Berlin theaters could stop this trend for very long.

EAST GERMAN ATTENDANCE HABITS: A LOST OPPORTUNITY?

Although, it could be argued, East Germans came to the West in ever decreasing numbers, those that did nonetheless had an opportunity to attend nonpolitical theater that was not available to them in their homeland. Such an argument poses two questions of fact. First, how politically oriented is the theater in East and West Berlin respectively? And, second, did the East German visitor in fact utilize his opportunity, so often mentioned by the politicians and critics as an important *raison d'être* for subsidization of the West Berlin stage, to attend plays that could not be or were not performed in the East?

Political direction in the theater may take a number of forms. That, through staging and cutting, standard operas and plays can be turned into political instruments should come as no surprise to either theater and opera lovers or to political scientists. This technique of politicization is particularly noticeable to the Westerner visiting the theater in the East. In some cases the changes are major and even structural: one can very easily come away from East Berlin's Theater am Schiffbauerdamm with the impression that J. M. Synge's *Playboy of the Western World* is nothing more than a diatribe against the idolization of gangsters in American mass media. In other cases the changes are so minor as to be merely irritating to the connoisseur or politically sensitive visitor: in an East Berlin production of Mozart's *Abduction from the Seraglio,* for example, one does not hear Blonde protest that she is "an Englishwoman, born to freedom"; and the unspecified "wicked man" who defiled and abandoned the nurse in Ibsen's *Doll's House* turns out, at least at the Maxim Gorky Theater in East Berlin, to have been an

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American. We might like to believe that only our political enemies would engage in such skullduggery but, if we may judge from the East German press and theater magazines, our political enemies are equally convinced that we are the real culprits in this respect. Read, for instance, the complaint of the East Berlin critic Georg Honigmann, writing about a West Berlin production of Schiller's classic *Don Carlos:* "Schiller falsified and twisted around, great German poetry degraded into an American pot-boiler." [6] And one often finds themes that are currently unacceptable from a political point of view—such as anti-Semitic remarks in plays by Shakespeare and Schiller—toned down or even cut from West Berlin productions. Without collating the scores, texts, costuming, and staging of operas and plays performed in both East and West Berlin, however, it would be difficult to determine the precise extent to which these works of art are politicized in the East or West.

Another, and far simpler, means to give political orientation to the theater is to dictate the selection of plays to be performed. In a series of interviews with responsible theater officials east and west of the Brandenburg Gate, I tried to find out the extent to which such direction occurs. Curiously enough—or perhaps it is not so curious after all—the replies that I got were almost identical in every respect. "Theater is politically directed in the other side of the city," so the argument ran,

> but we are completely free in our own selection of works. Theater directors over there are forced, if not by legal means then through strong extra-legal pressures, into selecting a repertory that is politically acceptable to the state; if they were to perform something objectionable they might be thrown into jail or forced to flee. We in our half of the city follow only our consciences and philosophies of life in the selection of plays to be performed. It is merely coincidental that the disposition of our government (which favors politically unfettered drama) corresponds with our own attitude.

What would happen if conscience dictated the selection of

[6] "Schiller verfälscht und umgedeutet, eine grosse deutsche Dichtung zum amerikanischen Boulevard-Kabarett degradiert." *Berliner Zeitung,* December 9, 1950. Honigmann interpreted each "boo" and whistle from the displeased West Berlin audience as a cry of "Ami, go home!"

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a piece antagonistic to the state, a piece perhaps by a writer from the other half of the city? The typical response was: "But that just would not happen. Our audiences are not interested in such plays. They would either laugh us off the stage or kill us financially by staying at home. Besides, such plays do not fit into our philosophical attitude. Hence the problem of opposition to the state simply would not occur."

Such attitudes on the part of theater directors in East and West Berlin are without doubt sincere. And I would not suggest that they are mutually contradictory. Generally speaking, a person who is a member of a community knows its mores and customs, what he may or may not do (in a legal or non-legal sense), without having to be told. It is also to be expected that the person who feels himself to be a member of the community will internalize its demands, accepting the community's style and philosophy of life as guideposts for his own conduct.

Understanding why different criteria of selection prevail among theater directors in East and West hardly modifies the fact that most Westerners (or persons raised in a Western tradition, as a great majority of East Germans doubtless were) might find the political orientation of the theater in the East objectionable. And it is perfectly reasonable to assume that most East Germans willing to undertake a trip to West Berlin theaters were in a sense escaping from the East German style of political direction. Such an assumption may be reasonable, but is it true?

A simple and yet accurate way to answer this question would be to examine East German attendance patterns at West Berlin theaters. If we take as an operational test of a play's acceptability to the East German regime its performance or non-performance in one of the approximately seven dozen East German theaters during the years from 1948 to 1961,[7] then we may reword our asumption of the previous paragraph into an hypothesis to be confirmed or disconfirmed: East German visitors to West Berlin theaters attend plays that are not performed in East Germany. To test this hypothesis I examined the day-by-day box-office receipts[8]

[7] Whether or not a play was performed in the East was determined by the listings in the East German periodical *Theater der Zeit*.

[8] Box-office sales rather than total attendance was used so as to exclude

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of West Berlin's largest playhouse, the Schiller Theater, for the four seasons from September 1956 to June 1960.

Preliminary statistical analysis reveals that variables other than a play's performance or non-performance in the East were more important in explaining East German attendance patterns. Of four possible explanatory variables—performance versus non-performance in the East, the more serious versus the lighter nature of the play, its period (for instance, classical Greek or modern American), and its general popularity at the Schiller Theater—it is the fourth that seems to have been the most significant. The East German was more likely to come to the West, not to see plays that were kept off the stages in the East, but to see performances that were also popular among West Berliners. It would seem, then, that the East German playgoer in West Berlin did not differ significantly from his West Berlin counterpart. If anything, assuming that a play's popularity rests in good part upon the quality of the production—there are good and bad performances of *Minna von Barnhelm* or *Hamlet*—the East German was slightly more interested in attending performances of quality than was the West Berliner.

Turning from the Schiller Theater itself to its experimental theater, the *Werkstattbühne,* created in the summer of 1959 by the actors' studio of the Schiller Theater to present some of the newer trends in world drama, we find another test of our hypothesis. During the 1959–60 season the *Werkstattbühne* presented sixty performances, with an average attendance of over 150 persons. The plays were from the "theater of the absurd": Edward Albee's *Zoo Story* and Samuel Beckett's *Krapp's Last Tape; Ten Minutes to Buffalo* by the young German Günter Grass; *The Terrible Temper of Philipp Hotz* by the Swiss playwright Max Frisch; Fernando Arabel's *Picnic in the Field;* and Federico Garcia Lorca's *The Miraculous Shoemaker's Wife.* During the following season the Workshop added *The Empire Builders* by Boris Vian, and an evening of nineteenth-century Berlin

members of West Berlin's theater club, the *Freie Volksbühne Berlin* (FVB), since the latter determines in large part the plays its members will attend. It is also important to note that the total number of East Germans purchasing tickets at the Schiller Theater declined from year to year: the share of box-office tickets sold to East Germans fell from slightly over ten per cent in 1956–57 to a bit more than one half that percentage in 1959–60. The following comments take these changes into account.

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olios (so popular that it was soon transferred to the larger stage of the Schlosspark Theater).

The East German theatergoer, besides being able to make use of the All-Berlin Cultural Program to buy his tickets for the Workshop, had opportunity enough to learn about its activities. As an adjunct of the Schiller Theater it is located in the same building and makes use of the same box-office and advance-sales facilities as the mother theater. The Workshop's plays are well reported in the programs of the Schiller Theater as well as in the West Berlin press. Since we might suppose that the East German willing to come to West Berlin to see a play or an opera would also have been likely to take an occasional peek at a West Berlin newspaper or West German theater publication, he hardly could have missed reading something of these plays. It should be noted, however, that it is equally likely that the East German who did not visit the West probably would have heard little about these works. The theater of the absurd, having little place in the Communist concept of culture—a party cultural conference in 1958 branded Beckett a "representative of decadence" [9]—has received few other than derogatory notices in the East German press.

An analysis of ticket sales for the Workshop also tends to disconfirm the hypothesis that East German visitors to West Berlin theaters attend plays that are not performed in East Germany. Of the 23,597 paying visitors to the Workshop during its first two years, only 886 (3.8 per cent) came from the East. During the 1959–60 season 4.9 per cent of the tickets were sold to East Germans, a proportion that fell to three per cent during the following season. By way of comparison, about thirteen per cent of the Schiller Theater's total ticket sales went to East Germans during these two seasons. If the Workshop did indeed represent a chance for East Germans to visit a theater unfettered by political chains, and I would suggest that it did, then it is clear that they failed to make use of their opportunity.

The attempt to make such opportunities available to East Germans, to turn the West Berlin theater into a cultural bridge between East and West, was not inexpensive. In the first place, of course, the subsidization of East German ticket

[9] *Theater der Zeit,* XIII (1958), 32.

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purchases was costly in an economic sense. Second, and far more important in my opinion, there were a number of psychological costs to bear.

ECONOMIC COSTS

It should be noted at the outset that, relative to theaters in the rest of Germany, the municipal theaters in West Berlin are expensive to operate. As may be seen in Table 1, the expenditures (excluding extraordinary costs) of the Schil-

TABLE 1

OPERATING EXPENSES OF MUNICIPAL THEATERS IN WEST BERLIN, HAMBURG, AND MUNICH, 1958

Theater	Perform-ances	Attend-ance	Expendi-tures	Exp. per Perform-ance	Exp. per Visitor
Schiller Theater (Bln)	378	359,689	DM 4,055,300	DM 10,728	DM 11.27
Neues Schauspielhaus (Hbg)	408	556,987	3,942,800	9,664	7.08
Kammerspiele (Mun)	414	262,440	2,848,100	6,879	10.85

Source: Municipal budgets of West Berlin, 1960, 1017–19; Hamburg, 1961–62, II, 198–201; and Munich, 1960, 101–03.

ler Theater per performance or per visitor in 1958 were higher than for either the Neues Schauspielhaus in Hamburg or the Kammerspiele in Munich. For the fiscal year 1958, the municipal theaters of West Berlin and Hamburg received the following subsidies for every ticket sold:

West Berlin		*Hamburg*	
Municipal Opera	DM 15.72	State Opera	DM 11.30
Schiller Theater	9.87	Neues Schauspielhaus	2.37
Schlosspark Theater	6.92	Thalia Kammerspiele	1.89
		Richard Ohnsorg Theater	.70

In part, the cost of subsidizing the theater in West Berlin is due to the extent to which the city contributes to a privately operated theater club, the *Freie Volksbühne Berlin* (FVB). This cost does not, however, take into account any losses incurred by selling tickets to East Germans at reduced prices.

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How expensive was the maintenance of the West Berlin theaters as a cultural bridge between East and West? If we assume that each ticket sold at the box office to an East German was a ticket that would have been purchased by a West Berliner if it had been available, then it is a simple matter to compute the financial loss due to the subsidization program. In the 1951–52 season, for example, sales of tickets to East Germans (at a price in Eastmarks or DME twice as high as the tickets' Westmark values) brought in DME 84,070 at the box office of the Schiller Theater. These same tickets, sold to West Berliners, would have brought in DMW 42,035. Since, at the rates of exchange then current, DME 84,070 was worth DMW 20,280, the loss to the Schiller Theater (or, more properly, to the West Berlin taxpayers) was DMW 21,755. During the five seasons from 1952–53 to 1956–57, when East Germans could purchase tickets at one half their Westmark value, the loss to the Schiller Theater amounted to DMW 148,242. The West German Federal Government, through the All-Berlin Cultural Program, covered a deficit of DMW 120,230 for East German ticket sales from 1957–58 to 1960–61. Thus East German ticket purchases at the box office of the Schiller Theater during the first decade of its existence represented a financial cost of DMW 290,227 (or approximately seventy thousand dollars).

To this sum must be added losses from tickets sold to East German members of West Berlin's theater club, the *Freie Volksbühne*. On the basis of figures published by the FVB as well as those made available by the municipal government, I would estimate that the net cost of such sales were DMW 894,986 from the 1951–52 to the 1960–61 season. During the first seven of these years the cost was borne in part by West Berlin members of the FVB, but primarily by the city government; after September 1958 FVB sales to East Germans were covered by the All-Berlin Cultural Program.

Similar calculations for the Municipal Opera, the Schlosspark Theater, and West Berlin's private theaters [10] (Table

[10] For box-office sales at the private theaters, only a rough estimate was possible. Information of this sort was not available at the private theaters in West Berlin at which I asked. My estimate of three per cent of total sales going to East German box-office purchases is doubtless on the conservative side. Even if it were only two per cent, however, the difference in the total estimate presented in Table 2 would be only DMW 654,000. I might note at

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2) reveal that the total cost of subsidizing East German ticket

TABLE 2
ESTIMATED COST OF SUBSIDIZING EAST GERMAN TICKET PURCHASES AT WEST BERLIN THEATERS, 1949–61
(in DMW 1,000)

Theater	Box-office Sales	Freie Volksbühne Sales	Total Sales
Schiller Theater	290	895	1,185
Werkstattbühne	3	....	3
Schlosspark Theater	184	476	660
Municipal Opera	476	1,247	1,723
Other theaters	1,963	2,950	4,913
Total	2,916	5,568	8,484

purchases at the municipal and private theaters in the years after the blockade was DMW 8,484,000 (or about two million dollars). Of this amount the West German government paid about thirty-seven per cent directly through the All-Berlin Cultural Program and an indeterminable amount indirectly through its general subsidies to the West Berlin government.

Such a figure doubtless overestimates the net cost of the subsidization program. It is difficult to know the extent to which East Germans purchased tickets that ordinarily would have been bought by West Berliners. FVB ticket sales pose no such problem since throughout most of this period the organization had a waiting list sufficiently long to replace any loss of East German members. Even if one half of the box-office tickets had gone unsold, however, reducing the net estimated cost to DMW 7,026,000 (or about $1.7 million), the price of supporting West Berlin's cultural bridge to the East was nonetheless a sizable sum.

Although sizable, the sum was clearly not prohibitive. For every man, woman, and child in West Berlin it amounted to eight cents per year—an amount that I am sure almost every West Berliner would have been willing to pay to facilitate the daily trek of almost one thousand of his compatriots in the East to the cultural blessings of the West Berlin stage.[11] From the theaters' point of view, not only did East

this point that, while the rest of the data in Table 2 are also estimated to some extent, I am confident that they are correct within one or two percentage points difference.

[11] This average is based on a total estimate of 302,000 East Berliners and East Germans attending West Berlin theaters in the 1960–61 season. For a

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Germans often purchase tickets that would otherwise have gone unsold, but their presence also gave the theaters a sense of mission in the cold war—a mission that hardly could have escaped mention when their budgets came up for municipal review and approval. Government officials undoubtedly felt that the subsidization program enhanced the likelihood of East-West contacts on terms favorable to the West. At the very least, such contacts provided added support for the West Berlin claim to federal assistance.

If West Berliners were generally agreed that almost any expense was justified if it brought East Germans to the western part of the city, there was much less agreement on the desirability of making cultural traffic reciprocal. Heated arguments in the cultural and political spheres of West Berlin together with the government's apparent ambivalence have provided perhaps the most marked aberration from the city's unified outlook in the years since the blockade.

PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS: A CULTURAL BRIDGE FOR ONE-WAY TRAFFIC ONLY?

The essence of these arguments was the role that the theater should play as a two-way bridge between East and West Berlin. In a sense West Berliners were being called upon to decide whether theirs should be an "open" or a "closed" society, whether they should welcome or resist a confrontation with the culture of an ideological opponent. It is in this sense that West Berlin's dilemma parallels that facing the entire Western world. Least of all in the United States have we decided upon a continuing and logically consistent policy toward cultural contacts with Russia and other members of the Soviet bloc. What sets West Berlin's dilemma off from ours, however, is the sense of immediacy deriving from proximity that is so prominent in the divided city.

At one extreme were those who argued that art is above politics, that West Berliners should do everything possible to break down the cultural barriers separating them from the East. "Just as the Red Cross helps and works independently of political borders during time of war," wrote one Berlin

much larger estimate (560,000) reported three days after the construction of the wall between East and West Berlin, see Wolf Jobst Siedler, "Im Kulturellen kann die Spaltung verhindert werden," *Der Tagesspiegel*, August 16, 1961. Nowhere else have I seen an estimate this high.

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newspaper, "so too should the media of art." [12] Political reconciliation, the argument continued, will follow cultural reconciliation. Since we in the West are firm in our belief that the truth and beauty of our art will eventually win out in the minds of men over the distorted images presented in the East, we should welcome the confrontation of East and West provided by Berlin's peculiar position. Above all we must not stoop to the methods that the Communists use to prevent cultural contacts. If we were to do that, we would only be disfiguring the essential truth and beauty of our art. As one of postwar Berlin's most prominent critics, Friedrich Luft, wrote early in 1949, "our efforts should be directed, not toward sealing off West Berlin, but toward making cultural life in our own house so fruitful, genuinely free, and exemplary that its rays will shine deep inside the surrounding Soviet Zone." [13]

Not quite so extreme was the alternative suggestion that the East has something of real value—plays by Bertolt Brecht, for example, or the artistry of some of Germany's best performers—to offer to West Berliners. The West Berliner who refuses to partake of such cultural opportunities is merely cutting off his nose to spite his face. An unfortunate if possibly inevitable measure of opportunism, however, stemming from Berlin's currency exchange position, often marred the neatness of this argument. By exchanging his Westmarks for Eastmarks at the rate of about one to four in West Berlin, the resident of the West could afford much better tickets at East Berlin theaters than he could at home. The Westmarks that could purchase a ticket in the Schiller Theater's second balcony could purchase a ticket for a first-row seat in East Berlin's Theater am Schiffbauerdamm. The West Berliner with his cheap Eastmarks could also afford cake and champagne at the buffet counter of East Berlin theaters for what a bottle of beer would cost him at theaters in the West. For West Berliners who felt that Schiller or Wagner performances in East and West were like Gertrude Stein's roses, the temptation of lavish performances at cheap prices in the East was great. Those who argued that the East Berlin theater

[12] *Der Tag*, quoted in "Geistige Einheit," *Der Tagesspiegel*, March 24, 1949.

[13] Friedrich Luft, "Das schwarze Tuch vor den Augen," *Die neue Zeitung* (Berlin edition), February 25, 1949.

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has something to offer to Westerners might well have added that such performances were better than none at all.

At the other extreme was the argument, based on the idea that art has become a political weapon in the cold war, that the West should discourage its citizens from exposing themselves to or supporting the "enemy's" artillery. This argument actually took place on two levels. The first level was that of the fearful ideologue: exposure may lead to conviction. Such an anxiety evidenced distrust in the strength of character or conviction of the common people on "our" side—a distrust perhaps justified in the light of Germany's most recent history—or fear that the messages communicated by the "other" side were plausible (and possibly even truthful) enough to strike a responsive chord in the mind of any reasonable man. The second level was that of the cold war politician. On the one hand he was unwilling to give aid and support to the enemy by subsidizing the latter's operations. When a West Berliner bought a ticket to the State Opera in East Berlin and, perhaps, a sandwich or two during intermission, he was indirectly contributing to the continuation of the Communist regime in East Germany. If all visitors from West Berlin had stayed away from the East, it was suggested, theatrical troupes in that part of the city would have played before half-empty houses and would have collapsed financially. (That there was considerable truth to this belief was clear when purely propaganda pieces were on the boards and the absence of Westerners other than the curious depopulated the theaters.) On the other hand there was the simple principle of political reciprocity. After all, went the argument, it was the East that began restricting artistic freedom in Berlin and trying to keep its citizens from theaters in the West. Only retaliation in kind could meet such a challenge.

That East German behavior lay at the root of the political and cultural dilemma facing West Berliners is a fact at once true and beside the point. It is true, at least in the eyes of West Berliners, because the Communist government in East Germany from its inception deliberately set about to build a politicized theater—one that would serve and be responsive to the interests of the "working class," that is, the Communist ideology. If this meant selecting appropriate plays and

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operas and rewriting others, it also meant a policy limiting the access of East Germans to the Western stage. It was the East (that is, the Soviet Military Government) that caused the collapse of early postwar efforts to reconstruct Berlin's theater club. It was the East whose policies were primarily responsible for the division of Berlin in 1948. It was the East that prohibited theaters in West Berlin from advertising or selling tickets in the East, that excluded newspapers bearing advertisements and critical notices, that began to harass those of its citizens who had too many contacts with the other side of the city.[14]

To say that East German behavior was solely at fault, however, is to miss the essential point of the dilemma. It was not at all obvious to West Berliners that their theater, too, was politicized. The task of Western theater officials in the early postwar years was, after all, relatively uncomplicated: To re-establish the theater of the Weimar era. The assumptions about art, life, and politics upon which this effort rested remained for the most part unexamined. Indeed they were so basic to a traditional German conception of the theater that to most West Berliners they must have appeared self-evident, not a subject for serious discussion. It is exceedingly doubtful that many West Berliners consciously considered the essentially political character of their "nonpolitical" stage, nor the role that it has played and continues to play in perpetuating a society steeped in the liberal democratic tradition of the West.

In setting about to create a socialist society and a socialist theater, the East Germans explicitly rejected these "bourgeois" assumptions. Their task—to re-educate the East German population to accept this new way of life—was truly overwhelming. Half-measures would not achieve the desired results. Bold and sometimes ruthless action was needed. Given their objectives, the fact that the East Germans pursued the policies they did is understandable—even if we disapprove of both the objectives and the policies.

[14] For lively accounts of these events by prominent participants, see Siegfried Nestriepke, *Neues Beginnen: Die Geschichte der Freien Volksbühne Berlin, 1946 bis 1955* (Berlin-Grunewald, 1956), and Arno Scholz, *Berlin im Würgegriff* (Berlin-Grunewald, 1953). For an account of a more recent incident of this sort, see "Germanys Split on Shakespeare," New York *Times*, January 11, 1964.

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However legitimate the policies may have been in an East German frame of reference, West Berliners perceived them to be illegitimate. To them the East German stage was tendentious. It might more accurately be said that the perceived politics of the East German theater were incompatible with the implicit political outlook prevailing in the West.

The dilemma facing West Berliners centered on ways of meeting the challenge posed by "aberrant" East German behavior. One view was permissive—perhaps too much so given the circumstances. The other was tough—a toughness that verged on rigidity. The lines of battle formed early in the postwar period and, by the time of the blockade winter of 1948–49, solidified. The course of West Berlin's cultural policy during the ensuing years, vacillating as it did between the two polar positions, proved to be one of the more divisive factors in the fabric of the city's society.

The city officially maintained the position that West Berliners had free access to the art of the East. No restrictions were placed upon the purchase of Eastmarks by West Berliners; no police checks restricted intra-city travel on the subway or elevated railroad lines; no government-sponsored propaganda campaigns urged the people of West Berlin to stay away from theaters in the East. At the same time, however, the city did attempt to diminish the likelihood of communication between the East Berlin stage and West Berlin theater fans. In January of 1949 the British Military Government refused to permit a singer from the East Berlin State Opera to appear in its sector and shortly thereafter prohibited the exhibition of Soviet-licensed films,[15] a policy soon followed in the American and French sectors of Berlin. The sale of East German newspapers was halted. In March of 1949 came an order from the municipal government forbidding the city-owned billboard agency (BEREK) from accepting advertisements from the East.[16] By the end of that year the sale of tickets to East German events was prohibited in West Berlin.[17] The city's government has maintained these

[15] *Der Tagesspiegel,* January 16, 1949, and *Die neue Zeitung* (Berlin edition), March 16, 1949.

[16] "Gegen kommunistische Reklame in Westberlin," *Der Tagesspiegel,* February 18, 1949; "Keine kommunistische Reklame mehr," *ibid.,* March 30, 1949.

[17] In April 1957 a promoter who used West Berlin newspapers to advertise the sale of tickets for an East Berlin performance of the violinists David and

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policies down to the present day.

The Western press was no less important than administrative measures in limiting the amount of information about artistic activity in the East that was available to West Berliners. The conservative *Tagesspiegel* set the pace. Calling upon "every Berliner, whether artist or not, to opt either for the East or for the West and to bear the consequences, now and in the future," [18] the *Tagesspiegel* instituted a virtual blackout of news about the East Berlin stage as early as December 1948. Some newspapers hesitated, publishing arguments pro and con the usefulness of such a boycott. During the course of the next two years, however, one journal after another stopped listing the programs of East Berlin theaters, radio stations, and movie houses, stopped carrying their advertisements, stopped publishing critical notices of their performances. All that remained was to chronicle the misfortunes and skullduggery of the East Berlin stage. While it is true that occasional reviews of the more outstanding productions appear in the press even today, the only public places in West Berlin advertising performances in the East are the Eastern-owned elevated railway stations. (A few privately-operated organizations such as the student ticket agency of West Berlin's Free University also continue to display some notices.)

ARTISTS IN A DIVIDED CITY

Two aspects of the dilemma of politics and culture in West Berlin proved to be particularly thorny. The first of these centered on artistic personnel: Should actors and singers who were active in East Germany be permitted to work in West Berlin also? Should West Berlin performers be permitted to make appearances in the East? What was perhaps the opening shot in this battle came in October 1948 when the American Military Government barred the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra from performing on an East Berlin radio program.[19] In spite of continued agitation by the editors of

Igor Oistrakh (although without giving the place of the performance) was fined DMW 500. E.M., "Trojanische Paradepferde," *Der Tagesspiegel*, April 9, 1957; "Geldbusse wegen unerlaubten Kartenverkauf," *ibid.*, April 11, 1957.

[18] "Die öffentliche Meinung," *Die Tagesspiegel*, December 24, 1948; appeals for a boycott appeared in *ibid.*, December 7, 1948, and December 15, 1948.

[19] "Propaganda ohne Musik," *Der Tagesspiegel*, October 9, 1948. Editori-

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Tagesspiegel and other West Berlin leaders, a number of actors and singers continued to keep engagements in both East and West for another two years. A journalist from the West German city of Wuppertal, describing Berlin theater life in May 1950, wrote that "there is hardly a single first-class name that is not to be found in the programs now in the West, now in the East." [20] But sentiments against this "doubletracking" were mounting. At a membership meeting of the *Freie Volksbühne* in June 1950, Senator Joachim Tiburtius, in charge of West Berlin's educational and cultural policies, noted that he generally opposed hiring actors and singers who have contracts in the East. Tiburtius added, however, that budgetary considerations sometimes made such arrangements necessary.[21]

Not until the following year did West Berlin's government take a firm position. In April 1951, when the general manager of the Hebbel Theater, Boleslav Barlog, dismissed some of his West Berlin technicians and replaced them with East Berliners, the public outcry was great. "Of course we do not want to see the cultural mission of the theater hemmed in by political fences," wrote the Berliner *Montagsecho;* "but in Berlin things are different from elsewhere. Here not even a general manager can be without a feel for politics." [22] The West Berlin House of Representatives took Barlog to task shortly thereafter,[23] and the barrage continued until October when, at a press conference, Barlog declared his intention not to employ technicians or performers who were also employed in the East.[24] A few weeks later Senator Tiburtius

ally the *Tagesspiegel* applauded the move, but added its wish that the members of the orchestra itself rather than the occupation authorities had forced the cancellation of the performance.

20 G.O., "Theater auf der anderen Seite," *General-anzeiger der Stadt Wuppertal,* May 5, 1950.

21 "Niederschrift über die Hauptversammlung der FVB am 4. Juni 1950," typescript, p. 5; I am indebted to the director of the FVB, Mr. Karl Hans Bergmann, for permission to read these reports. The FVB meeting adopted a resolution recording its position against such "doubletracking"; see Nestriepke, 135.

22 "Sauberkeit hinter den Kulissen," *Berliner Montagsecho,* April 9, 1951. "We cannot afford political extravagance," the newspaper added.

23 This debate took place on April 19, 1951. *Stenographische Berichte des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin* (Berlin, 1951), 1st electoral period, 1st session, I, 225–30.

24 W[althe r] K[arsch], "Notwendige Entscheidungen," *Der Tagesspiegel,* Oc-

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enunciated the West Berlin Senate's position: "From now on no artist employed at a West Berlin establishment may enter into a permanent working arrangement in the East." [25]

During the next decade the city combined with the theaters to enforce this decision. In January 1952, against the express warning of Barlog (by this time general manager of the newly-opened Schiller Theater), the actress Helene Riechers took a leading part in a Communist-sponsored cultural conference in East Berlin, only to have her contract at the Schiller Theater terminated.[26] Three of postwar Germany's most outstanding singers, Rudolf Schock, Margarete Klose, and Josef Herrman, met similar treatment when they signed contracts with East German companies in 1954.[27] An exception to the general rule was made only in the case of emergencies such as, for example, the sudden illness of a performer. But even in the exceptional cases there was a remarkable trend: during the year 1950, of the singers that appeared as guests at the Municipal Opera, thirty-one per cent were located permanently in East Germany (Dresden and Leipzig), another thirty-one per cent in East Berlin, and the remainder in West Germany or foreign countries in the West; during the 1959–60 season, none of the guests came from East Germany, only one (0.7 per cent) from East Berlin, and the remainder from the West.[28]

Digressing for a moment, I might note that East Berlin authorities faced an entirely different sort of personnel problem. To retain stage technicians, actors, and even directors

tober 25, 1951. In response to Barlog's contention that he did not perform a political function, Karsch wrote: "Whether he wants it so or not, his work is a part of our defensive battle against the East."

25 "Die Oper muss sparen: Kein Westkünstler mehr im Osten," *Der Tag*, November 13, 1951. As will be noted later, exceptions in the cases of extreme emergencies were to be permitted.

26 "Vertrauensbruch gegen den Senat: 'Unpolitische' Künstler und das SEP-Kulturtreffen," *Spandauer Volksblatt*, February 3, 1952.

27 "Tür zu für Rudolf Schock," *Der Telegraf*, January 6, 1955. The same restrictions were applied to Helmut Melchert of Hamburg and Josef Metternich of Munich and Hamburg. In a press conference Senator Tiburtius enunciated the official position of the city administration: "Singers are also citizens." Schock, by the way, was later reinstated as a member of West Berlin's Municipal Opera.

28 The term "guests" includes both scheduled and emergency guest singers. I am indebted to Miss Christa Hoffmann of the Deutsche Oper Berlin for assistance in locating this information.

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who lived in West Berlin, it was necessary to provide at least a part of their salaries in expensive Westmarks or to institute other forms of compensation (such as special coal and food rations during the blockade, or honorary degrees and awards). Periodically, as sufficient newly-trained East German technicians moved into the labor market, West Berliners were dismissed en masse. Occasionally, however, individual general managers were important enough in their own right or because of their political connections to resist governmental attempts to dictate employment policies.[29] Artistic personnel was another question. Even if the East Berlin theaters could train politically acceptable technicians, they continued to rely upon performers who lived in West Berlin, in some cases down to the present day. Prior to August 1961, almost one half of all theatrical and musical ensembles lived in the West. Replacing those that terminated their contracts after the construction of the wall on August 13—at least seventy-five per cent of the thousand West Berlin artists working in the East, and including some of the most prominent stars appearing on the East Berlin stage—proved to be a difficult task for East German authorities. In some cases the opening of the season was delayed for weeks; in others programs were changed to accommodate remaining personnel, or singers and other performers were hired away from other Soviet bloc states.[30]

MISSIONARY WORK IN THE WEST

The second problem of note arising from the cultural and political dilemma in West Berlin pertained to the city's relations with West Germany: How could West Berliners persuade West Germans to adopt the policies toward cultural contacts pursued by their city? The problem arose during

[29] This was particularly the case with Walter Felsenstein of the Komische Oper; in fact he was even able to insist upon this point after August 1961. See [Günther Matjthes, "Nur bei Felsenstein singen noch West-Berliner," *Der Tagesspiegel*, August 29, 1962. Less important personages, such as Fritz Wisten, could not exert such pressures. In August 1952, when he was general manager of the Theater am Schiffbauerdamm, the East German Communist party (SED) forced him to withdraw a complaint about the dismissal of his West Berlin employees by giving him the alternative (in effect) of resigning his post. "Protest wieder zurückgezogen," *Die neue Zeitung* (Berlin edition), August 21, 1952.

[30] *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 7, 1961; September 8, 1961; September 10, 1961; September 16, 1961; October 6, 1961; October 12, 1961; February 2, 1962; August 29, 1962; and New York *Times*, October 3, 1961.

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the blockade. West Berliners, whose daily struggle against Communist encirclement was relieved only by the American-British airlift, found it difficult to comprehend the permission given the East Berlin Deutsches Theater to tour in the British zone of West Germany. Apparently in response to heavy protests in the West Berlin press, the British found a way to cancel the trip.[31] Similar incidents occurred time and again during the ensuing years: in August 1949 when Thomas Mann accepted the East German Goethe Prize; in the same month when Wolfgang Langhoff and his [East] Berliner Ensemble were invited to perform as guests in Bonn; in January 1957 when the Deutsches Theater of Göttingen elected the late Eduard von Winterstein of the Deutsches Theater in East Berlin an honorary member of its ensemble; and still more recently in the nationwide debate on whether or not plays by Bertolt Brecht should be performed in West Germany and West Berlin.[32] As with many other cold war issues, proximity to the Communists in Berlin has produced a tough policy in which the more distant and less concerned West Germans do not concur. It is not difficult to understand why such issues have become a major stumbling bloc to the formation of firm ties of community between the island-city and West Germany.

THE BRIDGE TO THE WEST

The success of West Berlin's cultural bridge to the East in the years between the blockade and the wall was at best mixed. On the one hand it did enable the maintenance of some degree of contact between East Germans and West Berliners. Every day during the last season in which it was possible, an average of one thousand East Germans crossed the teutonic version of the Iron Curtain to attend plays and operas in West Berlin. On the other hand, however, the fact that, with the passage of time, a declining number of East Germans crossed this cultural bridge is inescapable. Nor does it seem that those who did visit the West Berlin stage

[31] *Der Tag,* April 14 and 21, 1949.

[32] See, for example, Walther Karsch, "Warum man Brecht nicht spielen soll," *Der Tagesspiegel,* September 3, 1961; Friedrich Torberg, "Soll man heute Brecht spielen?" *Der Monat,* XIV (1961), 56–62; and Joachim Kaiser's response to Torberg's article, *ibid.,* XIV (1962), 60–64.

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were overly anxious to see works that were, for political or other reasons, not performed in their homeland. Moreover, maintaining West Berlin's cultural bridge was expensive, in terms of both monetary costs and the psychological costs of ambivalence, conflicting ideas of purposes and methods, and resentment toward those outside West Berlin who refused to go along with the city's policies.

Ulbricht's wall, of course, caused an abrupt change in West Berlin's cultural policy toward the East. If on the one hand it eliminated the need to subsidize theater tickets for East Germans as well as the need to worry about West Berliners visiting theaters in the East, on the other hand it also eliminated one of West Berlin's main *raisons d'être*—its function as a bridge, cultural or otherwise, between East and West.

The city's cultural and political leaders were quick to point to the potential of radio and television as means to maintain some form of contact. For a time there was considerable discussion of this idea in the press; and the American government went so far as to contribute an extra three hundred thousand dollars to the American-operated Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) for the purpose of broadcasting more plays and possibly even films.[33] East German authorities considered the potential effects of such programs threatening enough to undertake a concerted campaign against those of its citizens who tuned their radios and television sets to Western stations. But it is doubtful, even if sufficient resources were available, whether these media could adequately fill the part played by the theaters in years past.

Except for limited changes in radio and television programming, however, West Berlin has been able to do little in the last two years that could serve as a cultural bridge between East and West. For political reasons—overwhelmingly sound from the Western point of view, but nonetheless political—the city's officials have not sought to arrange any form of cultural exchange between the two halves of the city; nor does it appear likely that such exchanges will take place in the near future.[34]

[33] David Binder, "U.S. Berlin Radio Sharpens Service," New York *Times*, November 5, 1961; "Ätherwellen über die Mauer," *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 28, 1962.

[34] As late as May 1962 the Berlin Senate barred a pianist, Gerhard Puchelt, from appearing with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra because of an un-

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Instead, West Berlin seems to have embarked upon a new task, enhancing the city's importance to West Germany in an effort to strengthen the ties of community between them. The slogan "Berlin is worth a trip!" is not a new one. But the years since the wall have seen West Berlin's official and cultural leaders going to great lengths to encourage West Germans to visit their former capital city. As an example, special package plans (including airlines fare, hotel lodging, and a theater ticket) were offered to West Germans who wanted to see the first German production of the musical *My Fair Lady* in Berlin. The main thrust of this effort, however, has been aimed at the establishment of West Berlin as a cultural center for all of West Germany. Typical of the many proposals for accomplishing this end is that offered by Mayor Willy Brandt. In a letter to Federal Economics Minister (now Chancellor) Ludwig Erhard, Brandt proposed a five-point plan: the enlargement and extension of West Berlin's universities; the establishment of a national educational institute as well as an institute for training school engineers; the creation of centers for cultural and administrative assistance to developing countries; federal aid to further the arts in West Berlin; and the establishment of a UNESCO-sponsored international center for scientific documentation.[35] By the summer of 1963 some of these proposals had reached the action stage.

Their bridge to the East replaced by Ulbricht's wall of concrete and barbed wire, West Berliners are seeking to strengthen their bridge to the West. The success of their efforts rests upon a number of factors, not the least of which are future changes in Berlin's position between the Soviet Union and the United States, the continued willingness of the West German government to provide heavy subsidies to

authorized tour through the Soviet Union in January of that year. "Philharmonische 'Sperre' für Gerhard Puchelt," *Der Tagesspiegel,* May 1, 1962.

[35] "Berlins 5-Punkte-Kultur-Programm," *Der Tagesspiegel,* April 5, 1962. The number of such proposals is a tribute to the fertility of the West Berliners' imaginations; some of them, however, seem less concerned with creating a cultural center in West Berlin than with salvaging at least a part of the federal monies formerly used to finance the All-Berlin Cultural Program. See Claus Zoege von Manteuffel, "Umstrittenes Kulturzentrum," *ibid.,* April 4, 1962; and Uwe Schlicht, "Die Zukunft der Berliner Universitäten," *ibid.,* June 28, 1962.

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the island-city, and the continued desire on the part of West Berliners themselves to keep their metropolis alive and a part of the world's political and cultural scene.

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ADAMS, BURKE, AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSERVATISM *

SCHOLARS writing about conservative political thought generally label John Adams as the intellectual father of *American* conservatism. Many of these same writers also indicate that the father of *all* conservative political thought is Edmund Burke. They view Burke and Adams as English and American equivalents, with Burke usually given greater credit for perceptiveness and originality.

Comparative statements about the thought of Burke and Adams are strangely ambivalent, however. Within the same book a student of conservative thought may say at one place that Burke and Adams are virtually identical in thought and at another place he may caution that Adams is in some important ways different from Burke. These contradictory statements are never reconciled and only the slightest hints are offered to explain how both statements could be true.

Clinton Rossiter, for example, in his *Conservatism in America,* includes at least half a dozen passages indicating that Burke and Adams are the twin fathers of modern (that is, post-French Revolutionary) conservative thought and that their principles can be viewed as forming the basis for a single body of political thought.[1] But at four other places Rossiter indicates that Burke and Adams produced some different ideas. Two statements are particularly striking:

> For all his talk about aristocracy and inequality, John Adams was John Adams and not Edmund Burke. The town meetings, schools, farms, and churches of New England—not the monarchy, peerage, estates, and Church of Old England—were the institutional base on which he built his theory. . . . The philosophical similarities between men like Burke and Adams . . . cannot be ignored, but we would deceive ourselves badly if we were to insist on an identity of faith and purpose. . . .

* The author is grateful to Professor Charles S. Hyneman of Indiana University, Professor Louis Hartz of Harvard University, and Professor J. David Greenstone of the University of Chicago for reading and criticizing earlier drafts of this article.

1 Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1955), 16, 24, 55, 163, 187, 211.

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> The new conservatism will trace its intellectual lineage to Adams rather than Burke; it will be conservative without being Conservative.[2]

Rossiter is here suggesting that Adams is not a Burkean Conservative and that the reason is that Adams was dealing with an American society far different from English society. Unfortunately, even in Rossiter's own book this perception is not elaborated and is coexistent with passages holding Burke and Adams to be the twin fountains and pillars of conservative political thought. Other writers have insisted on an almost complete "identity of faith and purpose" despite Rossiter's warning.

Russell Kirk is the most persistent in viewing Burke and Adams as virtually identical. He says that "Burke's is the true school of conservative principle" and then labels Adams as "the founder of true conservatism in America." To clinch this general linking of the two men Kirk concludes that "indeed it is difficult to draw any clear line of demarcation between the ideas of the Whig and of the Federalist." The only differences he notes are Adams' lack of attachment to the English crown or to an established church. He further says that "These two great conservatives occupy common ground, but they press their separate assaults against radicalism with different weapons." [3]

Peter Viereck also suggests that Adams is undifferentiated from Burke when he calls Adams' *Defence of the Constitutions* a masterpiece of "Burkean conservatism." Viereck realizes, however, that in the definition and treatment of the "aristocracy" Adams is working with different social material than Burke.[4]

In short, the leading literature on conservative thought in England and America contains a mixture of contradictory statements about the intellectual differences and similarities between Edmund Burke and John Adams. The thesis of

[2] *Ibid.*, 129, 300. He makes the same points on pp. 215 and 250, where he says: "The task of the Right is to produce a political theory that is both conservative and American. This task will take some doing. It calls for creation and integration, not imitation; it calls for a discriminating revival of Adams, Calhoun, and the conservative Lincoln, not a wholesale importation of Burke or de Maistre."

[3] Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953), 5, 62, 77.

[4] Peter Viereck, *Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill* (Princeton, 1956), 88, 20–21.

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this article is that this literature has caught some of the similarity in *temperament* between the two men, but that it has missed the real differences in their *thought* because it has not examined in enough detail the two societies in which the men lived and wrote.

This article will attempt to expand both perceptions of the writers on conservatism: the perception of similar temperament and especially the truncated perception of the relations between social facts and political conclusions. In elaborating the second point no deterministic theory is espoused. It is not suggested that the differences between English and American society in the late eighteenth century *caused* differences in the thought of the two men. The central argument will be that the differences in social and political structure which the two men analyzed tended to lead them to different conclusions. Adams, in order to be relevant to American society, spoke in terms which the Liberal or *philosophe* of the eighteenth century would understand and of which, in general, he would approve. Burke, on the other hand, abhorred concessions to Liberal or *philosophe* principles.[5]

What follows will first examine those aspects of thought of Burke and Adams which show similarity of temperament —their thought on the American and French Revolutions. Even in this area there were crucial differences in approach. Second, a summary view of American and English society and politics during the last part of the eighteenth century will be presented. Third, the thought of the two men about their own societies will be compared. Finally, there will be a short summary.

I

The most significant areas of political agreement between Burke and Adams concerned the American and French Rev-

[5] A new book on John Adams presents a thesis related to the one presented here. Edward Handler, in *America and Europe in the Political Thought of John Adams* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), argues that Adams interpreted American society in European terms and viewed Europe in the light of the American experience. Thus Handler stresses the misunderstandings which he feels plagued Adams' thought. In this article I am stressing political elements which I feel Adams understood quite well. Handler also takes the position that Adams certainly is not an "American Burke." See 26–27, 48–49, 157–59.

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olutions. Temperamental similarities in the outlooks of the two men are illuminated by studying their reactions to these political situations. Intellectual differences are highlighted by studying the thought of the men about the situations.

Adams and Burke agreed on the wrongness of the English impositions on the American colonies after 1763. They both appealed to the English constitution, although in different ways, to show that the colonies' long-established rights were being violated by the activities of the British government. Both men were sensitive to cavalier treatment of long-established rights. Both concluded that long-standing policies on the rights of the colonies should not be arbitrarily overthrown.

But Burke and Adams also disagreed about the American Revolution. The appeal in Burke's American speeches and the *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol* was based on expediency. He wanted no abstract speculation on what was right or wrong; he merely wanted to know what practical measures would reconcile Britain and the American colonies. He urged the prudent course upon his country. Adams, on the other hand, was interested in rigid constitutional morality. He felt the Stamp Act was wrong because it was unconstitutional, not because it was merely an inexpedient assertion of power on the part of Parliament. He consistently talked about "grand and fundamental principles of the constitution," [6] and he made it clear that questions of right and wrong must be referred to these grand principles for final judgment.

In his arguments on the American question, Burke made an appeal to blind tradition. Because Parliament had always treated the colonies in a certain way it should continue to do so. Burke doubted "the wisdom of human contrivances" in dealing with the thirteen colonies. "A profound reverence for the wisdom of our ancestors" would solve the trouble with the colonies and nothing else would serve as well. In the seventeen-seventies, as well as later, Burke had no patience with "metaphysical speculations." [7] But Adams, Otis,

[6] John Adams, *Instructions of the Town of Braintree to Their Representative,* quoted in Gilbert Chinard, *Honest John Adams* (Boston, 1933), 51–52.

[7] Edmund Burke, *Speech on Conciliation with America,* in E. J. Payne (ed.), *Burke: Select Works* (London, 1881), I, 176, 201, 223.

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and the Americans in general were interested in these same metaphysical speculations which Burke condemned. Burke contended that the bulk of mankind "are not excessively curious concerning any theories whilst they are really happy. . . . "[8] But the Americans were not happy and were extremely interested in theories, as witness their favorable reception of the speculations of Adams and Otis. In the summer of 1775 Adams wrote to Warren saying that the colonists must model a constitution for the whole continent.[9] Adams, in short, viewed the struggle with Britain as susceptible to rational theoretical analysis.

Burke's and Adams' similar temperaments are highlighted by a survey of their reactions to the French Revolution. Adams, from the first, distrusted the Revolution. He later wrote one of his Dutch friends that it was he, Adams, who had converted Burke, in 1786, from being happy about the prospect of revolution in France to being terrified by it.[10] Superficially, the sweeping pronouncements against the Revolution by Burke and Adams are identical. Burke described the Revolution as "an irrational, unprincipled, proscribing, confiscating, plundering, ferocious, bloody, and tyrannical democracy." [11] Adams spoke about the Revolutionary slogans as being "a chimera" and "a swindle." [12] He called the Revolution one of the "Epidemical or Endemical Distempers to which Man kind are liable" and a "Crisis of this fever in human Nature." [13] Burke damned the Revolution as "a foul, impious, monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral nature." [14] Adams admitted that he did not know

8 Burke, *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol,* in F. G. Selby (ed.), *Burke's Speeches* (London, 1917), 169.

9 Letter of July 24, 1775, cited in Chinard, 85. Adams' *Thoughts on Government,* written in early 1776, gives further indication that he was in a planning and constitution-making mood.

10 Adams to Adrian Van Der Kemp, July 5, 1814, in Joseph Charles, "Adams and Jefferson: The Origins of the American Party System," *William and Mary Quarterly,* XII (1955), 424–25.

11 Burke, quoted in Zoltan Haraszti, *John Adams and the Prophets of Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 20.

12 Adams, quoted in Haraszti, 45.

13 Adams to Jefferson, Nov. 4, 1816, and Nov. 21, 1794, in Lester J. Cappon (ed.), *The Adams-Jefferson Letters* (Chapel Hill, 1959), 494, 256.

14 Burke, quoted in Charles Parkin, *The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought* (Cambridge, 1956), 95.

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"what to make of a republic of thirty million atheists." When Louis XVI was executed, he asked, "When will these savages be satiated with blood?" [15] Both men strongly attacked the *philosophes*. Adams, for example, charged Helvetius and Rousseau with teaching the French nation "liberty, till they made them the most mechanical slaves; equality till they destroyed all equality; humanity till they became weasels, and African panthers; and fraternity till they cut one another's throats like Roman gladiators." [16]

Despite similar instinctive hatred of the Revolution, Adams and Burke actually condemned the Revolution on different grounds. Adams, after all, wrote a letter to Richard Price praising the same sermon which had occasioned Burke's writing of the *Reflections*.[17] Adams opposed the *philosophes* and the Revolutionists on *rational* grounds. Burke opposed them on *traditional* grounds.[18]

Burke condemned the Revolution because it shredded the past. He held that a balance in a constitution or in the society could never be built by a legislative body but that it must grow over a period of years. Adams also attacked the revolutionists for destroying a balance with their central-

[15] Adams, quoted in Charles D. Hazen, *Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution* (Baltimore, 1897), 266, 254.

[16] Adams, quoted in Adrienne Koch, "Hamilton, Adams and the Pursuit of Power," *Review of Politics*, XVI (1954), 62.

[17] Letter of April 19, 1790, in *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1850–56), IX, 563–64. Said Adams to Price: "Accept of my best thanks for your favor of February 1st, and the excellent discourse that came with it. I love the zeal and the spirit which dictated the discourse, and admire the general sentiments of it. From the year 1760 to this hour, the whole scope of my life has been to support such principles and propagate such sentiments."

[18] Jose Ortega y Gasset captured the essential difference between the traditionalist and the rationalist. "In the political world the traditionalist mind will be found living in respectful concurrence with what is already established, which, precisely because it is established possesses an invulnerable prestige . . . . The desire of the rationalist temperament is to mould the social body, at all costs, to the pentagraph of concepts framed by pure reason." J. Ortega y Gasset, in Michael Curtis, *The Nature of Politics* (New York, n.d.), 62–63.

The argument here is that Burke revered what was established in France. Adams did not like what was established either in France or in pre-Revolutionary America. He believed in the necessity of molding the political structure of a society. He further believed that careful planning of change could produce good results. In the case of France, Adams disliked only the *specific plans* of Turgot, Condorcet, and the rest; he did not question the planning process itself.

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ized, unicameral power. But Adams admitted that a properly constructed legislature could rationally build such a balance again. In an individualistic society, such as the United States was or such as the new France hopefully would be, such balances could be rationally constructed. Adams praised some of the observations of the *philosophes*. They were "totally ignorant of the science of government," [19] but ignorance was their big fault, not evil intention. Burke felt that the intentions of the *philosophes* were bad, and he insisted that there was no such thing as a rational science of government. In short, Adams attacked the *philosophes* and the revolutionists not for being rationalists but for being rationalists who had made bad and unworkable plans. Burke contended that the plans of any rationalist are, of necessity, bad and unworkable because rationalists do not realize that a social balance can come about only through historical growth. Adams wanted a true scientific balance and he disliked the French Revolution because it had resulted in unrealistic plans which ignored the need for balance. Burke thought the whole planning process itself necessarily evil in result.

Another difference between the views of the two men on the French Revolution can be seen in their attitudes toward the *ancien régime*. Burke gave extravagant praise to the monarchy, especially to the Queen. He gave only compliments to the French clergy and nobility. He recognized the similarity between the feudal or corporate parts of French and English society. He felt that the old regime was doing a good job in governing France, and as proof of this he cited the facts of French population and wealth. None of this praise is found in Adams' writings. He had no affection for traditional French society. Indeed, Adams saw himself so opposed to the old regime that he was afraid that the government of Louis XVI would prohibit Jefferson's proposed translation of Adams' *Defence* from being distributed in France.[20]

II

What was the social content of America and England

[19] Adams, quoted in Haraszti, 23.

[20] Adams to Jefferson, March 1, 1787, in Cappon, 177.

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which helped shape the political thought of Adams and Burke? Specifically, what differences existed between the two societies which might have led to differing political conclusions on the part of the two men? A new society was being built in America, whereas English society had been established for many hundreds of years. When the colonists came to the New World they brought many English institutions with them, but it was impossible to transfer the whole of British society to a new land. Conditions were far too different to allow this transfer to take place. Forms and institutions from the old society could be copied, but the content of the society could not be copied. Centrally, the English feudal corporate structure of society was not transferred to an America committed to individualism from the outset.[21] Thus both the class structures and the political institutions and practices of the two countries were significantly unlike in the late eighteenth century.

The general terminology for classes in both countries was the same, but the content of the classes themselves was not the same. A village base of society existed in both countries.[22] But in America, land was plentiful and relatively cheap and as a result the middle class was far bigger than the English middle class. Also the American "aristocracy" was far weaker than the English aristocracy and the middle class gained members from above as well as from below. Greater economic equality in America created greater social equality. What aristocracy did exist in the colonies developed independently of European origins for the most part, and the requirements for being an aristocrat varied from colony to colony.

Furthermore, even granting that some kinds of class lines did exist in America, the mobility of the American classes was far greater than in England. Class lines in England were less fluid than in America. The individual American, with

21 Both Louis Hartz and Samuel H. Beer have dealt with the difference between a corporate society and an individualistic society. See Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), and Beer, "The Representation of Interests in the British Government: Historical Background," *American Political Science Review*, LI (1957), 613–50.

22 For data on the agricultural village base of both societies, see Manning J. Dauer, *The Adams Federalists* (Baltimore, 1953), and W. T. Selley, *England in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1934).

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the exception of slaves, was not permanently situated at one level in the society; he was free to move up, or he could always be shoved lower. Thus former indentured servants could become wealthy merchants, and decaying landed families could become an impoverished section of the middle class. There was no need to abolish formal class distinctions in America because the distinctions meant relatively little in an individualistic context. In England, class distinctions were kept precisely because they meant so much in the corporate framework.

Class in the individualistic America of Adams had meaning only in local terms, whereas class in the corporate England of Burke had nationwide meaning. A farmer in New York might recognize the Dutch patroons in the Hudson valley as aristocracy and a back country farmer in Virginia might recognize the tidewater planters as aristocracy. The patroon, however, would have no meaning for either of the Virginians, and the tidewater planter would have no meaning for either of the New Yorkers. And a Boston merchant as an "aristocrat" would mean nothing to any of them. In England a landed aristocrat was the only type of aristocrat. A member of the landed gentry from Cornwall would be recognized as a true representative of his class both by his aristocratic brothers and by the agricultural laborers in Yorkshire. The word aristocracy had identical meaning to all classes in England, but in America the word aristocracy had meaning only within particular colonies or within particular regional groupings of colonies.

These general social conditions produced specific political differences. Both in the colonies and in the newly-created states, politics varied greatly from English politics of the same period. For example, the concept of the representative in America was strikingly opposed to the English concept. That the representative was the personal deputy of the voters in his constituency was the American view. Voters and candidates alike usually had to live in their own particular district. In England, of course, neither voters nor candidates had to live in a given district. In England a candidate represented the whole nation in theory and a single class in practice, and in both of these situations it did not make any difference where the elector or elected lived. But in America,

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local interests and local classes were predominant. Representatives, therefore, were answerable to geographically limited interests and classes.[23]

The structure of legislative bodies in the two countries differed. In England classes and corporations were represented, whereas in America classes and corporations were not built into the structure of the legislature. The English Parliament represented the counties, the boroughs, the cities, the universities, the Cinque Ports, the hereditary nobility, and the church. The American colonial and state assemblies represented the people in their territories without consideration, with few exceptions, of corporation or class. In Massachusetts, for example, Sam Adams and his Caucus Club could rise to effective power not because they represented a given corporation or class but mainly because they were skillful politicians operating in a partially friendly social context.

The power of the executive and of the upper house in Great Britain was greater than the power of the corresponding parts of the colonial or state governments. The colonial assembly early won the right to initiate legislation and to assent to revenue and spending laws. The story of the eighteenth-century colonial lower house was one of increasing powers. The same was partially true in England. But it is important to remember that the English House of Commons was almost completely controlled by the Peers of the Realm, whereas the American lower houses represented at least the upper half of the middle class. Furthermore, during the period from 1760 through 1782 George III was making a strong bid in England to recapture many of the powers of the crown which had been taken by Parliament under Anne and the first two Georges.

The franchise was accorded to a much broader section of the population in Adams' America than in Burke's England.[24] It was based on historical accidents in England;

23 For a discussion of the American view of the representative see Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* (New York, 1912), III, 70–76.

24 For discussions of the franchise in the two countries see Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760–1860* (Princeton, 1960), especially Chaps. 2–7; Robert E. Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution* (Princeton, 1956), especially Chaps. 4 and 9; Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London, 1957);

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hence the resulting welter of varying ways to the borough franchise. But in America it was based on general rules. In most colonies everyone with a moderate amount of property could vote. Personal property was considered as good a qualification as real estate in some states. Even after 1832 only one person in thirty in England could vote and the figure was about one in fifty before the reform. In America during the colonial period about one sixth of the population was eligible to vote in most colonies, and when the new states were formed six of the constitutions were essentially democratic. From fifty per cent to eighty per cent of white adult males could vote in most colonies and the percentage grew after the Revolution. According to one modern student the suffrage changes made during the Revolution "committed the country to a democratic suffrage." [25]

There was far better and more even representation in America than in England. In England the rotten borough and the pocket borough were prevalent. In America, with few exceptions, such institutions never existed. In England the House of Commons grew progressively more out of touch with the people. There was no effective way to exert popular pressure on Parliament, and regardless of whether a Whig or Tory cabinet was in power the land-holding aristocracy effectively controlled both Houses. Plural voting was widespread in England at the same time that the one voter, one vote practice was well-established in America. The transactions of colonial assemblies, and then of the state legislatures, were well publicized. Public pressure was reasonably effective in these state assemblies. Voters were not numerous by modern standards, but they were reasonably evenly distributed geographically and even socially.

Local government was more vigorous and meaningful in America. In post-1689 England the power of the country squires in completely controlling local government was called into question by neither Whigs nor Tories.

Political parties in the England known by Burke represented social classes as such, and this was widely understood to be the case and to be healthy.[26] In the America in which

and A. Lawrence Lowell, *The Government of England* (New York, 1917).

25 Williamson, 116.

26 See Beer, *passim.*

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John Adams was politically influential, parties were no more than factions. Madison was empirically correct in his description of factions. What is more important, these factions were only local in character. In such a situation the spirit of faction and of continual social bickering, if not actual social strife, was identified with the spirit of party.

III

How did these social differences affect the thought of Adams and Burke? First, Burke and Adams disagreed on specifics regarding social classes and political parties. Second, the necessities involved in thinking about an individualistic society led Adams to become a rationalist and the necessities of thinking about a corporate society led Burke to become a traditionalist.

Adams did not put much faith in the British corporate society. His attachment was specifically to America. As he put it: "I always consider the settlement of America with reverence and wonder, as the opening of a grand scene and design in Providence for the illumination of the ignorant, and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth." Burke was, of course, devoted to his own corporate society with its estates, monarch, peerage, established church, and appropriate political practices. Adams was faithful to the society of his own New England, a society which even Jefferson admired. In his *Diary* Adams referred to "the towns, militia, schools, and churches as the four causes of the growth and defence of New England. The virtues and talents of the people are there formed; their temperance, patience, fortitude, prudence, and justice, as well as their sagacity, knowledge, judgment, taste, skill, ingenuity, dexterity, and industry." [27] The statement is Burkean in tone, but not in content, because the towns, schools, and churches of New England were far different from the villages, schools, and churches of old England.

Adams viewed the British Constitution as a model or ideal prototype. But this was strictly a political model, not a social model. "Constitution" was a legal term for Adams, one which denoted the formal structure of government. The

[27] Adams, quoted in Clinton Rossiter, "The Legacy of John Adams," *Yale Review*, XLVI (1957), 549, 538.

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social structure was a phenomenon apart from the government. Governments were complex, but it was complexity of human construction and not of unguided growth. Adams endorsed the theory of the English Constitution as a framework for government. But he always qualified approving statements by saying that there were corruptions in English society, as well as in the government itself, which must be removed.

Burke, however, understood "constitution" to mean the entire social structure of England and not only the formal governmental structure. When Burke admonished the English not to follow the horrible example of the French and when he exhorted them to stand "on the firm ground of the British constitution," included in his concept of constitution was the whole corporate society to which he was devoted. The "little platoons" [28] were part of the British Constitution because it was the little platoons which were represented, if any representation was present, in the various local governments, as well as in Parliament. The civil society, which created duties for persons, was, in Burke's view, part of the constitution. The constitution in turn was based on a compact which could not be altered. Civil society, prejudice, and prescription were all bound up with the Burkean constitution.

As a result of the specific class structures in their two countries Burke and Adams viewed class issues differently. Adams, for example, was concerned all through his career with the struggle between the aristocracy and the democracy, whereas Burke was far more concerned with the struggle between the aristocracy and the crown. In his *Thoughts on the Causes of Present Discontents* Burke said that a rapacious aristocracy is bad but that his "fears are not upon that quarter." [29] His fears in 1770 were about the court and not about the peerage because it was the king and his friends who were trying to encroach on the power of the peers and their captive repesentatives in the House of Commons. Burke wanted the court checked; he had little fear of the nobility. Adams, in his American milieu, did not have to worry about the court, at least after the Revolution, and his mature po-

[28] Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Chicago, 1955), 349, 71.

[29] Burke, quoted in Payne, 22.

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litical theory is a plea for checks both on the aristocrats and on the people. The social struggle in which he was interested was the one between the few and the many. Burke later became interested in the people as a result of fears induced by the French Revolution, but this was only a negative interest, and he wanted complete suppression of the people coupled with continued unhampered elevation of the aristocracy.

The attitudes of Burke and Adams toward the classes in their own countries were dissimiliar. Adams described the aristocracy as he saw it. Burke pleaded for the aristocracy against the claims of any other group. In looking to the actual aristocrats of England, Burke talked of them as the "great oaks" and the "proper chieftains" [30] of society. They were "the wiser, the more expert, and the more opulent," [31] without whose rule civil society would cease to exist. Burke admitted that both the House of Lords and the House of Commons were based on the same foundation: "hereditary property and hereditary distinction." [32]

Adams, however, saw all men as equally foolish and equally inclined to make mistakes regardless of their social standing. There were no "proper chieftains" for Adams. He wrote to Jefferson in 1787 that "the many should have a full fair and perfect Representation." He stressed that his great fear was the aristocracy. Adams differentiated between natural aristocrats and artificial aristocrats, and the latter he hated passionately. But he also distrusted the former and said that all through history they had made war against the rights of mankind. His definition of an aristocrat—a person who controls one vote besides his own—indicates how far removed the American situation was from the English, where an aristocrat would probably control several seats in the Houses of Parliament.

It is a mistake therefore, to view Adams as pleading for the aristocracy in any Burkean sense. He believed in a natural aristocracy, as did such democrats as Sam Adams and Thomas Jefferson. But Adams greatly feared the degeneration of the American government into "a continual strug-

30 Burke, quoted in Viereck, 30.

31 Burke, *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, in Ross J. S. Hoffman and Paul Levack, *Burke's Politics* (New York, 1959), 397.

32 Burke, *Reflections*, 78.

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gle between a Junto of Grandees." [33] This is precisely what the English government was, and this is what Burke defended. Adams wanted neither a hereditary monarch nor a hereditary Senate in the United States. Certainly he wanted the Senate to be more representative of the aristocracy and the House of the democracy, but he referred to the Senate as a form of "ostracism" for the American aristocracy and he told Sam Adams in 1790, the year of Burke's *Reflections,* that the aristocrats must be placed in a "hole" by themselves.[34] In short, a Burkean defense of the aristocracy such as Fisher Ames attempted (which attempt was denounced by Adams) [35] was irrelevant to America. Because of his recognition of the American situation, Adams was able to preserve his political influence.

In their attitudes toward the people—the mass of men—Burke and Adams again differed. Burke distrusted and hated the mass of men because of their inherent defects. Adams, on the other hand, saw that all men had defects and all were equally despicable in some sense. But his specific reservations about the mass of men were based almost wholly on the grounds that the mass of men were weak enough to be led astray by the aristocracy. No mob was dangerous until in the control of an aristocrat; such control, therefore, must be prevented. Burke hated the people and labeled them the "swinish multitude" and "wild beasts." [36] He spoke of "the madness of the common people's dream, that they could be anything without the aid of better fortunes and better heads than their own." [37] This mad dream was precisely the dream of most Americans. Adams was still too skeptical about human nature in general to endorse the dream fully, but he

[33] Adams to Jefferson, Dec. 6, 1787, and March 1, 1789, in Cappon (ed.), 213, 236.

[34] Adams, *Works,* IV, 290; VI, 419.

[35] After reading Ames' essay "On the Dangers of American Liberty" he commented: "Mr. Ames saw no danger but from one party, the Democracy. There is equal danger from another party, the Aristocracy. Licentiousness is as great in the latter as in the former. The latter has its oligarchy as well as the former. The latter has its demagogues as well as the former. The latter is headed by a faction as well as the former." Cited in Haraszti, 24.

[36] Burke, *Reflections,* 115; Burke, *Works* (London, 1855–56), III, 87.

[37] Burke, quoted in Ernest Barker, *Essays on Government* (London, 1951), 199.

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certainly felt that the common people could realize their dream just as well with the aristocrats ostracized to the hole called the Senate. The common people might not succeed, but this would be the result of the common weakness of all men and not of the weaknesses peculiar to one class. Adams remained dubious about this part of the American dream, but he never denounced it in Burkean terms. He was aware that such a denunciation would have ended his effective connections with American intellectual and political life.

Adams, therefore, admitted that the principle of popular sovereignty was correct. All men may be equally swinish, but this situation is not to be ameliorated by doing as Burke did and elevating one portion of the herd over the other portion. In a letter to John Taylor, Adams condemned Burke rhetorically: "Whom do you mean by your 'multitude?' The multitude, in your country, means the people of England, Scotland, Ireland, and all the rest of your dominions. The multitude, in this country, means the people of the United States. The multitude means mankind. Make your exceptions, and then say, after an attention, whether they are not, upon an average, as swinish as the rest. All the delicacy of your classical criticism, all the subtilty of your metaphysical discrimination, cannot devise a justifiable limitation of your words." [38] Burke made such a limitation and it may have had meaning in England. But, as Adams keenly perceived, it had no meaning in the United States. It was all men whose first want is dinner and whose second want is a girl, not merely the non-aristocrats. The aristocrats were pictured by Adams as mean, cunning, crafty, cruel, and devoid of principle, whereas the main fault of the people in the mass was stupidity in being taken in by low tricks on the part of the aristocracy.

In viewing political parties, Burke, of course, prepared an eloquent case in their defense. He saw them both as natural and as good. He was particularly happy with the party structure with which he was familiar. Especially correct on all public issues was the party or faction which Burke himself happened to favor at any given moment.

Adams also treated parties as natural and tended to believe that, in the long run, there would be an aristocratic party

[38] Adams, *Works*, VI, 496.

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and a democratic party. But this development, based as it was on human nature, had to be controlled, and the means of control was to apply the central principle of balance. Virtue was the exclusive property of neither party in Adams' view. Below this abstract level Adams was faced with the facts of American politics. The part of American life he disliked most was the spirit of party or the spirit of faction, which he spoke of as "a devil." [39] The way to tame the devil was neither to attribute all virtue to one party or faction nor to harden class lines into party lines, but to keep the whole situation flexible and disjointed, a solution which approximated actual conditions in America in the early seventeen-nineties. Here again Adams and Burke responded to an intellectual question in terms of the societies which they knew and defended. Burke represented a class and felt that all members of the House, including the best men of the country, should do so. Adams acted in the name of his balance. Parties were inevitable, but the best men of the country should act in the name of the whole society and should stay aloof from class interests and party interests.

Finally, Adams emerges as a rationalist, or even as a *philosophe*. His main interest was in political construction in America. Burke emerges as an intellectual opposite, a traditionalist.

Burke praised the irrational and damned metaphysics and political mathematics. For him, political thinking should never be done in metaphysical or mathematical terms. Political thinking should always be done in moral terms. Such morality was always attached to specific institutions or specific political problems, and general theorizing apart from these institutions and problems was itself immoral. In speaking of metaphysical distinctions Burke's position throughout his entire life was the same: "I hate the very sound of them." [40] Instead of political mathematics he wanted faith in prescription, prejudice, and prudence. These principles would show old, established institutions as the best. Starting from these principles Burke could then easily write his rhetorical discussions about treating futurity as a ward and about the great

[39] *Ibid.*, VI, 540.

[40] Burke, *Speech on American Taxation,* in Payne, 154.

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primeval contract linking past, present, and future generations.

Adams, on this point, presented the antithesis of the Burkean position. From the first he praised the colonists for having thrown off the shackles of "canon and feudal law." [41] He warned the British not to attempt to impose these bonds on America. At an early point in his career he conceived of himself as a political architect and said so in writing to his wife: Paine in *Common Sense* "has a better hand in pulling down than in building. . . . I flatter myself I should have made a more respectable figure as an architect. . . ." [42] In his *Thoughts on Government* Adams showed himself to be such an architect. His central notion of balance was a mathematical principle, the kind of principle which Burke detested. Adams proposed using constitutional techniques to balance the warring classes in society. Burke would contend, of course, that such a balance could grow only over a period of many centuries in a specific society. But Adams' political goal was to establish "rational principles, and rational systems of Government." [43]

America was an open lot on which much political construction could be erected. Adams had a tremendous sense of the great opportunities open to Americans in their building of the new state and federal governments. He felt, in complete opposition to Burke, that rational construction at a given constitutional convention could create a good government. In a 1775 letter to Richard Henry Lee, Adams wrote with approval of a body of men "pulling down tyran-

41 See his *Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,* in *Works,* III, 447–65. In this short and perceptive essay Adams sees the essential difference between English and American society. "The canon and feudal systems, though greatly mutilated in England, are not yet destroyed. Like the temples and palaces in which the great contrivers of them once worshipped and inhabited, they exist in ruins; and much of the domineering spirit of them still remains." Not only religion but also "a love of universal liberty and a hatred, a dread, a horror, of the infernal confederacy" of canon and feudal law were responsible for the settlement of America. The founders of the new country "knew that government was a plain, simple, intelligible thing, founded in nature and reason and quite comprehensible by common sense. They detested all the base services and servile dependencies of the feudal system."

42 Adams, quoted in Chinard, 89.

43 Adams to Jefferson, Sept. 18, 1823, in Cappon (ed.), 598.

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nies at a single exertion, and erecting such new fabrics as it thinks best calculated to promote its happiness." [44] Much of this feeling remained with Adams the rest of his life. Writing about the events of 1776, he said that "no people ever had a finer opportunity to settle things upon the best foundations." [45] In 1787 he added that "the people in America have now the best opportunity and the greatest trust in their hands, that Providence ever committed to so small a number, since the transgression of the first pair. . . . The institutions as now made in America will not wholly wear out for thousands of years. It is of the last importance, then, that they should begin right." [46] Adams could make this kind of statement precisely because America could create many of its own institutions. Some of the European inheritance no doubt would remain; indeed, Adams wanted some parts of the inheritance retained. But America would be ill-advised to adopt the full social content of Europe in its institutions. Burkean thinking had no relevance to the New World at this point. State-building and constitution-constructing were the unique tasks of America and John Adams relished his part in these tasks.

In short, John Adams undertook many enterprises which Edmund Burke said a politician or political thinker should not do. Burke denounced an *a priori* science of government; Adams said it was his primary duty to study the first principles of political science. Burke said that a free government could not be legislated; Adams drew up several plans for legislating a free government. Burke announced that only a very learned person, one who probably did not exist, could understand the extremely complex fabric which was government; Adams claimed to be that learned person.

IV

Personal temperamental differences play a large role in political thought. But intellectual similarities and differences between thinkers of two different countries cannot be

44 Adams, *Works*, IV, 187.

45 Adams, quoted in Correa M. Walsh, *The Political Science of John Adams* (New York, 1915), 1.

46 Adams, *A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America*, in *Works*, IV, 290, 298.

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understood unless the social conditions of the two countries are compared. A purely intellectual comparison between two bodies of thought is partially fruitful, but to answer why thinkers differ in outlook although they may be largely the same in temperament, the facts of the societies involved must be included in the analysis. It is very well to say, to expand upon an epigram of Clinton Rossiter, that Adams "hated politics but he loved political science," [47] whereas Burke loved politics but hated political science. But the tidy paradox can be explained when it also can be shown that the English milieu fostered the love of politics in a man of conservative temperament and the American milieu fostered the love of political science in a man of conservative temperament.

Burke and Adams came to similar conclusions only when they were confronted with events which involved a third country—France—or which involved English-American relations. They arrived at basically dissimilar conclusions when confronted with wholly national questions. English social nature and needs were intrinsically different from American social nature and needs. Therefore, the schemes of thought produced by Adams and by Burke diverged. This divergence is both explained by and in turn illuminates the essence of England and of America during the late eighteenth century. Burke could be totally anti-Enlightenment and still affect the course of English politics profoundly. Adams, however, had to be an Enlightenment figure in order to have a real impact on the America of his time. He summarized his feelings in writing to the leading American *philosophe,* Jefferson: "Your Taste is judicious in likeing better the dreams of the Future, than the History of the Past. Upon this Principle I prophecy that you and I shall soon meet and be better Friends than ever." [48]

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[47] Rossiter, "The Legacy of John Adams," 540.

[48] Adams to Jefferson, Aug. 9, 1816, in Cappon (ed.). 487.

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TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF HYDRO VS. THERMAL POWER *

IT HAS been argued that nominal cost comparisons of hydroelectric and thermal plants tend to understate the real cost of the heavier investment required for a hydro power installation. Since the nominal cost of capital available to power enterprises in capital-scarce countries usually understates the real cost of capital to the economy, hydro may get an undeserved edge on thermal in these nominal cost comparisons.

It might be suggested, however, that although hydro is extravagant with scarce capital, it has a number of advantages over thermal power which, though difficult to quantify, may materially alter the balance of the argument. Hydro, in brief, has certain technological and economic characteristics, relative to thermal, that enable it to take root in the country that produces it, and that in various ways propel the country's development.

That hydro and thermal might have these differential effects on development was first suggested to the writer by a comparative study of the Argentine and Brazilian electric power industry. The industry's pattern of growth was similar in both countries: development by private foreign power companies and a general postwar transition from private to public power. Both countries, moreover, had serious power bottlenecks in the nineteen-fifties. Their attempts to solve the problem, however, met with strikingly different degrees of success. Brazil was able to allay the serious shortage by the late nineteen-fifties, and in the process set up a viable government-sponsored power program. Argentina, in contrast, was still coping with a crippling power deficit in the early nineteen-sixties, its attempts to provide a substantial program of government power having met with very limited success.

* I thank the Foreign Area Fellowship Program for the fellowship under which this study was made. The opinions in the study are my own, and not necessarily those of the Fellowship Program. I am indebted to Professor Albert O. Hirschman of Harvard University for his encouragement, and for discussing with me at length the ideas presented in this paper.

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The difference in technology between Brazil's and Argentina's power industries—Argentina having an unusually high proportion of thermally-governed power and Brazil, an equally high percentage of hydroelectric power—seems to have had much to do with the greater facility with which the Brazilian government has managed its power industry. In short, the construction and operation of hydro in a developing country, although incurring a greater real capital cost than is usually believed, also confers real benefits on the economy—in the form of stimulation of local production, in the creation of skills, and in training for planning.

These characteristics of hydro technology have much the same effect as do certain production processes described by Albert Hirschman:

> Certain types of modern technology perform a crucial function in aiding management in the performance of new, unfamiliar, and perhaps somewhat uncongenial tasks. By predetermining to a considerable extent what is to be done where and at what point of time, the machines and the mechanical or chemical processes they perform reduce these difficulties immeasurably in comparison with a situation where work schedules depend exclusively on the convergence and coordination of many human wills and actions. . . . The technical processes carried out by machinery provide factory operations with a basic structure and rhythm which in effect deal out functions and determine sequences.[1]

Hydro works much the same way on the *system* level, with the technology itself pacing and coordinating investment decisions, impelling and encouraging refinement and growth of the system. Thermal, on the other hand, is like the operator-paced production process which Hirschman refers to—dependent on the "convergence and coordination of many human wills and actions." If this coordination and continuity in investment is such a scarce factor in developing countries, then a case can be made for the technology that brings it about. Hence hydro's greater capital intensity in construction—like Hirschman's more capital-intensive process-centered industries—may be justified because of the better performance it compels.

This paper presents some of these conclusions about hydro

[1] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, 1958), 146–47.

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and thermal, which emerged from the writer's study of the Argentine and Brazilian cases.

I

A hydroelectric project, whether private or public, draws on local resources and population much more than a thermal project, at every stage of its execution. Building a hydro plant is a long, drawn-out operation; preparing for it may take as long as constructing it. The terrain must be surveyed. Average annual rainfall and run-of-the-river measurements must be taken over a considerable period of time. The river must be carefully studied so that it is thoroughly understood. Teams of civil engineers must traverse the distance from dam to consuming center, marking out transmission tower sites every several hundred feet, haggling with local landowners for rental rights.

Each hydro project, then, requires its own solution, its own adaptation to the particular locale. A thermal plant, on the other hand, requires only a large space to put it down on, near the area it will supply. It is a much more technologically complex collection of equipment, but its complexity is internal and does not have to do with molding it to its site. In fact, "package plants" for steam power may now be purchased from the industrial countries. The buyer has only to supply the foundations and general site improvement.

This difference between hydro and thermal construction requirements parallels that between civil and mechanical engineering. In developing countries, most trained engineers are civil and electrical, rather than mechanical engineers. Except possibly for the setting of the turbine, civil and electrical engineering are the skills required for the planning and construction of a hydro plant.

Private foreign companies, then, could use—and, hence, train—the available engineering talent in Latin America for the execution of their hydro projects. It was even to their benefit to use local engineers: they knew the terrain, they did not cost as much as imported engineers, and they knew the language and ways of the people who had to be persuaded to allow transmission towers on their land.

In contrast, the few local mechanical engineers who might be available for a thermal project would be less likely to

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have been used by the foreign power companies. The more refined and complex nature of thermal equipment, compared to hydro, made it necessary to import personnel along with the equipment. There was—and still is—a kind of finicky ethnocentrism about entrusting such sophisticated equipment to local personnel.

Engineers even personalize this difference in thermal and hydro equipment. Hydro is a big lumbering piece of machinery, they say, slow to respond but responsible, easy to deal with and hard to insult. Thermal, on the other hand, is delicate and high strung, precise and temperamental. Any engineer can plan a hydro plant, they say, but a thermal plant is a frightening thing.

Thus thermal's complexity and compactness put it out of the range of local experience and talent. In addition, rapid changes in technology are being made in thermal, rather than hydro, engineering. The technology of hydro equipment is relatively stable. Thus the foreign companies and their consultants, who are forging the changes in technology, would be in much closer touch with the requisite engineering for thermal plants.

Hydro, in sum, uses the engineering, the problem-solving, construction, and maintenance work of the local population. It creates a corps of technicians familiar with the planning and execution of hydro plants—in a truly creative way, due to the problems unique to each hydro project. The thermal plant, in contrast, leaves much less of its technology among the population. It clings to the edge of the city, dependent on the expertise of foreign engineering. The country with hydro, then, is more capable of entering the field of power production.

Brazil's training in hydropower was evident in the preparation of the 1961–71 investment program for power. The entire civil engineering project—which determines the basic specifications of a hydro plant—was carried out by Brazilian engineers, most of whom had no connection with foreign firms. A further example is CEMIG's [2] recent collaboration with the UN Special Fund in a projected complete survey

[2] CEMIG stands for Centrais Elétricas de Minas Gerais, the autonomous government power corporation founded by Juscelino Kubitschek in the early nineteen-fifties, during his term as Governor of the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais.

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of the hydrologic potential of the state of Minas Gerais. Though foreign engineering firms were taking part, they supplied only five of the twenty-five necessary engineers specialized in hydroelectric planning. The remaining twenty came from CEMIG itself.

II

The necessity for long-run planning is considered one of the major disadvantages of hydro as opposed to thermal power, especially in developing countries. Costly and extensive investigations are required for the evaluation of a hydro project, and large projects necessitate estimates of demand for ten to fifteen years into the future. A hydro plant, moreover, cannot be developed in stages to the same degree as thermal. The construction of thermal stations, in contrast, may be phased to coincide more closely with the expected increase in power demand. The investment in thermal, then, is not only utilized more fully at all times, but a significant share of total investment is postponed to a time when demands on scarce capital resources may be less pressing in relation to their availability. Although the various units of a hydro plant might be installed at different stages, the *final capacity must be determined before the project is ever* started. In contrast, plans for thermal plants, which are flexible enough to allow for successive expansions, often provide only for the capacity of the initial installation.

These considerations are particularly important in a developing economy where demand is exceedingly difficult to forecast, and where it is almost impossible to make cost estimates that will be relevant several years hence. In brief, then, thermal does not make the impossible demands upon foresight that hydro does. Thermal can follow demand as it grows, and thereby avoid costly periods of under- or oversupply. This however, may be precisely the cause of the unplanned, emergency state that characterized the Argentine power system, while the difficult requirements of hydro planning might underlie the success of Brazil's experience with power.

Hydro, that is, can never be an emergency solution; it takes too long to execute. Of necessity, it is planned to satisfy a demand that is not yet in existence because of the years

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that will intervene between its conception and its final execution. A country like Brazil, with predominantly hydroelectric power, is thus forced into planning for its electricity because the penalties for not doing so are high. Hence Brazilian power managers are always warning not of the immediately imminent crisis in power supply, but of the crisis to come several years in the future. John Cotrim, past director of CEMIG, wrote in 1960 that all power plants in construction then were planned to meet 1962, 1963, and 1964 demands because they would take five or six years to construct. But the problem at hand was that if *new* projects were not started immediately, the government would be "abetting a tremendous electric power crisis, which will make itself felt by 1964." [3]

If hydro forces its managers to plan, then it instills planning as a habit. Moreover, power planning is good training for economic planning in general. The power economist does not have to be a power engineer. The training that power provides is not specific, and those who have learned to plan in power can apply their talents to other sectors of the economy. Moreover, the power sector in developing countries in many cases attracts the best people in the country, because power management seems so directly bound to the country's development. Two examples of government power managers who moved on to positions of general economic planning are Lucas Lopes, former finance minister of Brazil, and Pierre Massé, at present Commissaire Général du Plan d'Equipment et de la Productivité of France. The experience of both men had been primarily with hydropower.

To the extent, then, that hydropower forces planning, it is a much better training school than thermal for economic planning in general. Planning, of course, is desirable for any kind of electric power supply. A thermal system should also be planned so as to operate efficiently and meet increases in demand. But because of its flexibility, its much shorter construction period (a crash program to plan and construct a thermal plant can now be carried out in six months), and

[3] "O Problema da Energia Elétrica no Brasil," *Revista do Conselho Nacional de Economia,* IX (1960), 104. This and all further translations are mine.

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its smaller initial investment, thermal does not *require* planning. When one knows that the deadline for power supply can be pushed further and further ahead—especially when other urgent matters are pressing—one is likely to let planned expansion slip by, and attend to other things. And this is exactly what thermal enables its government managers to do. Needless to say, when a country is forced to operate its electric power industry with an eye to future demand, its supply will keep up with demand more than in a country whose government is able to add a little power every time it sees a shortage.

The predominance of thermal power in Argentina, in fact, is actually blamed by many Argentines for having stifled hydroelectric development, as well as successful power development in general. "Thermal electricity," says one writer, "postpones the integral solution of the energy problem—that is, the hydroelectric complex." [4] Another writes that the "high percentage of thermal plants in Argentine production is due solely to a state of emergency and neglect to make studies." [5]

Hydro, in sum, trains its managers to see crisis in the future. For thermal managers, the crisis is a reality only when it exists, because it can be met almost immediately. The more this type of *post hoc* expansion of a thermal system takes place, the less feasible economic hydro projects become. The shortage is too severe to wait for the planning and execution of a hydro project, and the country is not likely to have the resources to invest in both. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that state action in the Argentine power sector was characterized by a definite aim to take advantage of the country's hydroelectric resources. Yet the percentage share of thermal in the government's past and present power construction program turned out to be much higher than was originally envisioned.

The Special Fund's appraisal of Argentina's dream hydroelectric project, Salto Grande, carries the same implications:

> Our economic comparisons show [the study concluded] that

[4] Bruno A. Defelippe, *La Política Energética Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1953), 157.

[5] Horst Carlos Fuldner, *Consideraciones y Comentários sobre la Economía de la Electricidad . . .* (Buenos Aires, 1956), 59.

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> Salto Grande could furnish power to the Gran Buenos Aires-Litoral area *more cheaply than equivalent thermal* capacity. However, the additional US $97,500,000 of Argentine capital needed, and the *eight-year period required* for engineering and construction, are practical reasons which prompted the selection of alternative thermal power in the ten-year program.[6]

In this case, time and the initial expense are the major obstacles. And these are the two obstacles that hydropower experience helps a country to overcome.

III

The technology of hydropower creates strong impulses toward its own perpetuation, impulses which thermal does not have. Like the planning that hydro forces upon its managers, the effects of these impulses—continuing reinvestment and refinement of the system—are also "scarce resources" in developing economies. They are therefore an essential part of the hydro-thermal comparison.

One of the major problems of hydro power is its dependence upon variations in rainfall and streamflow. Seasonal, daily, and hourly variations in the demand for power have their own pattern, of course, independent of variation in water supply. In periods of strong river flow, excess water is released over the spillways, rather than through the generators. On the other hand, in periods of water shortage, streamflow is not great enough to meet the capacity of the plant or of demand. Both shortage and excess of water, then, mean wasted capacity in a hydro plant—the unused capacity of the generators during shortage, and the unused potential of the spilled water during excess.

Thermal produces power as it is needed. The power that can be generated is a direct function of installed capacity, rather than of installed capacity *and* variations in supply of the major input. If there are shortages of power in a thermal plant, they are due to inadequate capacity in the *system*, not to inadequate supply of the major input. Moreover, shortages of power from a thermal plant imply full-capacity operation of the plant—and hence no loss of revenue. Shortages

[6] Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, and Kennedy & Donkin, *Study of Argentine Power Problems* (New York and London, 1960), 2. Italics mine.

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in a hydro plant, on the other hand, mean *unused* capacity —due to inadequate riverflow—and therefore loss of revenue.

Excess capacity in a thermal plant is due only to the hourly, daily, or seasonal trough in demand. In a hydro plant, however, excess capacity means wasted potential power in the form of spilled water, as well as idle generators. Moreover, excess capacity is much more costly for a hydro plant than for a thermal plant, even without considering the spilled water. Hydro's "free" water generation pays back the high initial investment of the installation. Thus moments of idleness in a hydro plant delay the amortization of that initial investment, with no savings in operating costs, which are almost zero. Thermal, on the other hand, amortizes its lower initial investment more quickly and its idle capacity not only represents less revenue, it also means less cost—in the form of fuel that is not used. Idle capacity, therefore, is a much smaller drain on the profitability of a thermal plant.

Hydro's dependence on nature is not irremediable. There are ways of evening out the gluts and shortages of waterflow that not only help the system operate more efficiently, but increase the profitability of each plant. And because this uneven utilization of capacity is much more costly in a hydro plant, there is a stronger incentive to correct the difficulty.

In the jargon of the industry, correction takes the form of "firming up" the unreliable waterflow. A hydro system can sell only its "firm power"—the amount of power which could be produced in the lowest water year, and which the system can therefore guarantee to provide by contract. What is left over—secondary power—is usually substantial, since most years see more than a minimum waterflow. This secondary power, then, is lost revenue; as a Bonneville power administrator said, "When you see water cascading over the spillways of Grand Coulee . . . it may look pretty but those are dollars going over the dam." [7]

It might be argued that developing countries push their power systems to a greater extent because customers have to be content with buying unreliable power rather than no power at all. Hence the spur to improvement caused by revenue loss from the unused secondary power would not be

[7] U.S., Bonneville Power Administration, *The New Program of Bonneville . . .* (Portland, 1962), 7.

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as great as in an industrial country with more rigorous standards as to what it can contract to sell. But this argument pertains only to possible loss of revenue during water excess. It does not account for the loss of revenue during shortage, when the system simply does not have *any* kind of power to sell to those who want to buy. It is clear, then, that hydro articulates a waste. This leads to improvements which expand and refine the already existing system:

(1) One of the methods of evening out the irregularities of water supply is to regularize the flow of a river by the use of artificial storage basins. Storage is very expensive in terms of the benefits it will confer on any single plant. But there is a strong interdependence between storage at one plant and the generating capacity of any other plant downstream. If downstream plants without storage are already installed, an upstream storage plant will be very desirable. It will regularize the streamflow to all downstream plants and thereby increase their capacity to generate firm power. In addition, the upstream storage plant may cross the threshold of economic feasibility if its benefits extend to several plants, rather than to the one plant associated with it. If the development of the river is in a downstream, rather than an upstream, direction, otherwise uneconomic downstream sites may be economic if considered as beneficiaries of an upstream storage plant.

Hydro, then, not only induces its managers to build one plant after another on the same river, it also encourages a development of the river which is planned and integrated from the start.

(2) Drought is the specter that haunts a hydro system. In the spring and summer of 1953, drought played havoc with the power supply of Rio and São Paulo, causing severe shortages and strict rationing of power consumption. American & Foreign Power, which supplied the interior of the two states, found its revenues sharply diminished. The rate increase it had finally been granted was suspended because of the necessary rationing.

Interconnection lessens these penalties of drought by making possible large transfers of power between systems, based on the diversity of their hydraulic regimes and the existence of large storage reservoirs. Brazil's recent three-year devel-

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opment plan (1963–65) gives priority to interconnection, in order, among other reasons, to obtain this insurance against drought.

Interconnection of isolated systems is of course desirable for both hydro and thermal in that it enables increased utilization of capacity through reduction of the required margin of generating units for reserve purposes. In addition, different districts can complement each other's power supply. When the load curve is at its trough in one area, the plant's idle capacity can be used to supplement the supply in another area, where, at the same time of the day, week, or season, the load curve is closer to its peak. Costs are thus reduced by keeping idle capacity at a minimum, and because the interchange of power between systems allows a smaller reserve capacity to be maintained for the contingency of peak loads.

The inducements toward interconnection, however, are greater in power systems that are predominantly hydraulic. Because interconnection in general increases the size of the area served, it also increases the diversity of demand. Greater diversity of demand tends to even out the variations in demand, an improvement which is more urgently needed in a hydro system.

Interconnection can also smooth the jerky nature of hydro growth, as pointed out in Brazil's Electrification Plan of 1954.[8] The interchange of power between systems that is facilitated by interconnection can help to prevent the shortages that may arise while a system is waiting for the completion of a major hydro installation, and preventing the waste of power from a plant whose installed capacity is beyond the needs of consumers in its immediate area. Since thermal's growth proceeds in much smaller steps, there is no such problem to overcome. That hydro poses the problem makes interconnection desirable.

Interconnection, no doubt, is an expensive and complex task. The hydro system, however, by its very nature, is better adapted to take the step. Hydro is accustomed to spanning distances, to spinning out expensive transmission lines. As the power supply of an area develops, the transmission lines of separate plants are likely to cross or pass near each other

[8] Brasil, Presidência da República, *Plano Nacional de Electrificação* . . . (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), 57.

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on their way to the consuming centers. The lines and their plants, located as they are between centers, create a natural hub for interconnection of isolated systems. Thermal plants, next to consuming centers rather than between them, have little contact with other centers and their power systems.

The Furnas hydroelectric plant in the state of Minas Gerais is a good example of the locational inducements of hydro toward interconnection. Furnas, whose first stage was completed in 1963, was to be the key project in an integral development of the Rio Grande, which is approximately equidistant from the three major centers of the industrial southeast—São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte. Before Furnas, these centers and their surrounding areas were supplied by three separate systems. Now, Furnas and several other large hydro plants envisioned for the Rio Grande will provide the hub for an interconnection of these previously separate systems.

Developing countries, by the way, find a political virtue in hydro's expensive transmission lines. One of the arguments justifying state intervention in electric power throughout Brazil was the political necessity of industrial decentralization. Hydro's transmission lines provide a path for such decentralization.

Hydro, in sum, offers attractions and exerts pressures toward interconnection. Interconnection, in turn, has a considerable effect on hydro projects. Like the upstream storage plant, it brings many potential sites within the realm of economic feasibility.

(3) The pressures of drought and variations in demand are as influential in promoting the integration of thermal plants into existing hydro systems as they are in bringing about interconnection. Hydropower needs complementary thermal power because a pure hydro system is completely at the mercy of rainfall and river variations. After a certain point, the cost of overbuilding necessary to insure year-round coverage of peak loads is excessive. The majority of new thermal power stations in Brazil are therefore complementary parts of hydro systems.

There is, then, a kind of technological linkage from hydro to thermal. The severe penalties of a hydro system without complementary thermal facilities—as was the case in Brazil

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—induce technological progress in the system, as well as the expansion of generating capacity through the addition of the necessary standby thermal units. A thermal system, on the other hand, creates no pressures to produce hydro. The thermal system is in no sense improved by the addition of a plant that is hydro, aside from the mere expansion of total installed capacity.

The working of this technological linkage from hydro to thermal is well illustrated by recent developments in the power industry of Yugoslavia. Immediately after World War II, the Yugoslav government built many hydroelectric plants. It had been unwilling to consider the opportunities for cheaper equivalent thermal in some cases because of the attraction of monumental hydro projects. During the dry season, electric power was very scarce and there was severe criticism of these hydro projects as having turned out to be a waste of resources. The only way to utilize this investment was to construct complementary thermal facilities. Following this, the government showed a much greater interest in objective cost comparisons of proposed hydro projects with equivalent thermal.

The inadequacy of the purely hydro system, in this case, brought about the installation of complementary thermal facilities. In this sense, hydro forces a learning process on its managers. It may at first lure water supply leaders who are looking for impressive projects. But sooner or later it requires from them the more pedestrian planning necessary to make their monuments work. It is this ongoing planning and reinvestment that is essential to the healthy growth of the power sector. What is important about hydro, then, is not that it leads its planners along a zigzag path, but that it leads them, via this path, to eventual mastery of their problem.

IV

The hydro project usually involves a greater expenditure in local exchange than does thermal, and draws on a wider range of local supply industries. A major share of the hydro plant's supply requirements (about seventy-five per cent) is not specifically electrical equipment but, rather, cement for the dam, simple piping for the penstocks, and materials for

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transmission—concrete and basic structural steel shapes. All this material can usually be obtained locally, or its production is within the reach of the local economy.

Thermal leaves much less of its construction expenditures in the local economy. Even its requirements for non-specific construction materials usually do not find local suppliers. The average thermal plant needs three or four miles of precision piping, only very distantly related to the simple piping used in hydro penstocks. It also requires a structural steel that can almost never be obtained locally, and which is used in only a small proportion in hydro installations.

To the extent, then, that hydro spends more money in the local economy than does thermal, it has a justification outside the power it will supply. It becomes an important source of demand for the supply of materials whose local production is feasible.

A country producing hydropower on a large scale, like Brazil, is more likely to grow an electrical supply industry than a country generating predominantly thermal power. Hydro equipment is much less complex than thermal and therefore more easily produced. Most of the equipment for a thermal plant must generally be imported. The boilers in steam plants are particularly difficult to manufacture locally. In addition, because the technology of hydro equipment is relatively stable—while thermal engineering is still moving ahead rapidly—it can be imported more readily and transplanted to the local supply industry. Hydro, as well, needs extensive transmission equipment—transformers, switchgear, towers, and so forth—which usually can be manufactured locally.

This difference between hydro and thermal manufacture is reflected in the heavy electrical equipment industries of Argentina and Brazil. There is little production of heavy machinery for the power industry in Argentina. Investment in power is therefore contingent to a great extent on the availability of foreign exchange. This inadequacy of the local thermal equipment industry is notable in a country which has always produced a high percentage of thermal power. Brazil, on the other hand, has developed an almost complete electrical supply industry, and can produce almost the entire range of equipment for a hydroelectric complex.

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Standardization of power equipment which makes large-scale or economic local production feasible is characteristically absent in developing countries. Hydro can facilitate standardization—and, thus, growth of local industry—through interconnection of systems.

There is another strong link between a hydro system and the development of the local equipment industry. If, as I have argued, hydro leads to a more planned development of the power system, then the demand for equipment several years into the future is visible to potential or existing local suppliers. Argentina provides the perfect example of this process in reverse. The growth of the local equipment industry has been hindered precisely because of the nature of the power enterprises' demand for equipment:

> The leading [electrical equipment] customers—national and provincial electricity enterprises and [the mixed private-public enterprise] SEGBA—do not space out there orders in such a way that manufacturing plans can be drawn up and efficient plant utilization ensured. The erratic nature of this demand is attributable to the fact that hitherto no long-term plans have existed, and when medium-term plans have been formulated, financial difficulties have prevented their implementation. Consequently, there are sporadic bursts of demand for large quantities of equipment to deal with emergencies, and long periods when no tenders are invited.[9]

The investment in hydro, then, is also an investment in the production of conditions favoring the growth of the local equipment industry.

V

A hydroelectric project is fine political capital. The politician looking for a good public works project is much more likely to select power if it is hydro. The hydro complex has drama and style, and there is an air of extravagance in its hugeness and grace which is awesome in a country trying to mobilize scarce resources for development. Though hydro supplies a basic necessity, it creates the aura of a country which no longer has to scrimp and save, but can spend with

[9] United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, "Generation and Transmission of Electric Power," *The Manufacture of Basic Industrial Equipment in Argentina*, Part III, E/CN.12/629/Add.2 (Mexico, July 13, 1962), 23–24.

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largesse. Its hugeness and its taming of a wild river bespeak a technological victory, and it imparts dignity to the people and the country who conceived it.[10]

Only hydro could produce rhetoric such as that of Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil, when he described the hydroelectric plants he initiated as Governor of the state of Minas Gerais and as President of Brazil:

> I left an example of daring and an affirmation of national capability—as well as teams of Brazilian technicians trained in hydroelectric works of great size. . . . Twice we broke the barrier of a million kilowatts (the Furnas and Três Marias projects), and Brazil dared to undertake the construction of plants truly huge. . . . No more does any Brazilian have the right to hesitate before works of great size. For it has been exuberantly proved that we have the capability, that we have the courage, and that we lack neither the resources nor the possibilities for confronting the challenge of the scarcity of electricity . . . .[11]

The thermal plant, in contrast, is another industrial installation at the edge of the city. It is no political eyecatcher, though electricity supplied during a shortage will certainly produce grateful voters, no matter how it was generated. A dam simply doubles the political appeal. It puts electricity in the home and the factory, and imposes a magnificent symbol of strength upon the countryside.

A country whose electric power production is mainly hydro, like Brazil, will have experience with it and talent to create it. Power thus comes within closer reach of the politician looking for an impressive public works project. In a country with thermal, like Argentina, both types of power generation are further from the politician's reach. He would be more likely to select another type of public works project just as impressive as a hydro plant, but more technologically and financially feasible.

[10] The government of a certain developing country once requested a power loan from one of the international lending institutions for a large hydro project. The government had recently replaced a dictatorship which was replete with white elephants and corruption. One of the reasons the new government wanted to build the hydro complex was so that it could "do something big and honest" in order to impress upon the country that it was different.

[11] Juscelino Kubitschek, *A Marcha do Amanhecer* (São Paulo, n.d.), 135–36.

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The political appeal of hydro, of course, is partially due to the mystique of hydropower. Hydropower, according to the mystique, is the free water that flows through the penstock gates. It costs almost nothing. The initial thermal installation may be less costly, but the power it generates costs money; it feeds on expensive fuel rather than free water. The people ask, therefore, why their government does not harness its rivers. Why not capture this precious resource, running wild and free? To let it flow into the sea, they say, is extravagant waste. Why not simply let it turn a wheel, and produce power that costs nothing?

The mystique, of course, is a gross exaggeration of the comparative costs of hydro and thermal. It simply fails to spread the initial cost of the installation on top of the almost-free kilowatt hours of hydropower. In so doing, it appeals for a spectacular expenditure on the grounds of preventing an intolerable waste. It can even enlist the support of thrift-minded holders of government purse strings, whose parsimony can be touched with the spectacle of precious waters extravagantly wasted in the sea.

The mystique, however, is not only a thing of the people. It has crept into the imagination of engineers and planners, and produces a kind of forgetfulness about the pain of the heavy initial investment. It has its rhetoric, too, as witness the words of Isaac F. Rojas:

> Water is our first and foremost unexploited potential. With heavy heart, I have looked at the lazy rivers in every part of our country. To take advantage of these waters is to create wealth. Just let a wheel catch the flow of a stream, and its wealth-giving power will be with us forever. . . . Our rivers remain untouched, when only a little effort would be sufficient to change their courses—be it to irrigate, or to fall mightily from the mountaintops.[12]

In contrast to hydro, thermal power is bare of mystique. If there are any sentiments about thermal, they are usually hostile. Thermal, after all, is the hungry giant who demands to be fed constantly with nothing but the best; fuel purchased with precious foreign exchange. Such feelings about thermal, of course, are based on the hydro mystique. If only

[12] Argentina, Comisión Asesora de Planificación Hidroeléctrica, *Una Solución Nacional—Agua—Electricidad—Economia* (Buenos Aires, 1958), viii.

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cheap hydroelectricity would be developed, according to the mystique, the expensive grip of thermal could then be avoided, and scarce resources could be devoted to other matters.

The mystique—regardless of its validity—describes an affinity for hydro, as opposed to thermal, on the part of layman, politician, and power manager. It is, therefore, a source of strength for a government-sponsored power program. It recruits sponsors dedicated to the realization of certain projects, it eases the process of budgetary appropriation for power, and it attracts managerial talent to the field of power development.

CONCLUSION

Government operation of the power sector in developing countries—like any long-run government undertaking—is subject to many tests of endurance. It must compete with other necessary projects for scarce talent and funds. It must rapidly take its own roots, so that it can outlive the attention span of its original supporters. It must have its own inner logic of growth which reveals to its managers the next step, and both lures and impels them to take it. The writer suggests that hydropower is more able to meet these requirements than is thermal. These particular qualities of hydro might be designated, in hydro-thermal cost comparisons, as the benefits of survival, of success, or of training for planning.

JUDITH D. TENDLER

NEW YORK CITY

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THE FAILURE OF THE MOVEMENT BY THE UNEMPLOYED FOR PUBLIC WORKS IN 1873

I

SOON after the 1873 depression started, workers in many large cities asked for public employment and special consideration from city and state authorities. These workers challenged the now dominant laissez-faire ideology of a developing industrial society. A short-lived but quite vocal "movement" demanding public aid for the unemployed spread through many large urban centers. John Francis Bray, the old Chartist radical then living in Michigan, warned that "hundreds of thousands of men, notwithstanding their Christian education, may refuse to starve to death quietly," and after the movement for public works was well under way a Chicago leader of the unemployed said it "struck terror into the hearts of the many who basked in the balmy sunshine of ease and rested secure in the midst of plenty." During earlier depressions, the demand for public works had attracted some sympathy from the well-to-do classes in large cities, but it was different in 1873. By that time, the urban middle and upper classes knew the troubles of the poor less intimately than before and were sufficiently alienated from the lower classes to resent and to fear organized efforts to violate "laws of progress." More than this, the 1873 movement attracted the support of immigrants and socialists. Coming so soon after the Paris Commune, it conjured images of enormous potential violence and destruction. The urban middle and upper classes did not understand the travails of the immigrant, much less the native-born poor. The New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor was not alone in calling workers asking for public employment a "vast hydra-headed class" ready to "strike at property and all we value most." A Chicago Unitarian minister felt that the "rabble" finally had come to the United States.[1]

[1] John Bray to the editor, *Workingman's Advocate*, Feb. 7, 1874; Francis Hoffman, "Speech," Chicago *Tribune*, Jan. 26, 1874; Rev. M. J. Savage, "Sermon," *ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1873; New York Association for Improving the

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Severe economic distress was felt in all large cities as a result of the depression. "The spectacle of seeing workers, men and women, walking leisurely to the few factories open," observed a contemporary, "is . . . upsetting to a New Yorker's notion of the 'eternal fitness of things.'" Production, employment, and income fell away quickly, and the New York *Times* predicted the "dullest and dreariest winter" since before the Civil War. After the giant textile industry sagged badly, a city official found at least forty thousand Philadelphia workers in need of public or private aid. Cincinnati and Chicago newspaper surveys forecast entirely "gloomy" prospects for western workers, too. About twenty-five per cent of New York's workers, nearly one hundred thousand persons, went without jobs that winter, and Samuel Gompers, a young cigar maker in 1873, remembered that "economic organization crumbled with some primeval upheaval." Some were frightened from the start: the New York *Evening Mail* worried about a "collision between the classes" because it was difficult to reason "with a man whose stomach is empty." [2]

Small numbers of civic-minded and philanthropic citizens as well as trade unionists quickly started makeshift relief organizations. The Young Men's Christian Association sold "dinner tickets" to New York businessmen to distribute to hungry and jobless workers. Other New Yorkers opened the Howard Relief Committee which fed and housed thousands of workers in an unused police station. Public kitchens served soup in St. Louis, Negro church leaders formed a society to aid helpless Philadelphia Negroes, and certain Cincinnati businessmen worked out a systematic scheme of unemployed relief. The New York *Herald* pleaded, "We must not desert the poor even while we pray Heaven to help the rich." Some trade unions also pitched in. The Chicago Typographical Union sent unemployed printers to other cities and a number of New York and Cincinnati unions

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Condition of the Poor (Hereafter cited as NYAICP), *31 Annual Report, 1874* (New York, 1874), 52, 58; Benjamin J. Klebaner, "Poor Relief and Public Works During the Depression of 1857," *The Historian*, XXII (1960), 264–79.

[2] Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Nov. 4, 1873; Philadelphia *Bulletin*, Nov. 7, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Oct. 7, 22, 25, Nov. 6, 1873; Chicago *Times*, Oct. 4, 18, 25, 1873; Chicago *Tribune*, Nov. 23, Dec. 4, 1873; New York *Evening Mail*, Oct. 15, 1873; Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, Nov. 6, 1873; Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (New York, 1926), I, 89.

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aided distressed members, but most urban labor unions lacked the funds to help jobless workers. "Real poverty," wrote the New York *Tribune*, " . . . is hidden away in garrets and tenements as if it were a crime." [3]

But self-help societies and makeshift relief arrangements remained few and far between in 1873. More than this, popular ideology blamed poverty on individual weakness and failure. The accusing finger pointed directly at the unemployed worker: he was lazy, lived carelessly, and lacked "virtue." "Saving is not their forte," concluded the New York *Graphic* of the unemployed:

> They want so many of the comforts of life that laying up money is out of the question. . . . A spirit of manly self-reliance is the best friend a workingman can have at any time. . . . There is no point in railing at the rich nor in scowling at the capitalists nor in condemning corporations simply because one's stomach is empty and he happens to be dinnerless. . . . Whining and whimpering are as useless as they are disgusting.

A Cincinnati writer argued that "people who expect to govern themselves must also learn to take care of themselves" and offered simple advice: the unemployed worker should "make a small package of his necessary clothes, commend his family . . . to the mercies of God and the care of the charitable, and set himself on foot if need be into the country in quest of work." Spokesmen for philanthropic organizations offered little sympathy. The New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor found that most idle workers belonged to the "degraded class . . . who have the vague idea that 'the world owes them a living.'" According to the superintendent of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, most able-bodied men were "loafing around the streets" and could find work "if they were not too lazy to look for it." Suspicious of the jobless worker, he insisted: "If the manifest destiny of a man is the poor house, we must let him go there. To aid some men will do them no good." Not surprisingly, charity officials meticulously isolated "pau-

[3] New York *Herald*, Nov. 8, 1873, Feb. 15, March 19, 1874; Philadelphia *Inquirer*, Nov. 6, 12, Dec. 2, 1873, Feb. 21, 1874; Philadelphia *Bulletin*, Nov. 19, 1873; Philadelphia *North American*, Jan. 1, 1874; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Nov. 5, 23, 25, 1873; New York *Tribune*, Jan. 20, 27, 31, 1874; New York *World*, Feb. 15, 1874.

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pers" and "idlers" from the "honest poor." Home visitors and investigators carefully checked out most aspirants for relief and helped victims of "disabling sickness or other providential causes" but left all others "to the pressure of necessity to coerce them to self-support." [4]

Some workers complained about charity. The New York Workingmen's Central Council rejected "the crumbs that fall from the tables of the rich in the form of charity," and a New York building trades worker lamented that "the thought of being obliged to beg what . . . honest labor entitles . . . [one] to is the keenest suffering of all." But for all the humiliation public and private charity heaped upon them, thousands of urban workers sought help in the months following the "panic" and taxed the limited resources of well-established public and private agencies. Unemployed men and women in New York, Boston, Cincinnati, and Cleveland crowded neigborhood police stations for overnight lodging. Even though New York labor leaders called them "living charnel houses . . . reeking with filth and vermin" and philanthropist Theodore Roosevelt Sr. said they were "foul" and "filthy in the extreme," each night New York police officials turned away almost two thousand applicants for lack of space. Some weeks more than fourteen thousand New Yorkers slept in the station houses. Traditional institutions of public relief also were jammed. New Yorkers slept on the floors of city-operated almshouses, and the county poor house serviced twice as many Chicago poor in 1873 as it did in 1872. The New York Commissioners of Charity gave out more relief in January 1874 than in the entire year ending in November 1873. According to the New York *World,* in the early months of the depression, one of every ten New Yorkers received some public or private aid. "The principal trouble is want of labor," complained a helpless New York public charity official. "Formerly we confined . . . relief to women. Now the men come to us hungry with hollow cheeks. . . . It is terrible, terrible." [5]

[4] New York *Graphic,* Nov, 10, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial,* Nov. 12, 15, 1873; Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 23, 1873; Chicago *Times,* Dec. 23, 1873; NYAICP, *30 Annual Report, 1873* (New York, 1873), 41 ff. and *31 Annual Report, 1874* (New York, 1874), 27–28.

[5] New York *World,* Nov. 10, 23, 30, Dec. 12, 1873; New York *Times,* Nov. 16, Dec. 28, 1873, Feb. 24, 1874; New York *Sun,* Jan. 19, 1874; Cincinnati

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II

As early as mid-October 1873, small numbers of city workers started asking for public employment in place of humiliating and ineffective forms of public and private aid. Traditional accounts ascribe the public works "movement" to native and immigrant members of the socialist International Workingmen's Association, but a careful study of the movement, its leaders, and its objectives tells a different story.[6]

The movement differed between cities: craft unionists, old-time Jacksonian "radicals," adherents to Greenback and currency reform, and anti-monopolists of one stripe or another vied with socialists for leadership of the unemployed. Socialist influence was negligible in some cities but dominant in Chicago. The demand for public works actually came from a heterogeneous group thrown together in an unstable and, at times, confused movement. The severity of the depression drew these persons together, but from the beginning they lacked central leadership, a common program, and a common ideology. The earliest plea for public works did not come from the socialists but rather from the Spring Street "International," a tiny group of New York reformers and radicals expelled from the socialist International in 1872 for their non-Marxian, pro-Greenback outlook. The Spring Street faction was joined by the New York Workingmen's Central Council, a trades' assembly closely tied to the Industrial Congress, and twenty New York labor unions. New York's socialists came in some time later. Currency reformers, trade unionists, and socialists led the Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Detroit unemployed from the start.

Early spokesmen for the unemployed demanded concrete programs of public works and aid. They asked New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati city officials for public employment bureaus, improved streets and parks, a rapid transit

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Commercial, Oct. 22, Nov. 25, 1873; Chicago *Tribune*, Dec. 27, 1873; "The Homeless Poor of New York," *Catholic World*, XVI (1872), 206–12; Leah Feder, *Unemployment Relief in Periods of Depression* (New York, 1936), 39, 47–48, 64–66.

[6] Gompers, 89 ff.; John R. Commons and others, *History of Labor in the United States* (New York, 1918), II, 219–20; Philip S. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States* (New York, 1947), I, 445–46; Samuel Bernstein, *The First International in America* (New York, 1962), 195–235.

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system, and municipally-owned markets where workers could buy necessities at cost. The Philadelphia unemployed wanted wages for public works to be set by a joint committee of workers and aldermen. "Soft" currency and contemporary Greenback doctrine convinced others that their recommendations were not utopian, and schemes to pay for public works included the issuance of paper money, the sale of low-interest bonds, federal loans, and wages paid in non-interest bearing city scrip. The Cincinnati unemployed offered a plan financed by funds collected from trade union members and contributions from sympathetic non-workers. Petitions addressed to local, state, and even federal authorities attacked laissez-faire doctrines and insisted that "society in its collective capacity" was "alone capable of dealing with the present gigantic difficulty." The widely copied "declaration" of the Spring Street "International" argued that "all penniless, houseless, involuntarily idle persons without regard to maturity or previous condition are properly the wards of the nation and should not be suffered to roam the streets . . . uncared for and neglected." Government had aided the wealthy in the past; now it had "to legislate for the good of all, not the few." "No single action of government protects the interests of labor," complained the Philadelphia unemployed, and government had to save workers "from the onerous burdens they so long and patiently have borne." Cincinnati labor leaders argued that since government legislation had given bankers, speculators, and other "unproductive capitalists" power to "start" a depression, it was "neither honorable, right, nor just that while the possessors of capital continue to clothe, feed, and house themselves as usual . . . labor—poor labor—should go cold, ragged, and hungry." [7]

From the start, interest in the movement was uneven in different cities. Silk and iron workers paraded the street of Paterson, New Jersey, and on at least one occasion, after threatening to storm the city hall, were restrained by the police. Nearly five thousand German and native-born work-

[7] For the diverse leadership of the "movement" and its demands, see New York *Sun*, Oct. 23, Nov. 4, 1873; New York *Times*, Nov. 16, 1873; Philadelphia *Bulletin*, Nov. 7, 1873; Chicago *Times*, Nov. 11, 17, 1873; Chicago *Tribune*, Nov. 13–18, 1873; *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*, Nov. 10, 1873.

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ers met in early November and set up ten Phildelphia ward organizations for the unemployed. Led by socialists and currency reformers (and, perhaps, by members of the still secret Knights of Labor), they gathered twice in Independence Square and called on the mayor and city officials several times. But the movement came to an abrupt and unexplained end in early December. In New York, Cincinnati, and Detroit, the plea for public works went unnoticed at first. The Detroit unemployed formed a few ward committees but factionalism quickly ended their efforts. Only the leaders of ten unions, some German immigrants, and a few currency reformers and socialists agitated in Cincinnati. In mid-November, the Workingmen's Central Council attracted eight hundred persons to a meeting to protest the refusal of New York city officials to heed its petitions and remonstrances. Small groups of labor leaders and others met with Mayor William Havemeyer, and a number of workers crowded the City Hall galleries and asked the New York aldermen for large-scale public works.

City officials everywhere turned down the early requests for public aid, and the urban press scorned the demand. Irate taxpayers forced an end to a limited program of street repairs started by the Paterson city government. The Board of Aldermen refused to meet with committees sent by the Philadelphia unemployed. Mayor Havemeyer told a group of New York workers that public works meant higher taxes and the "confiscation" of property. The press joined in and called public employment "the paternal theory in politics pushed to its very last extreme" and favored only by "lunatics and addle-headed communists." The Chicago *Tribune* even warned of the repetition of the French 1848 scheme of national workshops and other programs "commonly known as Socialism." Little could be done for the unemployed by the government, according to the New York *Times,* for "the natural laws of trade" were "working themselves out," and the government could "only watch the process." "Things," insisted the *Times,* "must regulate themselves." [8]

[8] New York *Sun,* Nov. 20–Dec. 10, 1873, Jan. 15, 1874; New York *Herald,* Nov. 6, 11, 16, 1873; New York *Tribune,* Nov. 10, 11, 12, 20, 1873; New York *Times,* Nov. 10, 11, 1873; New York *World,* Nov. 10, 16, 20, 1873; *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly,* Dec. 6, 1873; *Arbeiter Zeitung* (New York), Nov. 15, 29, 1873; Philadelphia *Inquirer,* Oct. 27, Nov. 10, 17, 21, Dec. 15,

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III

In place of ineffective local protests a short-lived but seemingly popular movement for government intervention and aid emerged in late November 1873. Heard in most large cities, the plea for "Work or Bread" was loudest in New York where a number of trade unionists and socialists concluded that mere resolutions could not convince public officials. The Workingmen's Central Council, therefore, planned a parade to City Hall, and George Blair, its leader and later active member in the Knights of Labor, asked that sixty thousand workers join the demonstration. At the same moment, the socialists chimed in and offered support. After German socialists in the tenth ward formed a local club that favored public employment, *Arbeiter Zeitung,* the German socialist weekly, urged similar organizations in other wards and a city-wide central council of the unemployed to pressure municipal authorities. A socialist "manifesto" printed in English and German and circulated in the lower Manhattan immigrant wards demanded a full program of municipal public works, a week's supply of food or money to distressed families from the city, and the suspension of evictions for the non-payment of rent during the winter months. The socialists phrased their demands in fiery language: "To avoid the fate of slaves, all workingmen must organize, combine their forces, increase their numbers, and centralize their powers." J. P. McDonnell, an exiled Irish Fenian and a militant socialist who had arrived in the United States some months earlier, argued in the New York *Sun* that because politicians never listened to small groups of workers labor had to organize "the greatest demonstration ever held in New York . . . and see what effect it will have upon our wealthy citizens and law-makers." [9]

After the Workingmen's Central Council and the German socialists formed a central council of the unemployed and six or seven ward organizations, the immigrant working

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1873; Philadelphia *Bulletin,* Nov. 7, 11, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial,* Nov. 5, 6, 7, 15, 19, 20, 25, 1873; Chicago *Tribune,* Nov. 13–18, 1873; Chicago *Times,* Nov. 17, 1873.

[9] J. P. McDonnell to the editor, New York *Sun,* n.d., clipping in McDonnell Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin; New York *Sun,* Nov. 28, 1873; *Arbeiter Zeitung,* Nov. 1–29, 1873.

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class community buzzed with activity. Neighborhood meetings, including one that involved fifteen hundred French workers and some refugees from post-Commune Paris, endorsed the socialist proposals. A local committee urged a judge to prevent the eviction of persons unable to pay rent. German socialists met with the Workingmen's Central Council and advised it to build strong ward organizations. Though bitterly at odds with the socialists on most matters, the Spring Street radicals agreed to cooperate. And men of "almost every nationality . . . as well as every trades' union in the city," wrote the New York *Times,* crowded Central Council meetings. Early in December, twenty-five leading trade unionists and labor radicals and reformers endorsed the plea of the Central Council and urged a meeting of the unemployed in Cooper Institue on December 11. Wagons decorated with placards announcing the meeting paraded the streets. A public call also went to socialist and labor organizations in other cities urging them to hold similar meetings.[10]

Even though the German socialists played an important role in setting up ward organizations and a few prominent socialists, such as Frederick Bolte, the secretary of the International Workingmen's Association, and Konrad Karl, the editor of *Arbeiter Zeitung,* helped plan the Cooper Institute meeting, it is erroneous to attribute these developments solely to them. They were too small a group and too bitterly divided to lead any popular movement. The spokesmen for the unemployed were primarily craft unionists, anti-monopolists, and currency reformers. Men such as John T. Elliot, Leander Thompson, and Theodore Banks had once belonged to the socialist International, but by 1873 they were less influenced by socialist than by Greenback and anti-monopoly ideology. Like George Blair and most other New York trade unionists, they accepted fundamental property relations but vigorously protested against the unfair distribution of wealth and the upper-class bias of most legislation. The call to Cooper Institute bitterly attacked city officials for rejecting earlier demands:

[10] "Public Call to Cooper Institute," *Workingman's Advocate,* Dec. 10, 1873; New York *Times,* Dec. 1–9, 1873; New York *World,* Dec. 2, 5, 1873; New York *Sun,* Dec. 2, 1873; New York *Herald,* Dec. 5, 1873; New York *Graphic,* Dec. 10, 1873.

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> What shall be done to relieve the necessities of the ten thousand homeless and hungry men and women of our city whose urgent appeals have apparently been disregarded by our public servants? . . . Is it employment and pay that working people should demand or the grudgingly given and debased bread of charity? . . . Is the centralizing of enormous wealth, earned by the masses, into the coffers of the few, the system that should obtain in a Republic, while the common people are steadily going down to want and helpless dependence?

The statement condemned the "centralizing" of wealth and urged "some proper limit . . . upon the avarice of man in the acquirement of speculative wealth." In sharp contrast to the earlier socialist declaration, the Cooper Institute call showed the anti-monopolist and non-socialist orientation of most of its signers. It spoke of limiting personal wealth, not abolishing private property, and it used as its yardstick the "Republic," not the labor theory of value. Socialists participated in the New York movement, but their Marxian views were shared only by a tiny minority of its leaders.[11]

Unemployment increased as winter approached, and the movement for public works and state aid to the unemployed gained support from thousands of urban workers and attracted much public attention. Chicago and Cincinnati workers paraded the streets with placards reading "Work or Bread" and "Death to Starvation." Poor and jobless immigrants in Cincinnati, Chicago, and New York found meaning in the movement, and the specter of propertyless, foreign-born workers demanding state aid had an electrifying impact on the urban community. Residents of large cities, explained the Chicago *Tribune,* were "entirely unprepared for anything of the kind," and the plea of the unemployed struck "like lightning from a clear, blue sky." [12]

Starting with the New York Cooper Institute meeting, the demand for public works picked up momentum all through December. More than four thousand persons, including many women and immigrants, jammed into Cooper Institute, and, in spite of a heavy rainfall, thousands of others

[11] Copybook of the IWA, 326–33, IWA, MSS., State Historical Society of Wisconsin; *Workingman's Advocate,* Dec. 10, 1873; New York *Times,* Jan. 23, 1874.

[12] Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 22, 23, 1873.

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milled outside near two platforms to hear German and English speakers. "The crush," wrote the New York *Times*, "was unprecedented." That same night, a large group of Boston workers gathered in Faneuil Hall and heard speeches by leaders of the Massachusetts Labor Reform party and the Eight Hour League. German and native-born socialists attracted increasing numbers of Cincinnati workers to meetings. Indianapolis witnessed its largest labor gathering ever when more than two thousand persons met at the invitation of local labor unions and the Indianapolis Trades' Assembly. On December 21, after a call from the immigrant socialists, an overflow crowd of between five and seven thousand Chicago workers—the largest labor meeting in Chicago history—packed into Turner Hall to listen to speakers in English, German, Polish, Czech, and Danish. The Chicago turnout was so large that a second meeting took place that night.[13]

At all of these meetings and at similar gatherings in Louisville, Pittsburgh, and Newark, public responsibilty and aid to the unemployed were the dominant themes. Behind the Cooper Institute speaker's platform hung a bust of George Washington with a pair of evenly balanced tin scales suspended from it and below them the inscription, "THE UNEMPLOYED DEMAND WORK—THE DAWN OF LIBERTY, DECEMBER 11, 1873." The New York workers urged street, park, and pier improvements and the building of small workers' homes on a one hundred-acre tract set aside in 1871 as a military parade ground. A resolution rejecting violence against persons and property was adopted,

[13] New York *World*, Dec. 12, 1873; New York *Sun*, Dec. 12, 1873; New York *Herald*, Dec. 15, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Dec. 14, 1873; Chicago *Times*, Dec. 14, 1873; Indianapolis *Daily Sentinel*, Dec. 23, 1873; *Cooper's New Monthly*, I (1874), 5–6. Chicago socialists began organizing the unemployed early in December and spread the following broadside among immigrant workers: "While thousands of workmen and businessmen are reduced to poverty and misery, capital is gaining the profits, and, in concentration, assumes a still more dangerous attitude. There is but one remedy . . . [and] it consists in the energetic union and concentration of the workingmen in one solid organization. . . . For by united action the evil will be removed, and then it will be hardly possible that while we have overfilled magazines with the staff of life and empty tenements—that the masses should starve, freeze to death, or wander without shelter. . . . We ask only for the necessities of life. Workingmen! Rally! Join in the phalanx! Let your number and a strong organization be your and your family's safety! For we have nothing to lose and everything to gain!" Chicago *Tribune*, Dec. 23, 1873.

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but the workers warned the New York authorities: "We will in time of need supply ourselves and families with proper shelter and [the] necessities of life and send all our bills . . . to the city treasury to be liquidated until such time as we shall obtain work and pay for all our work." A mason put it another way while addressing a Newark audience: "Workers don't want charity but work. No man will lay down and starve. Hunger will go through a stone wall. I don't advocate force, but before I will see my family hungry I will help myself." Chicago and Cincinnati socialists also asked for public employment, and the Chicago workers insisted that a committee of workers, not charity officials, distribute all public and private relief funds. "We find ourselves without the necessaries of life," said the Chicago unemployed, "and we claim the right to live."

Soon after these meetings, the unemployed renewed their pressure on the local authorities. In Boston and Indianapolis, they submitted long, detailed petitions. Small numbers of Irish and German laborers formed ward committees and asked the Pittsburgh Common Council to establish "workers' committees" to raise subscriptions for the unemployed. Louisville workers set up a Manufacturer's and Laborer's Exchange and petitioned local landlords and industrialists to go easy on their workers. Cincinnati and Chicago workers made their feelings known in an even more dramatic manner by parading the streets. Between six hundred and one thousand workers, mostly German immigrants, twice marched through the streets to the Cincinnati city hall. The Chicago socialist Socio-Political Workingmen's Union enrolled six thousand families of diverse nationalities and on December 22 more than ten thousand workers paraded the streets carrying German and English transparencies that read "War Against Idleness," "Unity Makes Strength," and "We Want Labor and Not Beggary." In what the otherwise hostile Chicago *Times* called "one of the most orderly demonstrations the city ever beheld," the workers accompanied their spokesmen to the city hall to demand public works from the Common Council.[14]

[14] New York *World*, Dec. 12, 1873; New York *Herald*, Dec. 15, 1873, Jan. 12, 1874; New York *Tribune*, Dec. 24, 1873; Pittsburgh *Post*, Dec. 20, 1873, Jan. 20, 23, 1874; *Workingman's Advocate*, Dec. 20, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Dec. 14–16, 1873; Chicago *Times*, Dec. 14–22, 1873; Chicago *Tribune*, Dec. 22–25, 1873; Indianapolis *Daily Sentinel*, Dec. 23, 1873.

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The leaders of the New York unemployed started a city-wide organization led by a fifty-man Committee of Safety appointed at the Cooper Institute meeting "to look after the interests of all the people and, if need be, enforce them." Headed by trade unionist George Blair and including among its members prominent German socialists and leaders of such unions as the tailors, paper hangers, longshoremen, painters, and bricklayers, the Committee had a German, French, Irish, and American secretary. It assigned men to organize ward clubs of the unemployed throughout the city, and by the end of December Blair said the Germans had a club in every ward and that native-born workers had started clubs, too. In one ward, the unemployed planned an appeal to the State Legislature asking for suspension of rent payments for the winter months. Addressing numerous ward meetings, Committee leaders urged workers to "band together" like the "farmers of the West" and "turn the plunderers out of office." And they visited city authorities to press for extensive public works "for the people now in enforced idleness . . . their idleness having been brought about by the government sanctioning speculation in our circulating medium." Gompers remembered the vitality of the movement many years later when he wrote that "the whole city stirred under the burden heaped upon it by conscienceless speculators." [15]

Putting direct pressure on city officials encouraged leaders of the unemployed to talk of labor politics, for they believed that relief would come only after the "producing classes" held political power. The Chicago socialists supported "the endeavors of the farmers to do away with monopolies" and started the Workingmen's party of Illinois. The socialists formed the Industrial party of Cincinnati, and the Louisville unemployed pushed unsuccessfully for a Greenback-oriented labor party. Except for certain socialists who eschewed political action, most of the leaders of the New York Committee of Safety also favored labor politics. At Cooper Institute, they urged cooperation with the Grange to destroy the "hydra monster monopoly" and soon formed the Peo-

[15] New York *World*, Dec. 13, 15, 16, 30, 1873; New York *Times*, Dec. 12, 27, 1873, Jan. 23, 1874; New York *Herald*, Dec. 27, 1873; G. B. (Blair) to the editor, *Workingman's Advocate*, Jan. 10, 1874; Gompers, 89 ff.

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ple's party. Twenty trade unions supported this party, as did the Workingmen's Central Council which called it the "only true means of success for an oppressed people." "The laboring people here," George Blair excitedly wrote the Chicago *Workingman's Advocate,* "are taking advantage of the crisis and are *organizing*—organizing on the question of bread and for future political action." [16]

In spite of Blair's enthusiasm, the large crowded meetings, and the increasing number of unemployed workers, the movement for public works was doomed from the start. Internal disagreements weakened it everywhere, and the shrill, hostile reaction to the proposals by the urban middle and upper classes assured the rejection of the grievances by the unemployed. Agreement on the need for public works among those leading the movement did not mean accord on other matters. The New York Workingmen's Union, dominated by Tammany Democrats, continually attacked its rival, the Workingmen's Central Council, as well as the Committee of Safety. Members of the Spring Street "International" withdrew from the Committee of Safety because it assumed too much power. Blair complained that "traitors, demagogues, and political tricksters" were wrecking the movement, but it was more than that. The socialists and non-socialists shared little in common. Most urban trade unionists and labor reformers rejected the socialists and identified them with traditional anti-radical stereotypes. The *Iron Molder's Journal* said the socialists favored "agrarianism" and were "irresponsible, ignorant, blatant idiots," and the *Workingman's Advocate* found that the socialist immigrants did not realize that "in a true Republic there need be no necessity for an appeal to arms." Even though Blair and other non-socialists favored cooperation with the radicals, other labor leaders objected and quit the Committee of Safety. As they led the unemployed through the streets, the Cincinnati socialists were met by local Greenback reformers and William Saffin, president of the Iron Molder's

[16] Cincinnati *Commercial,* Feb. 27, March 19, 1874; Cincinnati *Enquirer,* Feb. 6, April 4, 1874; Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 22–30, 1873, Jan. 19, Feb. 2, March 2, 9, 1874; New York *Herald,* Dec. 13, 1873; *Workingman's Advocate,* Jan. 10, 1874.

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International Union, who condemned the socialists and asked the workers to repudiate "extreme or revolutionary measures." [17]

Nor was this all. The labor leaders, anti-monopolists, and currency reformers who supported the demand for public works were steeped in pre-Civil War reform ideology. Socialism made no sense to them. Their plea for public works rested on a belief in "equal rights," rather than on a theory of exploitation. Social analysis offered by these reformers drew heavily upon a "conspiracy theory" of change and crisis.[18] They argued that bankers and speculators perverted the republican governmental structure and did so because irresponsible and venal public officials granted "special privileges" to the "Moneyocracy" at the expense of the "producing classes." The unholy alliance between government and the financial classes deprived workers of their "natural rights" and also caused economic crises. Non-socialist speaker after speaker at the unemployed meetings blamed the depression on the power granted the financial community by the government. Martin Foran, president of the Cooper's International Union, said in Indianapolis that "all the evil of the present financial crash" lay "at the door of the general government." Other speakers complained that "corrupt legislatures, money-grabbing Presidents, and Credit-Mobilier Governors" stole "power from the People" and then "started" depressions. The main speaker at the Cooper Institute meeting, John T. Elliot, argued that a few wealthy men "speculate in stocks, money, gold, or other commodities" and thereby bring on crises. The trade unionists and labor reformers did not question the "rights" of "legitimate" capital; they only attacked its abuses. "To stop panics," a German reformer told the New York unemployed, "there must be a repeal of those laws which protect the privileges—not the rights—of capital." [19]

[17] New York *Herald*, Dec. 15, 1873; *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*, Dec. 27, 1873, Jan. 3, 1874; *Workingman's Advocate*, Jan. 10, 1874; New York *Times*, Dec. 9, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Dec. 14–22, 1873; *Iron Molder's Journal*, Jan. 1874, 194–96; *Workingman's Advocate*, Dec. 13, 1873.

[18] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R.* (New York, 1956), 70–81; Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), 270–300.

[19] New York *Sun*, Dec. 12, 1873; New York *World*, Dec. 12, 1873; New

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If capital had "rights," so, too, did workers. Public works meant "a recognition of natural rights." Francis Hoffman told the Chicago unemployed: "What is the good of a government that will not support the poor and see that their wants are supplied? . . . You need not go down on your knees like beggars, for you don't ask but what you are entitled to." Elliot made the same point: "If the individual owes allegiance and support to the Government, the Government also owes allegiance and protection to the individual. . . . We demand for these starving, freezing citizens the support and protection due honest, law-abiding citizens." Foran echoed this view and remarked: "We do not ask for favors, but we do demand rights." [20]

Fear of the "money power" and a belief in "natural rights" affected the kind of reforms that the non-socialists favored. They urged a fully elastic national currency, and in New York supported a limitation on personal wealth and a referendum on all major legislation. "All things in nature and in our laws are limited," Elliot explained, "except the power to accumulate money." Elliot and the New York workers, therefore, favored a graduated income tax so as to limit individual wealth to three hundred thousand dollars and thus prevent the "money power" from "locking up our circulating medium" and causing depressions.[21]

No part of this ideology met with the approval of the socialists, who scoffed at the idea of "natural rights" and repudiated the notion of a "moneyocracy." Instead, the Chicago socialists blamed the depression on "corrupt social institutions . . . and over-production" and insisted that the experience of American workers "proved" that the United States was not "the land of liberty, wealth, and equality," and that republican institutions were a "sham." They rejected the idea that "capital" had legitimate rights. A New York socialist manifesto saw only conflict between labor and capital:

> There is no harmony between labor and capital, but strife, incessant strife. . . . Workingmen don't be deluded by the

York *Herald* Dec. 12, 1873; Indianapolis *Daily Sentinel,* Dec. 23, 1873.

[20] See, in addition to the sources cited in note 19, the following: Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 22, 1873; Chicago *Times,* Dec. 22, 1873.

[21] New York *Sun,* Dec. 12, 1873; New York *World,* Dec. 12, 1873.

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> phrases of your oppressors! . . . They will assert the inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness but live in luxury while you are deprived of the necessities of life.

Committed to such beliefs, a number of German socialists quit the Committee of Safety because of its reformist, nonsocialist, and avowedly political program. Some socialists worked in the New York ward organizations, but the International Workingmen's Association officially frowned on the movement because it did not "aim at the emancipation of labor." [22]

Internal disagreements weakened the public works movement, and the entirely hostile response by the well-to-do urban classes negated it. Analyzing similar requests during the 1857 depression, Benjamin Klebaner has written: "That work relief and public works should have been proposed in many quarters as the obvious palliative for the plight of the unemployed is not surprising, given the central position of work in the American ethic." [23] In 1873, however, the urban press rejected the plea for public works and government aid to the unemployed out of hand. Its response contained elements of surprise, ridicule, contempt, and apparently genuine fear, but none of understanding or sympathy. The United States was "a workingman's country," and its workers had "no burdens, social or political, upon them." Public employment was "sheer, unadulterated bosh," and men demanding it were "disgusting," "crazy," "loudmouthed gasometers," "impudent vagabonds," even "ineffable asses." Such men would "chop off the heads of every man addicted to clean linen." They wanted to make "Government an institution to pillage the individual for the benefit of the mass." Jane Grey Swisshelm, a prominent journalist, said the United States was not "made for paupers or that class of men who spend large wages on wasteful luxuries." Hopefully, "yellow fever, cholera, or any other blessing" would sweep these persons from the earth. Depressions, after all, were normal and necessary adjustments, and workers could only "quietly bide their time till the natural laws

[22] Chicago *Tribune*, Dec. 22, 23, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Dec. 14–22, 1873; *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Nov.–Dec., 1873; *Copybook of the IWA*, IWA MSS., 326–33; New York *Tribune*, Jan. 30, 1874.

[23] Klebaner, 279.

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of trade" brought renewed prosperity. Readers of *The Nation* learned that only Africa and central Asia were depression free and that government intervention meant retrogression. Private charity and alms as well as "free" land, moreover, remained adequate solutions for unemployment. "The United States," said the New York *Times,* "is the only 'socialistic,' or more correctly 'agrarian,' government in the world in that it offers good land at nominal prices to every settler and thereby takes the sting from Communism." If the unemployed "prefer to cling to the great cities to oversupply labor," added the Chicago *Times,* "the fault is theirs." Jane Swisshelm summed up the argument: "A Law of Nature" isolated men from each other and made no man "his brother's keeper." [24]

None of the proposals of the unemployed was viewed with favor, but the demand by the New York workers that personal wealth be limited to three hundred thousand dollars by a graduated income tax was criticized most severely of all. To restrict the "ambition of building up colossal fortunes" meant an end to all "progress," feared the Chicago *Times.* To ask a wealthy individual to share his possessions with a "tramp fresh from some gin shop" sounded as foolish as "a demand that a man like Webster should share his brains with some ignoramus who sweeps a crossing, or that a woman like Florence Nightingale should be relieved of the accumulations of philanthropy in her nature in order to make up the deficiency in some other woman who prostitutes the lives of her sisters in a bagnio." The New York *Tribune* found any limitation on personal wealth an effort "to have employment without employers," which was "almost as impossible . . . as to get into the world without ancestors." Confiscation of wealth "solely the result of superior saving on the part of one workingman over another" was criminal.[25]

Socialist participation in the unemployed movement together with the provocative threats and shrill talk of certain radicals and reformers, coming so soon after the Paris Com-

[24] New York *Tribune,* Dec. 12, 1873; New York *Herald,* Dec. 14, 27, 1873; New York *Times,* Dec. 12, 14, 28, 1873; New York *World,* Dec. 12, 1873; New York *Graphic,* Dec. 14, 1873; Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 22–27, 1873; Chicago *Times,* Dec. 16, 29, 1873: *The Nation,* Dec. 18, 1873, 399.

[25] Chicago *Times,* Dec. 16, 25, 1873; New York *Tribune,* Dec. 12, 1873.

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mune, heightened the anxiety of the urban press. More than this, it revealed the literate upper classes as much committed to a conspiracy theory of change and social crisis as the lower classes. The press identified public works with the foreign-born, the immigrant radicals, and "alien" doctrine. A Pittsburgh business weekly found public employment "redolent of monarchical dependency [and] communism." The Chicago *Tribune* found the "right to work" a product of the French Revolution, and the Chicago *Times* attacked immigrant aid societies for draining "Europe of its paupers" and thrusting them "for support upon American communities." The agitation came from "hordes of immigrants . . . just landed on our shores," ignorant of the fact that the state's only function was "to give them liberty to care for themselves." A St. Louis daily advised these poor to "work their passage back to the lands of their birth." "There are thousands," warned a Chicago Unitarian minister, "who . . . are ready to become the writhing body of any monster mob that can find a head, like the *sans-culotte* of the French Revolution." According to one newspaper, too many immigrants favored "riot and disorder. . . . How long will it be before they elect to take by force what is not given voluntarily?" After a parade of workers, the Chicago *Times* queried, "Is Chicago in the hands of 'La Commune'?" Remembering that force had suppressed the Communards, the *Times* worried, "Are we to be required to face a like alternative?" The Chicago *Tribune* warned against the socialists because Karl Marx foolishly rejected the classical economists and denied that "the principles of current economic science" were "immutable," "necessary," and had "their roots in human nature." Danger came from the socialists because they refused to "accept our political economy any more than a Mohammedan accepts Christianity, if indeed as much," and the *Tribune* concluded: "The coalition of foreign nationalities must be for a foreign, a non-American, object. The principles of these men are wild and subversive of society itself." [26]

Some urban residents even urged the use of force against the unemployed. Before the Cooper Institute meeting, New

[26] *Pittsburgh American Manufacturer,* Jan. 8, 1874; Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 23, 25, 26, 1873; Chicago *Times,* Dec. 23, 1873.

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York police officials ordered plainclothes detectives to spy on ward meetings. Police superintendent George Matsell, arguing that French and German radicals did "their utmost to inflame the workingman's mind," ordered the entire reserve police force to duty the night of the Cooper Institute meeting because he feared "a labor riot." Similar precautions took place in Cincinnati and Chicago. "If Chicago is in the hands of La Commune," warned the *Times,* "then La Commune and not Chicago must perish." A newspaperman wrote of the New York unemployed that "their dispersion with shrapnel would not have been unmerited," and Jane Swisshelm insisted that if "Constitutional limits" circumscribed the power of city authorities they should send "to some museum for a wax Emperor or a sawdust King and put him at the head of affairs." [27]

Blinded by abstract ideologies and a devotion to "natural" economic laws, committed to a conspiracy theory of change and social crisis so often attributed by historians only to the lower classes, and affected economically by the severity of the depression, urban residents did not identify with the poor or with the demand for public works. "When the question of economy comes before the citizen," explained the Cincinnati *Gazette,* "the plea of love for the laborer will not be received." Though some local politicians favored a program of public works as temporary relief, the Cincinnati Board of City Improvements rejected the plans offered by the unemployed. New York Mayor William Havemeyer, a prominent sugar manufacturer, talked with a group of workers:

> *Fitzgibbons:* We have waited on your honor to request you to sign the ordinances recently passed by the Common Council . . . to proceed with . . . certain public works. You are aware, sir, that thousands of men are out of employment. . . . We are afraid, sir, that unless we work our wives and children will starve.
>
> *Havemeyer:* I know how all this is; I know that it is hard for you to be out of employment; but don't you think that workingmen should lay up something for a rainy day?

[27] New York *Sun,* Dec. 8, 12, 1873; New York *Evening Post,* Dec. 11, 1873; New York *World,* Dec. 11, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial,* Dec. 14–22, 1873; Chicago *Times,* Dec. 22–30, 1873; Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 22–25, 30, 1873; *Workingman's Advocate,* Dec. 20, 1873.

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Fitzgibbons: Yes, sir, that's all very well, but workingmen can't save much out of their wages. Rents are so high; and then many of us can only work four or five days out of a week.

Havemeyer: Now, my boys are all workingmen. I have brought them all up . . . to hard work.

A Delegate: But they knew their father was a rich man and would see 'em through if they got in a fix.

Havemeyer: I like to see men employed, gentlemen, and I would like to have it within my power to set you all to work; but I would like to see men save money. . . . Men who get rich, gentlemen, are men who save. When a man has $100 in a bank he becomes a capitalist. . . . Now, my father when he came to London from Germany got about $100 a year, and he saved money. He didn't go to the beer shop and theaters every night; but he did go to the theaters once in a while, and when he went he always took a box. He didn't go in the pit. He took pride in presenting a good appearance.

Grey-haired Delegate: He had good sense. But I want to say, sir, that a workingman can't get property in this city nowadays.

Havemeyer: Some do. . . .[28]

The Chicago socialists and unemployed faced other difficulties. While the workers paraded toward City Hall, the Common Council rejected an enlarged public works program and recommended instead that the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, a private agency organized after the disastrous 1871 fire, distribute some of its seven hundred thousand dollars of surplus funds to the needy. The mayor, some aldermen, and a committee of socialists met with Relief and Aid Society officials, and the socialists, charging the Society with corruption and favoritism, urged that its funds be used for public works. After the proposal was rejected, the socialists asked that city officials or a committee composed equally of American, Irish, German, and Scandinavian workers distribute the surplus. Society officials, it was charged, were "speculating on starvation" and "strangers in feeling and understanding." Turning down this alternative, the

[28] Cincinnati *Gazette*, n.d., cited in Chicago *Tribune*, Dec. 26, 1873; Cincinnati *Commercial*, Dec. 14–23, 1873; Chicago *Times*, Dec. 14–23, 1873; New York *World*, Dec. 27, 1873; New York *Herald*, Dec. 27, 1873.

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officials invited the socialists to join them "in God's work" and help "rescue the poor and the suffering." Complimenting the Society, the city's fathers found it entirely "able to take care of, to feed, to clothe . . . the wives and children of men who cannot work." A socialist complained that "if we have labor, there will be no necessity for coming to this Society to draw upon its funds," but the city officials and charity leaders once again rejected all suggestions for an enlarged public works program.[29]

By the end of December 1873, the agitation for public works died down everywhere except in New York. The frustrated Cincinnati and Chicago socialists turned from street demonstrations and petitions to politics and pushed the Workingmen's party of Illinois and the Industrial party of Cincinnati. "The poor," complained New York trade unionist William Jessup during the Christmas holiday, "who cares to think in this hour of merry-making who or where they are." John Bray, still imbued with Chartist ideals, disillusionedly complained that "the call for government help, so long as our government is controlled by monied rings, is ridiculous." In New York, however, the movement was yet to reach its climax. Thurlow Weed, aged but still a master Republican politician, warned his followers of the "danger" created by the agitation for public works. He excoriated the "evil doctrines of the International" and urged an enlarged program of private relief and charity. "It is not a question of duty, of sympathy, or of interest," Weed insisted, "but one of *safety*." The matter concerned "the rich far more deeply than the poor." But Weed feared that the wealthy class would "draw its purse strings too tightly." [30]

[29] Taking the Relief and Aid Society officials at their word, thousands of unemployed workers visited the society offices, and its building was "filled to suffocation" for days. Society head Charles Trusdall hired fifty new "visitors" to investigate each applicant. The Society retained its rigorous standards; in one instance a home visitor found only one family in twenty worthy of any aid. Nevertheless some Chicagoans criticized the society for making concessions to "Communist demagogues and deadbeats" and to "professional beggars" who drove away "the modest and deserving poor." Chicago *Tribune,* Dec. 22–31, 1873, Jan. 1, 3, 8, 1874; Chicago *Times,* Dec. 23–31, 1873; *Workingman's Advocate,* Dec. 27, 1873–Jan. 3, 1874.

[30] J. to the editor, *Workingman's Advocate,* Dec. 27, 1873–Jan. 3, 1874; John Bray to the editor, *ibid.,* Feb. 7, 1874; Thurlow Weed to the editor, New York *Tribune,* Dec. 20, 1873.

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A few weeks later, New York police vigorously and without cause clubbed and beat thousands of unemployed workers gathered in Tompkins Square. Some contemporaries called the event "a riot"; others referred to it as the "New York Commune." One fact is certain: the events at Tompkins Square are as much a part of the history of civil liberty in nineteenth-century America as they are a part of the history of the movement for public works and state intervention on behalf of the unemployed.[31]

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31 A full discussion of the Tompkins Square event is found in H. G. Gutman, "The Tompkins Square 'Riot' in New York City on January 13, 1874: A Re-examination of Its Causes and Its Aftermath," *Labor History,* VI (1965), 44–70.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE PROFESSION—A REVIEW ARTICLE

IT IS rare that the members of an academic discipline engage in extended introspection about themselves and the state of their profession. For that reason, the recent publication of Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *American Political Science: A Profile of a Profession* (New York, Atherton Press, 1964; xiv, 173 pp., $5.75) marks an event of some importance, for it provides the opportunity—and at least part of the evidence—for informed discussion of controversial substantive, methodological, and professional issues in the field of political science.

In an effort to contribute to the clarification of these issues, the editors of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY asked two distinguished political scientists, Professor Robert G. McCloskey of Harvard University and Professor Austin Ranney of the University of Wisconsin, to comment at length both on the book and the current state of the profession.

I

This volume is the latest fruit of a 1963 questionnaire which elicited from a sample of American Political Science Association members a variety of information, mostly concerning their views about the discipline they profess. The results, partially reported twice before,[1] have already enliv-

[1] At the 1963 American Political Science Association meetings and in "Trends in American Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (1963), 933.

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ened many a professional cocktail hour. This final, more exhaustive accounting wrings the last droplets of data from the inquiry and—true to the academic rituals examined—preserves it all for immortality between hard covers.

Unsympathetic bystanders might be tempted to be derisive about the whole enterprise at the outset, citing it as yet another example of America's touching faith that truth is discovered by asking a large number of people what they think the truth to be and solemnly recording and tabulating those beliefs. But such a demurrer would not, I think, be just. In the first place the authors are neither unsophisticated nor solemn. They fully recognize that truth and belief may be incongruent, and they carefully explain that they are here concerned with the latter alone.[2] Moreover their analysis is duly salted with quips and mild ironic sallies which, though something short of hilarious, do suggest that the authors are free from the vice of taking themselves too seriously. And in the second place such a sampling of opinion does have a certain value within limits, if those limits are well understood. Seeing ourselves as others see us is often useful, not because the others are necessarily right, but because their views may cause us to re-examine our own; and this is always a healthy process even if we end by reconfirming our prejudices. Beyond that, there is a sense in which beliefs can be self-fulfilling: in important respects a profession is, for better or worse, what its practitioners think it is, and a survey of those thoughts can thus be an enlightening, even though imperfect, "profile of a discipline."

The data fall into three related but separable categories. To take them up in what strikes me as an ascending order of significance, they are: an assortment of facts and fancies about what might be called the sociology of the political science fraternity; a set of judgments about who is better than who, what is inferior to what; and another set of convictions

[2] The following sentence is the only lapse from objectivity I was able to detect (describing the rankings assigned to departments in this and two previous surveys): "Harvard, perhaps illustrating our earlier comment that belief is often as important as fact, is first on all three ratings." Somit and Tanenhaus, 35. I forbear comment.

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about some of the intellectual issues that are supposed to concern political scientists as a class.

The material in the first category is of some interest to those who seek to understand the organization, behavior, and folklore of academia. But what it reveals is seldom surprising, and the potential value of the less obvious revelations is much diminished, as the authors realize, by the shortage of data from other disciplines, or from earlier periods in the life-cycle of American political science itself. The clichés of the brotherhood faithfully turn up. Ask a group of academics in the post-Veblen-Mills era whether their profession is dominated by an Establishment, and a preponderance of affirmative answers is as predictable as presbyopia. Ask whether teaching ability is irrelevant to promotion, whether status is attained by quantity rather than quality of publication, by "connections" rather than by merit, and the results are equally foreordained. As the authors say, the fact that "cynical" or "realistic" views about these matters prevail is itself cause for concern, quite apart from the question of their validity. But it is perhaps time for someone to contend that such views represent half-truths at best; that the term "Establishment" is nearly meaningless in a discipline so heterogeneous and open-ended as American political science; that teaching and research are often mutually supporting rather than "almost incompatible"; [3] and that a concern for merit, defined qualitatively, may well be more common in the academic world than anywhere else in our society. As for the other data in this category—the proportion of academics to non-academics, of Ph.D.'s to non-Ph.D.'s, of "career satisfaction" to disappointment—they are moderately interesting as they stand, but would be a good deal more so, as has been said, if we could see them in relation to other times and other disciplines. The authors' proposal for future intra- and inter-disciplinary studies of this sort has much to be said for it.

The second category of findings—the rankings of scholars,

[3] *Ibid.*, 81. The words are Dean Barzun's, but the authors call him a "sagacious critic." I disagree with the sentiment and about the sage.

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departments, fields of study, and the rest—will of course excite more conversational electricity than any other aspect of the study, for whatever else academics may be, few could deny that they are obsessively invidious. These chapters will also doubtless be read by prospective graduate students, deans, and college presidents, who face the awful task of evaluating many disciplines in many places. But these rating-reports need not detain us long here, except in so far as they bear on other matters. On the whole they are probably about as close to absolute verity as any popular opinion poll is likely to come, which is not very close, but not always wildly remote either. Everyone will find his favorite occasions for outrage among specific items. I, for example, cannot see how anyone can rate Charles Merriam above Edward Corwin, to name only the dead. Though I am far from satisfied with the state of public law study, I am baffled that my colleagues rank it sixth among fields in terms of current significant work, while international relations ranks far above it. I suspect that the voters are not reading much public law literature these days, for in spite of its failings I believe that that literature maintains a decent minimum of thoughtfulness, solidity, and literacy, which are not over-abundant virtues in modern political science. Yet I recognize that this suspicion can be reciprocated with some justice, and would be willing to settle for a mutual nolle prosequi.

Nevertheless what has just been said has a bearing when we turn to the third category of data. The information about attitudes on intellectual issues is the most interesting and important in the volume, because of the light it sheds on the nature and state of the discipline. Since the questionnaire contained twenty-six statements specifically directed to such issues, no attempt can be made here to summarize the responses. But it does seem worth noting that almost eighty-five per cent of respondents believe that "systematic training in the history of political thought" is still vital to doctoral programs; and that the major issue dividing the profession is, as might be expected, "behavioralism."[4] Yet

[4] The ambiguities of the term are quite rightly by-passed by the authors.

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though the variation over behavioralism is considerable, the distribution is not bimodal, which might indicate a sharp and bitter cleavage. The great majority of the profession falls in a broad middle class which is neither zealously devoted to the behavioral persuasion in all its aspects, nor passionately opposed to it.

These findings, together with scattered data in the other categories, suggest a few reflections about the discipline today. For one thing, it appears that political science still thinks of itself as an eclectic, omnibus discipline, in spite of the aspirations of some to focus and restrict it. Indeed the tendency may be to extend its always ample boundaries, for it appears that new interests, such as behavioralism, do not drive out the old, such as the history of political thought, but are added to them. It follows that there is no orthodox consensus about method, merit, or material. Both a Charles Beard and a Herbert Simon can be acknowledged and admired members of the guild, yet only about fifteen per cent of respondents named each of them among the most significant contributors. It would appear, in short, that political science is not a unitary republic but a confederation, loosely bound together by a large common cause, tolerant of the diversity of member states which may influence but seldom dominate each other. Whatever may be said against such an arrangement in the political world, in the intellectual world it makes for a climate of autonomy and open-mindedness that is peculiarly congenial to live with and which is not perhaps the worst environment for the pursuit of knowledge.

To be sure this *modus vivendi* has the faults of its virtues. As new areas are gathered into the confederation, it becomes progressively less likely that the comprehension of one man can span them. It seems reasonable to guess that field insularity has increased, that the all-purpose political scientist of earlier years is becoming a rare bird; and this seems borne out by the fact that the field specialization variable

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I use it hereafter, as I believe they do, to denote a cluster of convictions which in common usage is identified with the persuasion.

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greatly affects judgments about significance of contributions (international relationists rated V. O. Kay seventh, while those in American government named him first; public law, as has been said, was rated sixth by the profession, while public law specialists ranked it second). But this is the price paid for choosing a field like politics which quite literally intersects practically all other areas of man's knowledge. The human body is also enigmatically complex and beyond the expertise of any single man, but this does not justify a medical science that confines itself, say, to gastro-intestinal specialists.

We should not take final leave until a few more words have been said about that King Charles' head of modern political science, behavioralism. Opinion distribution on this factor is significant. Thirty years ago it would probably have been unimodal; ten years ago probably bimodal; today it is neither. This seems to confirm what many have recently surmised: that the fraternity in general is now receptive to the methods and insights of behavioralism in so far as it finds them helpful; that it shows no disposition on the other hand to redefine the discipline in exclusively behavioral terms; that the moment has come to adjourn the debate; and that the discipline is about ready for a new movement and thus a new *casus belli*. What it will be remains to be seen; various possibilities are stirring. But two predictions can be made with some confidence: that the resulting controversy will make academic lives a bit more interesting for a while; and that in the end the confederation will absorb the new, once more without sacrificing the old.

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II

It is said that only two sentences were inscribed on the Delphic oracle: "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much."

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It remains to be seen whether the Somit-Tanenhaus profile of American political science will help its practitioners achieve the latter level of wisdom, but surely it moves us nearer the first.

Their book is timely. The two decades since Professor McCloskey and I received our academic commissions have seen far greater changes in political science than any in its previous half century as an independent scholarly discipline. The most gratifying has been our increased recognition by outsiders. Newspaper columnists, television commentators, civil servants, and party politicians now regularly refer to us as "political scientists," not "historians" or "political economists," and regard us as the academic specialists most knowledgeable in matters of politics and government. The National Science Foundation has recently admitted us to the select circle of social scientists eligible for full participation in their programs. And even Richard Nixon, while regretting our lopsided Democratic loyalties, has publicly called us "tremendously potent people." [1]

Most of us will gladly grant that we owe our heady new status in part to the devoted, tireless, and astute lobbying for the discipline by our man in Washington, Evron Kirkpatrick. But we may be pardoned for feeling that some credit also goes to the fact that we have more to offer today than we had twenty years ago.

These same two decades have also seen the most spirited intramural dispute in our history over the key questions of what kinds of knowledge we should seek and how we should go about acquiring them. The fact that neither the "behavioralists" nor the "antibehavioralists" have agreed among themselves, let alone with their antagonists, on any precise definition of "behavioralism" has not kept most of us from choosing sides. And the debate has impelled a number of our distinguished colleagues to survey the state of the discipline and advise us where it should go from here.[2]

[1] New York *Times*, November 11, 1964.

[2] This literature is too voluminous to be itemized here, but its most prominent authors include Robert Dahl, David Easton, Heinz Eulau, Charles

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The Somit-Tanenhaus survey differs from its predecessors in two main respects: it eschews prescriptions for improving political science (although on several points its authors' preferences are unmistakable); and, more importantly, its estimates of how today's political scientists view professional issues are based, mainly, not upon surveys of the literature or the authors' personal impressions, but upon a systematic survey of a sample of the American Political Science Association's members. It is, in short, an attitudinal survey, and it should be appraised by the standards generally applied to such surveys.

In my view it satisfies them very well. The authors engage in no polemics about who is and who is not a *real* political scientist, but sensibly define their population as all members of the APSA. The sample (questionnaires were mailed to 832 persons, with 431 usable responses returned) is carefully drawn and adequately checked for any systematic bias. The general questions explored are all of major professional interest, although, as the authors freely admit, not all major issues are covered. The authors also recognize that mailed questionnaires are less useful than direct interviews for getting the kind of information they seek, but this is another of those sad cases in which economic scarcity conquers political science ambitions. The phrasing of this or that question on their schedule is bound to annoy some readers, but Somit and Tanenhaus take all their wordings from the prescriptive surveys mentioned above rather than excogitating them. The responses are carefully analyzed by many of the best techniques we have. And, unlike many attitudinal surveys, the results are presented lucidly and with good humor. By the accepted standards, in short, Somit and Tanenhaus have given us a first-class empirical analysis of how political scientists in the mid-nineteen-sixties in fact see many of the discipline's key issues. Perhaps a first-class non-behavioral study would give an even clearer picture, but we cannot say until we see one.

Hyneman, Harold Lasswell, Vernon Van Dyke, Russell Kirk, Herbert Storing, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin.

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What, then, do they tell us about our present state and future prospects? I was particularly struck by three of their findings. First, they strongly confirm the widely held impression that a dozen or so graduate departments are generally regarded as the best,[3] their Ph.D.'s get the most desirable jobs, and they supply most of the profession's great men.[4] However, the authors also emphasize the less-known but equally significant fact that these departments are turning out a steadily decreasing proportion of political science Ph.D.'s, so that now around half are produced by the "other" departments.[5] This trend no doubt results primarily from the greatly increased demand for college teachers growing from increasing enrollments, but it has been encouraged by the national government's policy of geographical equity in distributing aid to higher education (as, for example, in the allocation of National Defense Education Act doctoral fellowship programs). It seems sure to continue. Hence, as departments expand to meet their increasing teaching obligations, more and more—even those of high prestige—will be forced to consider recruiting from a wider range of schools than they have tapped in the past. And this may well benefit the departments recruiting as well as the departments recruited from.

Second, Somit and Tanenhaus asked their respondents to evaluate the relative importance of ten factors in achieving professional success (operationally defined as the ability to get offers from other schools). Few readers will be surprised to learn that teaching ability ranked last. But many will be struck, as I was, by the fact that *volume* of publication

[3] Their discussion, in Chapter 4, of the variables influencing department ratings is particularly suggestive. Surprisingly, they show only a mild "halo effect" of high ranking on one's own Ph.D. department. Less surprisingly, they show a substantial difference in the rankings of certain departments —including both Professor McCloskey's and my own—by the extreme pro and antibehavioralists.

[4] Of the sixteen persons with American Ph.D.'s most often mentioned as post- 1945 leaders in the profession, all but one received his degree from one of the top dozen departments, but six came from one department (Chicago). Somit and Tanenhaus, Table 10, p. 66.

[5] *Ibid.*, 30–31.

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ranked first while *quality* of publication ranked only fifth—just ahead of textbook authorship. Now this finding may be seen only as damning evidence of the mindlessness of deans, the carelessness of department chairmen and executive committees, and the consequent reversal of the values the profession should hold. But it may also reflect something most of us learn early in our careers: that most professional papers, articles, and books receive an astonishing variety of appraisals from different but equally eminent members of the profession. Typically, what colleague A praises as sound and well researched colleague B denounces as pedestrian and trivial. So whatever its deficiences as a standard, quantity of publication has at least the merit of being easy to measure, and the level of a person's score is subject to little dispute. Perhaps, then, we should at least sympathize with chairmen and deans who, despairing of professional consensus on quality, turn to measures of quantity as a basis for awarding raises and promotions.

But this is at best a makeshift, and not a very good one. Most of us will feel that political science will never be a full-fledged discipline or profession until we achieve wide agreement, if not unanimity, on which scholarly works are first class and which are not. Hence I was most struck by the evidence Somit and Tanenhaus adduce supporting Robert Dahl's view that the familiar jousting between the behavioralists and the antibehavioralists, valuable though it has been in forcing us to examine the roots of our discipline, has now outlived both its scholarly usefulness and its entertainment value.[6] A first glance at the Somit-Tanenhaus findings suggests the opposite: more of their respondents have views on this issue than on almost any other (the pro-behavioralists have a modest plurality), and their positions on it are more closely related to their views on other issues than any other variable studied. But a second glance reveals something equally interesting: their respondents are not divided into

[6] As expressed in "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review*, LV (1961), 763–72.

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two hostile camps, one strongly upholding behavioralism and the other dead set against it. Most of them checked the "agree" or "disagree" options rather than the "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree." [7] Why? Possibly because we are a lot of Milquetoasts with no strong views about anything. But more probably, in my judgment, because both sides increasingly recognize some merit in the other's charges and feel it is time to spend our energies on something more productive than this rather tired debate.

The antibehavioralists object to the trivial, narrow, and apolitical questions behavioralists often ask, and no candid behavioralist can flatly deny the charge. On the other hand, the behavioralists object to the looseness of the methods the antibehavioralists use to answer their great moral questions, their total lack of mutual agreement about the quality of the various answers produced, and the consequence that such a political science produces not verified and reliable knowledge but merely squabbling schools of opinion. If this is not unjust to either side, then perhaps the Somit-Tanenhaus findings suggest that many of us are ready—indeed eager—to abandon our Twenty Years' War over behavioralism and join in a quest for a truly significant and reliable body of knowledge enriched by many different investigations of truly important political questions by truly rigorous methods. If this is indeed the direction in which American political science is facing, we need not worry about the warts and blemishes on the profile Somit and Tanenhaus have so usefully drawn for us.

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[7] Somit and Tanenhaus, Table 1, pp. 14–17.

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Federalism and Civil Rights. By BURKE MARSHALL. Foreword by Robert F. Kennedy. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1964.—xi, 85 pp. $3.50.

Burke Marshall's four years of dedicated and effective service as head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division entitle him to respectful attention when he takes time out from battle to survey the battlefield and the campaign. He does indeed present an absorbing catalogue of the scorched-earth tactics that have obstructed enforcement of the federal law against racial discrimination in the deep South. With the laconic directness, taut restraint, and circumstantial exactness of an eye-witness account, his report of the facts bears the hallmark of accuracy and balance.

His discourse on federalism, however, must make an earlier Marshall turn in his grave. Declared the great Chief Justice: ". . . a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution. . . . Let the end be legitimate . . . and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end . . . are constitutional." The latter-day Marshall does not, to be sure, question the federal government's constitutional *power* to do all that is necessary to give practical meaning to federal rights such as access to unsegregated public services and interstate travel, and to a color-blind franchise. But his policy judgments reflect invisible radiations which we thought the Tenth Amendment had ceased to emanate a quarter of a century ago.

He recognizes clearly enough how that recent marvel of Dixie ingenuity—palpably unfounded mass prosecutions for constitutionally privileged behavior such as peaceable protest against official discrimination, or disregard of segregation rules in interstate bus terminals—can eviscerate federal rights through imposition of legal expense (including the cost of extortionate bail) having the same deterrent effect as a heavy fine. And all this despite the certainty of ultimate appellate reversal. He recognizes, too, the imminent danger that Negroes will write off legal redress as illusory, and turn to the bitter and divisive alternative of self-help. He acknowledges that corrections are needed and that it may be possible to broaden the power of federal district courts to control abuse of state criminal process, without "any real danger to the society" (p. 62).

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Nevertheless he speaks of the present system of state-federal judicial relationships in terms of almost mystical reverence, hinting that any significant change will wreak shattering (though unspecified) damage. Despite his own department's magnificent success in dealing with the default by the Montgomery constabulary in the Freedom Ride emergency of May 1961, he sees no acceptable way to cope with determined opposition or abdication of responsibility by the local police. (Perhaps this is why he says of President Kennedy's pledge to eliminate discrimination: "It is apparent that this undertaking is not one that can be accomplished by the federal government" [p. 2].)

If nullification were thus achievable, Negro disillusionment with the law would indeed be justified. But Selma and its aftermath say it may not be so.

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The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. By CHARLES O. LERCHE JR. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1964.—324 pp. $6.95.

The conduct of Americans in Southern locations like Little Rock, Birmingham, and Philadelphia, Mississippi, may well during the past decade have influenced foreign attitudes toward the United States more than anything done by the president, the secretary of state, and all the ambassadors extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary put together. Officials concerned with sensitive currents of world opinion are impressed daily with the critical importance in American foreign affairs of Southern (and non-Southern) racial frictions.

Southern racial concerns have had a further profound impact, however, one not so readily visible but one that has helped alter the entire structure of Southern attitudes toward the foreign policies of the United States. The staunch support formerly given by Southern delegations in Congress to what Professor Charles Lerche calls "multilateralism"—a recognition of the interdependence of all states for such security and prosperity as they may enjoy—has given way, regretfully in the author's eyes, to a preference for policies of "unilateralism"—policies stemming from the belief that the United States should first and foremost retain and exploit the absolute maximum of national freedom of choice and action. In an older terminology, the shift would be called one from internationalism to isolationism. The shift has resulted basically, Professor Lerche argues, from a wave of protest,

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chiefly among poor white Southerners who have been disoriented by the massive changes occurring in their society, chiefly changes affecting race relations.

Variety as always marks the Southern performance, but a general change has clearly occurred. Mr. Lerche's thesis springs from an analysis of roll call votes in the House of Representatives from 1953 through 1962. He examines voting on fourteen differing foreign policy matters spread over the decade (for example, wheat for Pakistan in 1953, United States purchase of United Nations bonds in 1962) as well as voting on the annual foreign aid authorization bills. The latter well illustrate the trend. In 1953, seventy-four per cent of Southern members of the House who voted (fourteen states are included) favored the authorization. The percentage fell to fifty-six in 1954, to thirty-five in 1957, and was forty-one in 1962. Since 1957, the South has been the only region in the nation with a majority of its congressmen consistently opposing the principle of foreign aid. The contemporary Southern demagogue, Mr. Lerche holds, requires more against which to protest than his traditional scapegoats, the Negro and the economic interests. Foreigners and American policies entangling us with them, always reviled by some, have become major objects of spleen.

The conclusion rests on a close scrutiny of the voting records of persons representing 126 Southern congressional districts. The districts are placed in six categories in accordance with their degrees of multilateralism and unilateralism. Attempts are made to identify social, economic, and political characteristics of each category, including dynamic factors that account for elements of change emphasized by the author. He views Southern attitudes as in transition. The attitudes displayed by congressmen from the forty-three "multilateralist" districts veered in no important degree from those dominant among representatives from the Northeast, the Midwest, and the West. Mr. Lerche finds the districts at this end of the continuum of attitudes to be of two broad types. Some districts are still relatively untouched by the changes that have disturbed attitudes in most of the region. These districts adhere even yet to the old internationalist views that once were identified with the region as a whole. The others have gone all the way through the transition, comprising relatively sophisticated constituencies in large urban areas.

Although the author has eschewed the conventional documentation of bibliography and footnotes, professional students will find much of the analysis more stimulating than will other readers. Doubtless some of the assumptions implied and pro-

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cedures used may be debated. Nonetheless, the author addresses himself to the ethos of Southern politics with a rigorous hand and a sensitive eye, and in its grand contours his resulting analysis is informed, discerning, and an important contribution to an important subject.

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The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective. By SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET. New York, Basic Books, 1963.—xv, 366 pp. $5.95.

It was surely inevitable that someone would write a book on the United States of America as the prototype of the new nations of today. To Professor Lipset has fallen this distinction and, no doubt, his book will not be the last on this theme.

The historian and the sociologist (in the conventional sense of these terms) will not find his method altogether to their liking. For the historian, he will have too much jargon and too many generalizations; and for the sociologist too much quasi-journalism and too many details, often rather tiresomely buttressed by lengthy quotations from secondary authorities in the footnotes. Nevertheless, they would be advised to sink their conventional differences and to see in Professor Lipset's study a pioneering attempt to create a bridge between their disciplines.

In this respect, it is valuable to compare his belief in the possibility of generalization with the sensitive skepticism of Professor E. Evans-Pritchard's *The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology* (London, 1963). But whatever one's methodological standpoint, it cannot be denied that Professor Lipset's comparison of the United States of America and the new group of nations succeeds in illuminating both of them.

Commentary and analysis, however, on the role of myth and ideology in the formation of national consciousness, if not neglected, has to be dug out of his text, like a number of other themes in the book. It seems significant that "myth" and "ideology" are not included in his detailed subject index.

There is a sense in which this book is largely a scholarly elaboration on the well-explored but still mainly inconclusive theme of American identity. It is, therefore, surprising that it has relatively little on the American frontier (nothing at all on F. J. Turner); only brief notes on linguistic problems in the formation of nationality (a reference to the famous Number V of John Witherspoon's *The Druid* might have started a train of thought); and only one reference to the Monroe Doctrine, although this

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is to some extent compensated for by a percipient, if all too brief, pair of notes on Washington's Farewell Address. Similarly, the role of the Negro and race relations in the search for American identity cannot be said to be extensively explored. It would not be difficult to argue that this theme deserves separate treatment in the exploration of American value systems as much as religion and trades unions to which, relatively speaking, substantial, separately-titled sections are devoted. This is not to say that Professor Lipset neglects the Negro question (pp. 330–33 of his book contain some incisive writing on this subject), but their very succinctness is an example of the way in which his generalizations on the Negro and race in America may not strike the reader with the force which they deserve.

In all, this is one of those books to which the critical cliché "stimulating" must be applied in hope that the reader will understand "stimulating" in its pristine sense and not as a damnation through faint praise. No student of contemporary politics should ignore it. And at the end of his book (p. 348), Professor Lipset offers some advice which no social scientist—in any sense of this term—can afford to neglect:

> Only when one knows what is unique on a comparative scale can one begin to ask significant questions about causal relationships within a country. Hence, even that most particularistic of all social scientists, the historian, can learn much about American history by studying the history of somewhat comparable foreign nations at equivalent points in their development. And what is true for the historian is even more valid for the rest of us.

GEORGE SHEPPERSON

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

Power at the Pentagon. By JACK RAYMOND. New York, Harper and Row, 1964.—xiv, 363 pp. $6.50.

In recent years political scientists have published a spate of books about the military, and while it could be said of a few, as Dr. Johnson said of one book of his day, that we would rather praise them than read them, it remains true that the behavioral approach of scholars such as Stouffer and Janowitz has contributed a sophisticated perspective that was formerly lacking. But there are two other important sources of information about the military, and neither of them can be overlooked by specialists in the field. The first comprises fiction and poetry, because the questions of why and how men go into combat cannot be wholly answered by *The American Soldier;* one also must read Norman Mailer, James Jones, and perhaps also Stendhal, Tolstoi, and

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Hemingway. The other source includes the books by and about military men, and the narrative accounts that deal with the military establishment. The latter are usually written by working journalists, and they must not be looked down upon simply because they do not use terms like "decision-making" and "policy parameters," or describe characters as fascinating as Frederic Henry and Nick Adams. If the military complexity is ever to be fully penetrated, scholars, novelists, and journalists will have to begin picking each other's brains and cease picking at each other's work.

It is one of the merits of Jack Raymond's book that he is familiar with scholarship in his own bailiwick (he is Pentagon reporter for the New York *Times*); thus there are five references to Janowitz, three to Huntington, two to Kissinger, and so forth. But beyond that, *Power at the Pentagon* treats with skill and great detail the history and present situation of the military branch of government, and for that reason it is required reading for anyone who wants to know why Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation of January 17, 1961, felt it necessary to warn "against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex." Not that Raymond raises the specter of a general (or admiral) on a pale white horse; he is at least as apprehensive about military specialists in civilian clothing, for example, the "Whiz Kids" and other bureaucrats who make up what Raymond refers to (in quotes) as the "McNamara Monarchy." His main concern is that the military *and* civilian specialists, the economic dependence on armaments, the military lobbying, the willingness of universities to become major defense contractors, the close relations between the top corporations and the Pentagon, and other realities and trends do not, with or without our knowing it, lead to a militarized society.

Unfortunately, neither Raymond nor anyone else can tell us at what point a democratic society becomes militarized. Is that point reached when generals and admirals regard themselves as experts on education, integration, morals, foreign policy, and the meaning of Marxism? When leading television programs feature as heroes lieutenants, sergeants, corporals, ensigns, etc.? When there are whole store counters of children's toys in the form of rifles, bazookas, flame-throwers, grenades, rocket-launchers, jet fighters, polaris submarines, etc.? When Christmas carols are played in march time?

Perhaps the road to the garrison society has always been there, and what alarms us is that now we can see, in the near distance, the barracks, the drill field, and the firing range. Gertrude Stein

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was fond of saying that the United States, despite its claims to pacifism, has been involved in more wars than any country in Europe, and she was right. Consider, too, the number of generals who have been President since the Civil War (at least three, all Republicans), the number who wished to be President (at least seven, six of them Republicans), and the number who might have been nominated but declined to run (at least two, politics unknown). Finally, let us ponder a statement by Senator Richard Russell, one of the saddest statements ever made about Americans and American society:

> There is something about preparing for destruction that causes men to be more careless in spending money than they would be if they were building for constructive purposes. Why that is, I do not know; but I have observed, over a period of almost thirty years in the Senate that there is something about buying arms with which to kill, to destroy, to wipe out cities, and to obliterate great transportation systems which causes men *not* to reckon the dollar cost as closely as they do when they think about proper housing and the care of the health of human beings.

If we and Senator Russell could know "why that is," we would need less General Eisenhower's warning and Jack Raymond's book.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. By BERNARD B. FALL. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—xii, 493 pp. $7.95.

Southeast Asia in United States Policy. By RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963.—xi, 488 pp. $6.50.

Basic to America's problems in Southeast Asia has been the often limited and distorted knowledge of issues and events which her people have of that part of the world. These two books attempt to add to our understanding, Professor Fifield's by giving order to past and present American policies and commitments, Professor Fall's by analyzing our most difficult present Southeast Asian problem—Vietnam. The average reader will probably finish these books with a less than optimistic reaction, not unmixed with bewilderment. This attitude should not reflect adversely upon the authors' expositions, but rather upon the complexity of the issues involved.

Bernard Fall's insightful, often personal, analysis of *The Two*

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Viet-Nams is a must for those seeking a historic, political, economic, and military background to contemporary Vietnamese problems. The author is not chary of presenting his own views of historic events (his French background often leads him to bitter comments on American leaders, particularly Roosevelt) and of recent political and military decisions. In spite of disagreements with some of Fall's interpretations (particularly his downgrading of the relevance of other nations' anti-guerrilla actions to the Vietnamese experience) this reviewer was continually struck by his intimate and solid knowledge of complex events. Two of the most interesting sections of the book are the study of contemporary North Vietnam and the analysis of the insurgency problem in the south. Comparatively few scholars have had Fall's opportunities to visit both sections of Vietnam and the part on the north provides some unique firsthand commentaries. In the discussion of insurgency he attacks most previous efforts to defeat the Viet Cong, comparing the mistakes of the Americans with similar mistakes formerly prepetrated by the French. The weakness of his analysis comes in his attempts at prescription, which tend to follow the old political and social reform mold. Fall does not adequately explain how non-military solutions can meet the superior Viet Cong use of organization and terror (which he himself carefully describes).

Professor Fifield presents a clear description of U. S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the military, economic, and political environment within which that policy must operate. He also discusses the relation of China, India, and Japan to American commitments and alternatives. The book does not contain either the vitality of writing or the apparent prejudices of Fall's study and the solutions offered are usually rather low keyed. It is primarily a descriptive effort, written somewhat in the style of the New York *Times*. Writing on contemporary Southeast Asia often falls prey to the problem of swift-moving events and Fifield's analysis suffers somewhat from changes in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in Vietnam and Malaysia. Two basic questions which struck this reviewer were the traditional economic justification for foreign aid and the accepted impact of India and Japan on Southeast Asian actions. The author appears to follow the view that aid leads to a higher standard of living which in turn establishes a bulwark against communism. The correlation of higher standards, greater demands and frustrations, and concomitant instability needs greater consideration. Secondly, one can question the extent to which Southeast Asia will react to the "counterweights" of Japan and India given the recent apathy to Chinese incursions in India, reactions to the Indian economic

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minority in the region, growing nationalist isolationism in the region, and memories of the war.

Both of these books deserve to be on the shelves of those desiring a clearer knowledge of our problems and commitments in this vital area.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Leadership in Communist China. By JOHN WILSON LEWIS. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1963.—xiii, 305 pp. $5.00.

The subjects of Professor Lewis' study are the leadership theory and operational procedures by means of which the Chinese Communist party seeks to elicit the affirmative response of the party cadres and through them of the Chinese population to the goals of the Peking regime. These matters are presented, deliberately, apart from any systematic consideration of actual political behavior and its consequences in China since 1949. *Leadership in Communist China* is, if you will, an analytical catechism of the central beliefs of Chinese Communism as they relate to the leadership elite, followed by a description of party organization, membership, personnel administration, the organization and content of cadre education, and the techniques of cadre leadership—including a detailed look at rural leadership during the critical years 1958–61. Within its chosen limits it is very well done indeed, and carefully constructed upon the foundation of an enormous amount of Chinese-language source material. Standing as it does almost alone in its field, it underlines both how little we yet know of the polity of the People's Republic of China and how fruitful systematic exploration of this problem can be.

Professor Lewis' second chapter, "Basic Chinese Communist Philosophy and Ideology Applied to the Leadership Elite," and the third, "Mass Line as a Concept of Leadership," reveal a conception of leadership which for all its doctrinaire qualities is remarkably romantic, and potentially opportunist. The course of ideological training for party members and cadres seeks to develop leaders in whose "view of life" the interests of the individual are subordinate in all possible ways to those of the party-led collective. Once acquired, this state of mind is to be applied in continuous, organized, correct interaction between the cadres and the masses as the means of carrying out the tasks assigned by the party leadership. The core of political experience for the Communist leaders appears to be the (theoretically spontaneous) outpouring of the energies of the masses which is to be harnessed

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and directed by leaders whose ideology has allowed them to discern the "correct mission." "Only the subjective failures of party members and cadres deny the party and the 'people' just victories."

This synthesis of "the ideal mind and the ideal leadership method" is a product, as Lewis comments, of the twenty-year revolutionary military struggle by which the Chinese Communists gained power. His study suggests that it is at least questionable whether it is technically adequate to the problems of organizing and governing an enormous country, developing a backward economy, and operating in a multinational world arena—as opposed to the problems of fighting a civil war. Reference to the mass line can provide a cover of consistency to rapid policy shifts and tactical retreats, thereby rationalizing opportunism and potentially obstructing the adoption of policies and methods suited to the realities of post-1949 China.

ALBERT FEUERWERKER

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia By FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963.—xiv, 253 pp. $5.00.

U Nu of Burma. By RICHARD BUTWELL. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963.—x, 301 pp. $7.50.

In Southeast Asia, as elsewhere in the world, religion and nationalism have at one time or another merged indistinguishably in one single force, joined hands for common purposes as two separate movements, and taken sharply opposing positions. It is often a subtle and difficult problem to isolate and distinguish the role which each plays and to assign it its appropriate weight in the final mix. More broadly, the ingredients which enter into nationalism constitute a reasonably familiar list, but their presence or absence and relative importance vary from time to time and place to place.

Fred R. von der Mehden, well aware of the hazards of the investigation which he has undertaken, has made a discriminating analysis of the interrelations of Southeast Asian nationalism and religion. For this purpose he has concentrated his attention primarily on Indonesia and Burma, adding occasional reference to the Philippines as a country embraced within the same region but representing a quite different kind of situation. In Indonesia and Burma respectively, Islam and Buddhism are the dominant religions for the bulk of the population and have been of immense importance in shaping the culture and political des-

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tiny of the countries, although both also contain significant minorities with alternative religious affiliations. In this circumstance the religion of the popular mass could and did become a key determinant—perhaps the principal determinant—of the national identity in its growing opposition to the alien colonial rulers. The Philippines, on the other hand, presented a picture of a common religion for rulers and ruled, save for the Moros in the south, and the line between Filipino and Spaniard was somewhat more overtly drawn on a racial basis. While the widespread Filipino anti-clericalism had obvious religious implications, its roots, as Professor von der Mehden well demonstrates, were to be found in economic rather than in religious soil since the political, social, and economic dominance of the friars stirred up bitter resentments.

Although it greatly oversimplifies the complex and multifaceted approach which the author has adopted, it may in crude terms be said of both Indonesia and Burma that the trend has been away from the early paramountcy of the religious element in the nationalist movements, and toward a secular nationalism which reached out to include all the people of the country. The profound attachment of U Nu to Buddhism made this trend less apparent in Burma, but it took place there as well as in Indonesia even prior to the two take-overs by Ne Win, to whom there is, incidentally, surprisingly little reference in this volume. Of the existence of the secular nationalist trend there can be no doubt, but Professor von der Mehden makes excellent use of the difficulties which the Marxists have nonetheless confronted in attempting to establish their basically anti-religious position in countries whose ways of life and thought have been so markedly shaped by their religions. The religious nationalists have been largely superseded although they are far from having vanished from the scene; but the author concludes that in both Indonesia and Burma they "provided the transition between submission and purposeful opposition to the fetters of colonialism."

One of the outstanding leaders of Southeast Asia who also makes frequent appearance in *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* is dealt with at length in Richard Butwell's *U Nu of Burma.* This is a sympathetic and appreciative study of a man who appeared to be thrust by accident into the high political role which he came to play, who was, perhaps, a failure in the ultimate historical verdict, and who yet embodied much of the best and most characteristic of his people in his years of power. Professor von der Mehden suggests that he reveals the paradoxical character of Burmese political life in his dual position as a symbol of Burmese Buddhism and a supporter of West-

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ern democratic ideals, including equality for all religions and the prohibition of clerical influence in secular matters.

U Nu's attractiveness as a human being and as a political leader—where he cuts a figure not wholly unlike that of Gandhi on a lesser scale—derives in great part from what Professor Butwell describes as his effort to show his countrymen and the world "the relevance of love and truth to the solution of human problems." It is his biographer's conclusion that although U Nu is probably still the most popular Burmese of all time with the masses of his people, he governed the country badly both in his first decade in office and in his return to power in 1960. It may be that the major difficulty lay in a comment made about him by Sir Hubert Rance, that he utterly lacked a capacity for ruthlessness. However attractive a figure he may be, it is difficult to evade Professor Butwell's verdict that the part which he was forced to play was too big for him, but it is surely also true that he "played his part better, under the circumstances, than most others would have."

RUPERT EMERSON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

A History of Japan, 1615–1867. By GEORGE SANSOM. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963.—xiv, 258 pp. $7.50.

Both the lay reader and the specialist will welcome the third and final volume of an ambitious study of Japanese history, the first of which appeared in 1958, by the distinguished author of many scholarly translations, articles, and books about Japan. For the author, the publication of this volume also fulfills a plan he had nourished for many years—to supplement and to expand on his earlier, now classic, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (1931).

In the present volume, more than in the others of the trilogy, Sir George Sansom has adhered closely to his purpose of stressing the political and social aspects of the period under study. This is a happy if not a necessary approach, for these were the forces which had an overriding importance during the Tokugawa period. He has thus given much attention to such developments as the rise of cities, growth of population, social mobility, intellectual curiosity about the science and technology of the West despite the existence of a "Prohibition on Heterodox Studies," and breaches in the seclusion policy. He gives considerable attention to the economic life of the nation and to what he calls the "material foundations" of Tokugawa society, even resorting to frequent citations of statistics whenever they were available.

One needs to be reminded that these developments which have

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a distinctively modern ring occured in a feudal society, or at least under a regime which had a feudal outlook and a fierce determination to preserve the *status quo*. Tokugawa society, moreover, had a basic contradiction: it was a prosperous, peaceful society governed by a caste of professional fighting men who had long outlived their professional usefulness. In describing in a detailed and convincing manner such a complex, anomolous society—a society, standing, as it were, somewhere between feudalism and modernism—Sir George Sansom has made a major contribution.

Although the author never intended to do anything but a straightforward narrative history, one wishes that he had allowed himself, at least in the concluding volume of a major work, the liberty of more observations, interpretive statements, and references to and comparisons with Western history. For it is these elements, appearing only at random and all too infrequently, that give the work a truly distinctive quality and enhance its worth. In discussing, for example, the Christian persecutions in Japan, the author does not withhold the evidence, of which there is much, that converts were subjected to agonizing tortures and fiendish executions. But he is also quick to remind his readers of Savonarola's sufferings and of the record of the Christian Church in medieval Europe which, he says, is no less sickening (p. 44). The Albigensian crusaders, he adds, burned innumerable heretics "with immense joy," quoting from a contemporary source. It is just such thoughtful comparisons and observations which add to the worth of Sir George Sansom's book and which restrain the reader from making easy and hasty conclusions. But, I repeat, there are not enough of them. As it is, the book ends all too abruptly on a strictly chronological note, and it is only half the size of the first volume. His readers would not have begrudged Sir George Sansom an additional chapter or two for a summary overview of Japanese history and for general observations. But perhaps such a history is the author's next undertaking. Let us hope it is.

MINORU SHINODA

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

The Atlas of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Planned and directed by D. P. BICKMORE and M. A. SHAW. Oxford, The Clarendon Press and New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.—xii, 200 pp. and Gazetteer. $100.

Major reference works, being certain things to certain men, are peculiarly difficult books to review. A few years ago, when

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the third edition of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary was published, it was widely criticized by practicing writers and teachers whose concern for language was every bit as professional as that of the linguistic experts who at once denounced them as "laymen" applying outmoded and irrelevant criteria. This recent and obvious example of the proprietary jealousy and condescension of the specialist must come to the mind of any "lay" American facing the monumental new atlas issued by the Clarendon Press. Perhaps every journal should have assigned it two reviewers. A cartographer, a geographer, or an economist would judge the book from his own professional standpoint, and much fruitful and enlightening technical comment is possible about a volume which in some ways stands at the cartographic frontiers. Here it has fallen to a historian, but perhaps one whose scholarly interests lie in modern Britain may legitimately represent the "administrators, industrialists, teachers and others concerned with education, agriculturalists, [and] research workers in many fields," whose need for this atlas is invoked by the editorial committee in its introduction.

The first reaction of anyone who examines the book is bound to be one of awe. The maps are strikingly beautiful, and one is grateful at once for the technical artistry of its engravers and printers (though I have less reason to be thankful for the binders, since I do not expect the paper on the binding of a hundred-dollar book to come unglued). A next, more intellectual reaction is delight and fascination with the cartographic ingenuity evident on every page. The book promises excellent browsing and holds out the more important scholarly hope of new insights and useful confirmations to be derived from seeing patterns on maps not only of traditional subjects of physical geography and natural resources but of more venturesome areas in economic and social life. Unhappily, that hope does not fully materialize, and even the browsing is spoiled from time to time by irritation.

The atlas was planned, we are assured, "as a cross-section through [that is, across, not down to] the middle of the twentieth century, and is therefore an historical document and not a stop-press commentary." But one soon begins to wonder what precisely mid-century means. In the climatic maps, mean temperatures and sunshine are based on averages for the period 1921–50, fog on 1923–50, rainfall on 1916–50, and vapor pressure and wind on 1949–58. Probably there were difficulties in finding series of figures that were both meaningful and consistent, but at least the editors might have been candid about the difficulties and have offered some explanation of the variations. Basing these maps on the same periods of years would probably have

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made little change from what appears in the atlas, and certainly these maps are among the best and most useful in the book, as much so as the magnificent geological maps with which, appropriately, the volume begins. But inconsistency in dating becomes alarming in the economic and social fields where the atlas promises to convey important information in new and presumably comparable forms. The agricultural maps—showing density of labor, size of holdings, acreages under various crops, sizes of herds—are based on 1955; but the forestry maps are based on 1947. Industrial maps are based for the most part on 1954, and demographic maps, understandably, on 1951. Is "round about mid-century" really good enough?

Let us grant that it is, that these unexplained variations in dating were unavoidable for technical reasons. There remains the problem of the atlas as a historical document, a function with which the editorial committee professes to be much concerned: "With the growth of new towns, the redistribution of industry, and increase and shifts of population, and the revolution in transport systems, the rate of change has steadily accelerated, and mid-century is a good vantage point from which to survey the effect of these changes on the geography of the country." Too often, comparisons over time are impossible and comparisons of contemporary developments are meaningless. One of the major economic confrontations in modern industrial Britain has been that of coal and oil. They confront each other here on pages 96 and 97; but the coal figures are for 1954, and the oil map is based on 1958. Rail and road confront each other too—actually in the age of Beeching and Buchanan, symbolically in this atlas on pages 164–67; but the rail maps show us the volume of passenger and freight traffic for the winter of 1958–59, while the volume of road traffic is shown for August 1954, long before the vehicular explosion which began toward the end of the decade. What of the fate of the small shopkeeper? On page 154, a map ingeniously shows us local variation in sales per head in the retail and service trades in 1950; across from it stands a map showing sales per head in department stores—in 1957. To do full justice to such dynamic elements in the British economy at mid-century, we should need a number of maps at, say, five-year intervals. But if the space or money for that scale could not be found, it seems elementary that what maps there are be based on the same years. The figures are certainly available.

In dealing with the economic and human resources of the country, the editors have been generous and instructive but curiously selective. The cartographers have devised some clever

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little segments of circles to show quantitative variation—they are used for such diverse subjects as river flow and exports—but the editors do not explain their interesting and presumably significant decision to use them to show employment rather than output in most, but not all, of the industrial maps. Again, we are shown the patterns of professional and skilled trades, age distribution, and housing conditions, all important considerations in the human geography of the country. But we are told nothing about unemployment. There is not a single map dealing with education, though university recruiting or school-leaving age, say, must have regional patterns that are subject to the kind of mapping done here. Except for a map showing local variations in mortality, there is nothing to tell us about the health of the population, though the incidence of particular diseases or infant mortality are surely important facts as amenable to mapping as the distribution of larches. Except for a map showing the prevalence of Gaelic and Welsh speakers, we have no indication of the ethnic or national patterns of the population, and there are no maps touching on religion. To be sure, since 1851, no one has dared to inquire into the religious allegiances of the British people; but we can know about the administrative geography of the Established Church, while the geographical distribution of dissenting chapels and of Roman Catholic churches would be far from irrelevant information. And, surely, if historical exposition of mid-century Britain is taken seriously, room should have been found for one or two more maps of parliamentary constituencies to cover the general elections of 1945, 1950, and 1951, as well as those of 1955 and 1959.

This atlas is, then, a beautiful, strange, often informative, irritating, and essentially unscholarly miscellany. Important information which should and could be given cartographic form is missing. At considerable expense we have been given maps of transitory situations without the possibility of meaningful comparisons over time. We are not told whether or not a new edition for the sixties will bring us up to date and make comparisons possible, though it is doubtful that the Clarendon Press or purchasers can afford it. Crucial editorial decisions are allowed to seem arbitrary or quixotic, and sources of statistics are never given. This last omission seems a violation of the most elementary scholarly decency; supposing that a browser found a suggestive pattern, nothing is done to help him to further inquiries. One is left with the impression that a few words and tables are worth a thousand pictures.

The project of a national atlas for Britain was discussed be-

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fore the war and taken up again in 1951 by academics who had to make do, of course, without financial help from the state; the Clarendon Press came to the rescue. One gets the impression that the Oxford and Cambridge men who served as editors too often allowed technical concerns to obscure or override rigorous canons of scholarly utility and courtesy. Certainly pride in technical accomplishment suffuses both the introduction by the editors and the cartographic note by Mr. Bickmore and Miss Shaw, and rightly so. The cartographic department of the Clarendon Press has attained remarkably high technical and esthetic standards since its founding, and in this atlas it has tried and, to a considerable extent, has succeeded in doing things that had never before been done with maps. It is equivalent to the masterpiece of a medieval craftsman. In all likelihood, such masterpieces were more admired than used.

R. K. WEBB

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A History of Modern Germany: 1648–1840. By HAJO HOLBORN. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964.—xiv, 531, xxvi pp. $10.75.

If 1648 was an obvious starting-point for the second volume of Professor Holborn's history of modern Germany, he shows originality in choosing the years around 1840 for its end. Most historians have regarded 1789 or 1815 as turning-points. Professor Holborn is rightly skeptical of this division and sees the period of reform and restoration from 1790 to 1840 as a whole. Similarly he treats the preceding age of absolutism as a unity, without making the usual break at the accession of Frederick II of Prussia.

If the structure of Professor Holborn's book thus shows a welcome effort to break away from old stereotypes, the same is true of its internal balance. Substantial chapters on religious and intellectual life in the age of the Baroque, on Idealism and Neo-Humanism, on schools and churches, and on the transition from Idealism to Realism reflect the revulsion against the excessive preoccupation with political history which marked Prussian historiography from Ranke onward, and an endeavor (derived, no doubt, from Professor Holborn's teacher, Meinecke) to relate political action to the movement of ideas.

The framework is nevertheless still political, and this has affected the shape of the book to some degree; for a political approach almost necessarily throws the emphasis on Prussia. S. H. Steinberg once wrote that German historians "consciously or

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unconsciously made the political interests of the Prussian monarchy the criterion by which they judged the course of German history." This certainly is not Professor Holborn's attitude. On the contrary, he is commendably cautious in this respect, pointing out, for instance, that Frederick II was not "motivated by national feeling." Nevertheless, by comparison with the recent account by Frederick Hertz (1962), Prussia looms large, and one scarcely realizes that the pre-eminence of Austria was the cardinal fact of eighteenth-century German history. Following Hertz and Bruford, I should have liked also a fuller treatment of the medium and even the duodecimo principalities. No doubt they only "played a minor political role," but they were a substantial part of the German reality.

Professor Holborn has steered clear of the many controversies surrounding German history in this period. This is a book which studiously avoids taking sides. Its purpose seems to be to modulate the excesses of German nationalist historiography while maintaining a positive attitude to German achievement. Thus in describing the so-called "national uprising" of 1813, of which German writers have made so much, Professor Holborn points out that, except where prodded on by the authorities, the "people failed to act"; but he also contrasts the "patriotism" of the Prussian population in 1813 with their "apathy" in 1806. In the same way, while maintaining that Stein's reform of town administration "made the idea of self-administration an essential part of the German political heritage," he adds, correctly, that "the character of the Prussian city administration was moulded primarily by the full-time executives."

These carefully balanced judgments, which are not necessarily contradictory, will be appreciated by specialists, and it may be surmised that Professor Holborn has seen his task as reconciling contending opinions and producing a convincing synthesis from them. Just the same, one may wonder whether the course of German history was quite so smooth as Professor Holborn's narrative sometimes suggests. One may also wonder whether, at a number of key points, it might not have been advisable to make more explicit the fact that interpretations are divergent. The chapter on social and economic conditions after 1648, for example, is an excellent general survey; but it is hard to think that its value for the student would have been diminished if Professor Holborn had pointed out the difficulty of interpreting the evidence, for example, regarding population, and had reviewed the evidence which Dr. Steinberg (among others) has assembled against the traditional view (broadly accepted by Professor Holborn) of the extent of the damage caused

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by the Thirty Years' War. German history is full of great unresolved problems, of dichotomies, tensions, and unfulfilled hopes. This, in many ways, is what makes it so interesting. No one knows it better than Professor Holborn, but his book tends to "iron out" the problems. I think this is a pity; and I hope that in his third and final volume, when he comes to show how Germany served as a catalyst for the radical transformation of our world, he will allow himself greater latitude.

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ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

The Holstein Papers. Edited by NORMAN RICH and M. H. FISHER. Volume IV: *Correspondence, 1897–1909.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963.—655 pp. $22.50.

With this fourth volume (Volumes I, II, and III were reviewed in this journal, LXXVII [1962], 469–72) the publication of the Holstein papers is brought to completion. Like the preceding part of the *Correspondence,* this is characterized by quantitative unevenness, a bare four entries for the year 1903, for example, and many important events, the Fashoda episode for one, make no appearance. This source, therefore, continues to be a useful adjunct, but only an adjunct, to others.

Holstein's declining years did not make him a softer man; his touchy suspiciousness increased with his age and his threatened resignations were numerous. But there is no denying the high quality of many of his analyses through which one can perceive the disintegration of the German position, due in considerable measure to the quality of its management. For this was the age of world politics which, if anything, required greater deftness than ever.

The validity of Holstein's judgment that "our position in the world is incalculably powerful and great as long as we have no firm engagements towards *any* side whatever" (p. 189) is questionable. This was Britain's traditional position, but Britain is an island that relied on sea power. The relationship with Britain appropriately fills much of the correspondence, and to describe some of its phases as a *dépit amoureux* seems very apt. As the circle was drawing increasingly tight around Germany, Holstein's concern was mainly, and rightly, with how to break it. Moroccan and Balkan affairs are considered primarily from the standpoint of their possible usefulness to that end.

But to break the *Einkreisung* in the face of the determination to achieve first rank naval power was more than Holstein or anyone else in Germany could contrive. His judgment on this score

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was quite sound: "all these [the difficulties in the relationships among other powers] are favourable factors for Germany's future, provided that she does not by the immoderateness of her acquisitive urge cause this self-same fault of the others to be forgotten, thus driving them to unite" (p. 63, n.1). Or again: "Germany stands or falls with her army, and for that every sacrifice must be made. The fleet increases the number of our enemies, but will never be strong enough to vanquish them" (p. 450).

This was also the age of Bülow, who emerges from these pages as essentially a vain and weak man, an unfortunate guide for his country, especially with an impressionable, mercurial Kaiser on its throne. It was not so much that German aims were unreasonable, in the Moroccan case for example, as that her tactics successfully conveyed that impression to others.

There is much also on the sordid *dessous* of unsavory doings in high places, homosexual practices in the Kaiser's own entourage, the scandals and trials that ensued. This is a minor strand. The events of six decades ago may seem to be dead past. Yet continuity of development is unbroken, and the fundamental permanency of the manner in which high policy is operated by fallible tools is perhaps the chief lesson that emerges from this highly interesting record.

René Albrecht-Carrié

Barnard College

The Party of Humanity. Essays in the French Enlightenment. By Peter Gay. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964.—xiii, 290, viii pp. $6.95.

In nine distinguished essays, all of which had been previously published, Professor Gay has elaborated his general interpretation of the French Enlightenment. From his wide reading of the sources and his deep sensitivity to the options of the age, he has restored to the *philosophes* a significance and relevance which intellectual historians have often failed to discern. "As men of letters at home in a world that was losing its Christian vocation, the *philosophes* felt their critical loss as a deep problem and solved it by reinterpreting and transforming their civilization. They made themselves the spokesmen for a revolutionary age in search of an interpreter" (p. 117). Challenging the long-lingering clichés about the facile optimism, the dry rationalism, the dilettantism of the *philosophes,* he has insisted upon and demonstrated their social concern, moral courage, and political under-

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standing. His own commitment to the Enlightenment is never obscure, but it is a partisanship which emerges, as it should, from his excellent scholarship. Professor Gay cares very deeply about the quality of Western civilization, and in the *philosophes* he has found not only courageous reformers of the eighteenth century but intellectual models for the twentieth. "And yet, in an age of timid return to dependence on the supernatural, to tradition and authority, this philosophy—the commitment to criticism, to humanity, to passion; the respect for the classical past, coupled with a healthy self-confidence; stoic courage in the face of suffering; and irreverent humor—remains refreshing and relevant" (p. 187).

In shaping his understanding of the Enlightenment, Professor Gay has questioned, in fact destroyed, some of the most persistent yet fallacious generalizations about the eighteenth century. His uncompromising dissections of Beckers' *Heavenly City* and Brinton's *The Jacobins* have disposed (though probably not forever) of such misleading descriptions as "the age of faith" and "secular religion." He is even more cogent in scoring as tendentious Talmon's notorious effort to root contemporary "totalitarian democracy" in the eighteenth-century past. For at the heart of Professor Gay's historical wisdom is an insistence upon understanding an age in its own terms and relating each text to its own times. "We must speculate, but such speculation must grow organically from the material at hand, from the concerns of the times" (p. 167).

As a stylist Professor Gay is almost unexcelled. However weighty the subject, his prose is effortless and precise; however witty his epigrams, his serious engagement is never in question. As he demonstrated so well in *Voltaire's Politics,* he has a keen eye for the apt quotation. From the vast array of writings produced by the *philosophes,* he has culled striking passages, which unite or separate them, which plumb their human complexity or reveal their half-hidden insights. So he can remind us, in a quotation from *Rameau's Nephew,* that Diderot anticipated by a century and a half the Freudian concept of the Oedipus complex.

The book suffers, though considerably less than one might have expected, from the inevitable weaknesses of collected essays. Then central ideas are rather too frequently repeated; certain marginal topics are extensively explored. But no matter. The essays are themselves very revealing about the Enlightenment; and even more, they are an excellent preface to the great synthesis of the age, which Professor Gay will undoubtedly produce.

HARVEY GOLDBERG

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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De Gaulle and the French Army. By EDGAR J. FURNISS JR. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1964.—x, 331 pp. $4.00.

Professor Furniss' new book is both a study of the way in which General de Gaulle has handled the French army during and reformed it after the Algerian war, and a sequel to his previous volume on France's postwar diplomacy and strategy, *France, Troubled Ally.* What is best in *De Gaulle and the French Army* is Professor Furniss' shrewd account of de Gaulle's statecraft. De Gaulle emerges from his analysis as being indeed "remarkable . . . for the intimate connection he managed to maintain between goals established by his reflections and policies made possible by his successful pursuit of power." Professor Furniss shows how huge and complex a challenge de Gaulle faced from the army in Algeria—an army thoroughly divorced from and even hostile to the nation, using against de Gaulle both de Gaulle's own rebellion of June 1940 as a legitimizing precedent, and the myth of the unity of the army, and ready to turn France herself into a new Algeria in order to keep Algeria French. This challenge de Gaulle has met in such a way that the new French army that is emerging from the Algerian maelstrom is not only unlikely to be a political threat to the state, but also a perfect instrument of Gaullist domestic and foreign policies. Mr. Furniss shows how the combination of a nuclear deterrent (which favors the air force) and of a conventional army based on the traditional theory of the nation-in-arms is supposed (1) to overcome the "malaise" of the army by giving it a new, modern role; (2) to contribute to the expansion of the French economy; (3) to achieve international recognition for France; (4) to serve de Gaulle's design for a European entity with its own defense under French leadership; (5) to keep Germany, so to speak, under France's wing.

Mr. Furniss' understanding of de Gaulle's strategy does not prevent him from raising sharp questions. The gradual "forcing of reality" upon the army in Algeria was done through a mixture of deception and brutality that has left scars—and the situation was worsened by the incoherent verdict of various and changing courts of justice. The Gaullist plan for a nuclear force runs into well-known obstacles of cost and credibility. The doctrine underlying the maintenance of a large conventional army provides no guidance for recruitment and training. Nor are French policies the only ones Mr. Furniss criticizes. He makes some acute remarks about U.S. misconceptions of other nations' behavior, about such mistakes of U.S. diplomacy as the wooing of West Germany and the scheme for a multilateral

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nuclear force, and he states quite wisely that what was peculiarly French about the army's behavior in Algeria was not its resentment of civilian control and of the nation's preference for peace, but the articulateness with which views found in many armies besides France's were presented.

What is least satisfying in Professor Furniss' book is that he appears to have been unable to reach coherent conclusions about de Gaulle's policies. His critique of de Gaulle's plan for a conventional army ignores the fact that no final policy has yet been adopted; de Gaulle, as usual, proceeds by stages. Mr. Furniss' own suggestions are not consistent. On the one hand, his sympathy for the General's objectives in Europe leads him to express the hope that de Gaulle's "grand design" and "an equally far-sighted American statecraft" be reconciled. On the other hand, the author of *France, Troubled Ally*—whose theme was that France had constantly overtaxed her resources and ought to be discouraged from doing so in the future—recommends that the United States refrain from supporting France's nuclear ambitions, in the hope that they would die, as if those ambitions were not an essential part of de Gaulle's European policy. Mr. Furniss seems to have a difficult time deciding what is more exasperating, de Gaulle's pretensions or American illusions.

One last remark: it certainly was not Jean-Marie Domenach, the brilliant director of the left-wing review *Esprit* who voted against the Pompidou cabinet in June 1962. Domenach has never been either a member of Parliament or a member of the MRP.

STANLEY HOFFMANN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885–1897. By RICHARD PIPES. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.—xi, 154 pp. $4.25.

Today the Soviet historian tracing the origins of Leninism and the CPSU through the eighteen-nineties is relatively free to publish documents, but not to interpret them. Eight years after the Twentieth Party Congress, the young Lenin and the early Russian Marxists have yet to be fully liberated from the hagiographers and demonologists. Only the non-Soviet historian can analyze unhampered the realities of the eighteen-nineties, and this Professor Pipes has sought to do in his new study. Relying on contemporary documents and early memoirs, he writes with force, in a style compact, clear, and incisive.

Soviet historians tend to draw a sharp line between revolu-

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tionary Populism and the Marxism which rivaled it from the mid-eighteen-eighties—the one representing the *muzhik*, the other the urban proletariat, the former, a petit-bourgeois ideology, the latter, socialist. Professor Pipes shows that in Russia (in contrast to Switzerland) this dividing line was in practice thoroughly blurred, both groups concentrating their efforts on the urban proletariat, both advocating terrorism, both in active cooperation with each other at least until 1894.

Again, he demonstrates that although in theory the Marxist intelligentsia was at one with the socialist labor leaders, in practice these two groups were organized independently, eyed each other with suspicion, and sometimes advanced opposing policies. With equal zest, he shows that the revolutionary organization to which Lenin belonged in 1895 was by no means as unique as is generally claimed by Soviet historians; that it was one of a series of such groups going back to the mid-eighteen-eighties; that it did not initiate the policy of economic agitation but borrowed it from Warsaw, Lódź and Vilna; that its leaflets were, if anything, less political than those of the much maligned Economists of later years; and that Lenin could not be the official leader, still less the "founder," of so egalitarian a group.

Yet, at times, Professor Pipes has been carried away by his eagerness to dismantle. Nowhere will the uninitiated reader discover that by December 1895 Lenin, although not an official leader, was generally recognized for his sheer ability and energy as *primus inter pares* (in Martov's estimation). Nor will he realize that Lenin devoted a great part of his time in 1895 to producing revolutionary propaganda, because legal treatises on economics and illegal pamphleteering are alike described simply as "literary work," and *Rabotnik* (a journal meant for the working class in Russia) simply as "a new émigré journal." Nor will he understand how Lenin in the academic year 1894–95 could have acquired "excellent knowledge of the labor situation" (p. 67) if in that period he was "allowed little time for the detailed analyses of labor conditions" (p. 73).

Professor Pipes argues that the socialist intelligentsia and labor represented "not one but two separate and distinct movements." And it is true that each social group had its independent organization. But at this stage neither could do without the other. The first paper (probably the first publication) of the St. Petersburg workers came only late in 1897 and within a few months had to be handed over to the intelligentsia to save it from extinction.

What influence did the proclamations issued by the intelligentsia exert? We are told that those of 1895 created "a myth

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which in the following year helped embolden the working rank and file to undertake a really important series of strikes"; elsewhere the "only one of the proclamations [of early 1896] made any impact at all"; and finally that the intelligentsia "neither instigated nor prolonged strikes." The author justifies these confusing statements primarily by juxtaposing the dates of the leaflets to those of the strikes, an unconvincing method (made still less convincing by subtracting twelve days from the Julian calendar in the description of the strikes of May–June 1896).

Professor Pipes suggests that the revolutionary Marxists were driven into two conflicting deviations—Economism and Bolshevism—by the "apolitical mood of Russian labor." Economism acquiesced in this "political indifference," Bolshevism rebelled against it. Yet from 1891 the workers of St. Petersburg with growing frequency found themselves embroiled in clashes with their employers and the government, until 1905 finally saw open rebellion. The Economists did not "subordinate politics to economics as a matter of principle," but assumed—correctly, as it proved—that economic action would culminate in political revolt. It was less a problem of the apoliticism of the Russian working class than of who was to lead an emergent political force. Was it to be led from above or below?

This is an illuminating book, a stimulating book, a critical book not to be accepted uncritically.

JONATHAN FRANKEL

HEBREW UNIVERSITY,
JERUSALEM

Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis. By CHARLES ISSAWI. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1963.—xiv, 343 pp. $7.20.

Readers interested in Egypt and the Middle East have long been indebted to Professor Issawi for his factual and interpretive books on Egypt. As he points out in his preface (p. vii) this is his third one, made necessary by the vast changes in the last decade. But, he adds firmly, "I can assure the reader that there will not be a fourth."

Egypt in Revolution is fuller than its predecessors in several ways. It has more data, deals more with economic history, and is more interpretive. Though Professor Issawi writes clearly, and even manages to write with style in so uncongenial a *genre*, the book sometimes makes hard reading because he is so relentless in presenting statistical data in the text rather than in addi-

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tional tables. The presentation of so many statistics, moreover, inevitably induces the reader to place greater reliance upon them than is probably warranted by their origin and degree of reliability. Professor Issawi, of course, is aware of this limitation (even if he cannot overcome it), as when (p. 48) he prefers his "reliable information and personal observation" to the official figures concerning efficiency of nationalized enterprises.

The present book is also more pessimistic than its predecessors on several counts.

Professor Issawi regards (p. 48) the recent nationalizations as "ill-conceived" and has "misgivings" about the regime's raising of expectations among the masses which it "almost certainly" will not be able to satisfy. Industry appears to be growing faster than other sectors, but the author finds (p. 169) this sector difficult to assess because the welter of data does not include information which would "make it possible to determine how far Egyptian industry is competitive, to what extent it is actually helping to raise the real national income, and whether the funds invested in it could not be better employed elsewhere."

Land reform, according to Professor Issawi (pp. 162–63) has not achieved all its objectives. The first, to "break the power of the landlords," has been "completely successful." The second, to improve the rural level of living, has been attained with respect to those who have received land and the tenants, but not to landless workers. The third, to divert agricultural capital to industry, has been "not at all successful." The last goal, to raise output, seems to have been realized only to a slight extent.

The development of an infrastructure of transport and communications, according to Professor Issawi (p. 199) offers some hope, as does the "marked progress" which he notes (pp. 93–94) in "technology, the natural sciences, and the applied social sciences." But the use of such developed resources are another matter. Professor Issawi says that there has been an "equally marked retrogression in history and the more theoretical aspects of the social sciences" and that the expanded media of communication have been "reduced to instruments of government propaganda" (p. 220).

Egypt, Professor Issawi is forced to conclude, is "passing through a communist or social-nationalist revolution" (p. 220); though it is not "subservient to the Soviet Union," there has been "a great alienation from the western way of thought and life and a drawing closer to the Soviet way." (p. 310, n.2). In these pessimistic conclusions, however, this reviewer feels that the author does not distinguish enough between official policy and popular sentiment.

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On some points, Professor Issawi is fairly optimistic. He believes (pp. 85, 298) that the population problem is surmountable and that Egypt's eclecticism and Islam's rationalism are long-term factors favorable to modernization (p. 297).

MORROE BERGER

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo. By W. J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH. Brussels, Institut Royal des Relations Internationales and The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.—684 pp. 400 fr.

No one familiar with the rules governing the conduct of public officials should expect significant revelations from a book by the last Resident Minister of Belgium in the Congo, especially, if the book deals with his own mission. That one can indeed not expect significant new insights into the tangled web of Congo affairs from this source becomes quite evident as early as page 47. There the author notes: "A la base des problèmes actuels au Congo, il y a l'armée." This, he asserts, was true in June and July of 1960 and is true today. That the army, or more accurately the *force publique,* played a key role, cannot be disputed. That it is "at the base" of the problem, cannot seriously be maintained in the face of the body of evidence produced by various sources, foremost among them the special commission of investigation sent into the Congo by the Belgian Parliament in 1959.

The author never wavers from his obvious intent to attribute everything negative in connection with events in the Congo to local, that is, Congolese, forces. Presented in minutely documented form, based on personal notes by the author, on reports by Belgian officials, on eye-witness accounts, a recital of events emerges which completely absolves the Belgian government, financial circles interested in the wealth of Katanga, other interested European governments, the Belgian Army, the church, the Belgian settlers and administrators in the Congo, etc. British and American circles are cited, but only for their "naiveté" in believing Lumumba capable of governing the Congo. The reader of this volume would never know that Premier Tshombe of Katanga may have had the support of Belgian circles, that the wealth of Katanga, rather than a concern with the welfare of the several tribes or with the principle of federalism, was at the base of the dispute with Lumumba and the Congolese nationalist forces. Although mentioned, but not until page 499, the issue of the allocation of powers over financial matters between the

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central government and the provinces, is given no emphasis at all. As one is led through the myriad negotiations attending the several attempts to form coalition governments at the center, one is struck by the absence of any reference to the crucial matter of revenue.

Actually, the evident intent of the Belgian side to deprive the central government in the Congo of independent sources of revenue, thus rendering it dependent upon Katanga, which remained loyal to Belgium, had become clear to Lumumba and others long before M. Ganshof's notes would indicate. But one cannot expect more from a book written by one of the principal actors in the tragedy which it seeks to describe. Moreover, the general approach to political analysis evident in M. Ganshof's case seems to emphasize relatively superficial, formal, political arrangements and negotiations, and the rather sterile legal-constitutional dispositions, at the expense of more profound socio-economic, centrally important, political factors. The historian will find the minute renditions of the multiple negotiations between Belgians and Congolese quite useful. Although it misses the basic problems afflicting electoral processes in an area like the Congo, the book does contain a wealth of material on the several elections, the parties and factions, and on the leaders. Still, because it fails to come to grips with the shortcomings of the Belgian administration, the machinations of the Belgians—the Union Minière du Haute Katanga, the settlers, businessmen, and administrators in the Congo—and because it fails to treat the entire Katanga affair candidly, the book must be regarded as unbalanced and wanting.

HENRY L. BRETTON

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

William Lyon Mackenzie King, Volume II, *1924–1932: The Lonely Heights.* By H. BLAIR NEATBY. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963.—xii, 452 pp. $7.95.

This, the second of four intended volumes in the official biography of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canada's great and mercurial Prime Minister, is a singularly important contribution to Canadian studies.

No single figure has so dominated twentieth-century Canadian politics as has King. Already the subject of both adoring and highly critical studies, King promises to become the F.D.R. of Canadian historiography. Prime Minister for longer than any other Canadian politician, the man responsible for moving the New Deal north, a mystic who believed that he communed with

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his dead mother and with the dead Roosevelt, King led Canada in depression and war because he was the man, as Frank H. Underhill has written, who divided Canada the least. Any study of King is intrinsically interesting and important.

The first volume of this biography, covering King's life from 1874 to 1923, was written by the dean of Canadian political scientists, Professor R. MacGregor Dawson of the University of Toronto. His work was magisterial in tone, unadorned in prose, and while not infrequently critical of King, basically friendly to him; indeed, many critics felt, too friendly. With Dawson's death the burden for the subsequent volumes, the next already assigned, fell to H. Blair Neatby, then of the University of British Columbia and now of Carleton University, a young scholar who had not previously published a book. Many waited to see whether Professor Neatby could reach his predecessor's height.

Professor Neatby's volume exceeds that height. It is more objective, better written, consistently more interesting, and more critical of King than was Dawson's work. Neatby often uses a sparkling turn of phrase; he is not afraid of wit; and he balances public with private life nicely. This volume leans, in part, on a draft prepared by Professor Dawson before he died, but it remains very much Professor Neatby's book. The years covered were crucial to King: his election in 1926, the Imperial Conference of that year, Lord Byng's refusal of a dissolution, the depression, the Beauharnois scandal, the election of 1930—all are dealt with at length in unhurried and uncluttered prose.

This volume is important for a third reason: the King papers are not readily available to the general scholar, and it is upon this multi-volume study, and J. W. Pickersgill's published selections from King's voluminous diary, that we must rely for the data upon which to base our own judgments of King. Dawson and Neatby have supplied the data well. We can await Professor Neatby's subsequent volume, which is to carry the account to 1939, with confidence.

ROBIN W. WINKS

YALE UNIVERSITY

Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics. By CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH. New York and London, McGraw-Hill, 1963.—xiii, 737 pp. $9.95.

This is a superb book. One is immediately conscious, as one reads, that one is in the hands of a man of judgment, who is a master of learning in his subject. The amateur attempt of those who are guiltless of such knowledge to lay down the law in

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belles lettres is a form of impertinence. Critics of this species are fond of complaining that books are "long, so long." But, although long, I fail to see how Professor Friedrich could systematically have covered so vast a ground more briefly.

Professor Friedrich proceeds from a section on the Political Person and the Political Art, through chapters discussing power, rulership, legitimacy and law; on to discussion of equality and the "elite," and freedom; to the political order and bureaucracy, sovereignty, empire and federalism; and on to a final section on Tradition, Revolution, and Reform. He also discusses Influence (which is comparable to Credit in the economic world, imponderable but frequently decisive). Like others engaged in similar enterprises, he reviews the issues of ends, values, and religion, although (perhaps consistently with his general scheme) he does the last, not at the end and conclusion, but at the beginning, associated with ritual and after a section on symbolism. He rightly both distinguishes Political Science and Political Philosophy and asserts that they are concretely tied together. Indeed his presentation, while empirical, is rather historical and concrete than abstract, schematic, and quantitative (and utilitarian). It includes recurrent criticisms of the inflated reputation of Max Weber and (perhaps more open to debate) of the conscientious work of Talcott Parsons.

Rather oddly, at the beginning Professor Friedrich chooses to limit the key framework of reference, "the political," to what may be termed the *staatlich* and *étatiste* or to what in English we can best call the "civil" (*civilis*), the "military" being the frayed fringe of politics, unfinished business. Personally I hold it to be basic that this begs questions; and it is itself the more remarkable since we later find him relevantly (p. 173) discussing religious leadership and "ecclesiastical politics" and even (p. 195) democracy in trades unions.

Many of us have for years protested against that school (partly German in ancestry) which habitually treats "power" and "Dominative Power" as synonymous. This false identification explains the exaggerated and misleading reaction of Lord Acton in his famous dictum, which (however noble) has done much to obfuscate clear thinking. In few things is the work of Professor Friedrich more invaluable than in that insistence upon precise definitions which is basic to the cumulative building up of an agreed corpus of Political Science. While deploring vague usages, he both operates with the central concept of power and firmly joins the ranks of those who could assert that power—peculiarly in a democracy—is no less such if it is "consensual" or cooperative than if it is dominative or merely a matter of

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commands or of force. Incidentally, he sometimes uses the word "power" where this reviewer would use "control" or even "force" (since "power," as generic, can be in reserve or potential and also be negative; and "control" is specific, actual, and, in current usage, neither *fainéant* nor "formal"). Further, he often prefers to speak of (mental) "consent"—which can be merely "passive assent" or—which is very different—the consent and aid of the active worker, when I would prefer to speak of the market of (behavioral) "support," passive or organized and active. I would not myself agree that "power is *always* power over other men" (not reciprocal) nor does this seem to be Professor Friedrich's own theme, which permits balance; and to say that "men seek what they desire" (p. 160) is surely not the same as to say that "men seek technically the means to achieve what they desire." Much of life is frustrated by ignorance of these means, whatever the assigned ends. Power and control can, of course, not only be useful as means, but be themselves perverted values, as money is to a miser. These are only verbal points; but perhaps not unimportant clues.

Professor Friedrich's discussion of Authority (Chap. 10) is profound and of the highest importance. He is here in sharp and healthy opposition to the doctrine of what traditionally are called the Legalists. Authority is not just formal power; and authority is so far linked with reason that it is a counsel augmented by considerations of reason. Authority, I would suggest, is "recognized power," and those who recognize it should (and, we pathetically hope, will) be reasonable.

One wishes indeed that all authority were reasonable and that such as is not (for instance in some Southern states) were "false." Alas! that consensual or "communal" authority depends upon majority opinion, so often "of the great beast" and far from reasonable. If, however, we distinguish (as we do with Liberty) Authority A and Authority B, we can justly say, with the schoolmen, that all authority *ought* to be reasonable, if it is to be morally valid; and that A *ought* to conform to B. It is indeed true that Plato does not make the mistake of confusing communal reasoning (or preference and opinion) with scientific reason—while it can be argued for the former that we live in a plural world where nobody knows what "the rational" is, so we fall back on "votes." But Professor Friedrich's defense of rational tradition is Thomistic, admirable, and needed saying; and those who believe in the revival of Natural Law will be grateful for his contention that valid law appeals to reason *ex cathedra* as well as to empiric research into human need. There is much educational twaddle talked about heteronomy, antique tradition,

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and autonomy; it is well to have it recalled what Goethe knew so well—that autonomy also involves a law. Professor Friedrich has, in this impressive book, done a splendid and almost unprecedented job and the whole learned world should be in his debt.

GEORGE E. GORDON CATLIN

LONDON, ENGLAND

Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making. By OLIVER P. WILLIAMS and CHARLES R. ADRIAN. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.—334 pp. $6.00.

This volume is a comparative study of four cities of fifty to seventy thousand population in the state of Michigan. It is a significant and suggestive addition to the literature of local government for several reasons. One is its focus on smaller cities with less complete and complex political and administrative structures which, as the authors argue, differ from the metropolises that dominate our learning. Another reason is the use of comparative analysis under exceptionally favorable (that is, comparable) conditions. Still a third merit of the volume is its constant attention to policy as, in most cases, the dependent variable rather than to structure and process for their own sake, and the authors' constructive attempt to deal with policy in categorical and thus comparative terms.

This is not a study of "power structure" or of governmental structure primarily, though neither is neglected. Its main variables are socio-economic characteristics, electoral systems, political organization, and policy orientations; its main concern is with the interaction of these and especially with the effects of the first three in combination on policy outcomes. Four policy orientations or emphases are defined: economic growth; the extension of "amenities"; conservative, "caretaker" government; and neutral arbitration among discrete interests. These amount to ideal types with most of the usual advantages and disadvantages. The strengths here appear to be their breadth of applicability to other cities, their susceptibility to at least rudimentary indices, and the possibility of their elaboration as an aid to the "understanding" of values and social patterns common in American cities today. Their corresponding weaknesses would seem to be some necessary ambiguity, the difficulty of precisely relating constellations of values and other variables, and the sheer contemporaneousness of the types. I think the strengths decisively outweigh the weaknesses, despite the dangers of purely impressionistic application of the types which are studiously avoided here.

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While parts of this study have appeared in articles, there is a distinct gain from publication of the whole of such a broad analysis. The findings that nonpartisan elections and at-large elections tend to advantage upper-middle-class interests can be fitted to and discounted by community economic and social structure and the ethnic aspects of politics. The ways in which electoral and socio-economic factors mix to produce strong or weak political structures and the probable effects of such structures on the council-manager plan, the tactics of interest groups, and the stability of policy—as well as on policy "types"—are worked out with modesty and sophistication. Thus the old issues about the manager plan, nonpartisan, and at-large elections are explicitly set in a broader context. So, at least implicitly, are assumptions about economic elites and class interests. The several factors that condition the effects of these variables can then be explored in some depth. In *Four Cities,* as in many of our community studies, the manageable size of the cities and their sameness or monotony in some respects make possible a breadth of analysis which is difficult to apply to larger cities, at least in initial studies.

This volume's findings and the insights they provide display the utility of modern political analysis as an equal partner of sociological and administrative studies. One must add that its substance deserved better editing and proofreading.

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Legislative Partisanship, The Deviant Case of California. By WILLIAM BUCHANAN. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1963.—167 pp. $3.50.

Party and Representation, Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania. By FRANK J. SORAUF. New York, Atherton Press, A division of Prentice-Hall, 1963.—xii, 178 pp. $6.50.

In 1901 A. Lawrence Lowell asserted that the influence of party in the American state legislature, with a few exceptions, was negligible; for a half a century thereafter Lowell's generalization was often repeated but rarely investigated. Several scholars began taking a second look at state legislative politics around 1950, and the resulting research findings indicated that Lowell's observation was wrong almost as often as it was right. It held for the noncompetitive political systems (roughly a third of the states), but in many competitive states party cohesion in the legislature turned out to be very high. Because the volumes re-

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viewed here report on states with competitive political parties but with widely divergent levels of legislative party cohesion they are most welcome additions to the growing shelf of books on state politics. It is also good news that both are competently done and that they add both to our empirical knowledge and our theoretical tools for the analysis of legislative politics. (Sorauf's book was the co-winner of the 1962 Atherton Press Political Science Prize.)

William Buchanan's report on legislative partisanship in California is rightly subtitled the "Deviant Case," for California politics are quite unlike those of comparably large and complex states in the east. Although in national elections the state has long been competitive, its internal politics were until recently almost completely non-partisan. Partly as a result of the hex put on political parties by the Progressive revolt in the second decade of this century, the effectiveness of California party organizations dwindled to the vanishing point. As Buchanan illustrates in his review of legislative politics since 1930, the legislature was dominated by personal politics and loose and unstable factions. All the standard practices of more partisan states were taboo in California, and party meant so little that in the mid-nineteen-thirties a speaker of the House was removed in mid-term. This loose factional system opened the way for the notorious Artie Samish and other similar lobbyists. Buchanan rejects oversimplified explanation of the Samish interlude and discusses it most perceptively, and his explanation of the slow rise of a greater degree of partisanship since 1951 is equally convincing. When political cause and effect do not fit neatly, he admits it; at one point he concludes that the "California legislative process is genuinely mystifying" both to participants and observers. "Partisanship, when it operates, presents a rationale that enables . . . [one] to make some sense out of an otherwise confusing scene," he says, adding, however, that parties may seem to explain more decisions than they actually do. Realization of the pitfalls of oversimplified explanation of the incredibly complex is no mean virtue.

Let a complaint be registered, however: the book lacks an index. This is not a pedantic quibble, for the re-use value of such a work is as great as its original utility, and who can recall on what page he saw a half-remembered fact or argument?

Frank Sorauf's work on Pennsylvania is particularly welcome, since that is one of the states with very strong party organizations and, as it turns out, a high level of party cohesion in the legislature. There is also a strong constituency orientation on the part of legislators, whether it be to local party organizations or to

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other local interests, and the unity in the legislature is not a product of a dominating state party machine. Not satisfied with the general inferences to be made from examining legislative behavior Sorauf interviewed both legislators and candidates as to their conceptions of the legislative function and supplemented that with careful research on the character and activity of the party organizations of the constituencies of his one-half sample of the House of Representatives. He clearly demonstrates a positive relationship between the strong local party organizations and strong party loyalty of the legislator, and he illuminates some of the effects of the continuing tendency to localism in Pennsylvania politics.

The work could have been better had it been more ruthlessly edited, for there is too much needless repetition, and in the space of six pages (144–50 there are flatly self-contradictory observations that ". . . the greater the number of years in the House, the greater the party cohesion" and that ". . . experience in the Pennsylvania House has no effect by itself on party cohesion. Freshmen vote as often with the party majority as do the ten-session veterans."

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Conduct of the New Diplomacy. By JAMES L. MCCAMY. New York, Evanston, and London, Harper & Row, 1964.—x, 303 pp. $4.50.

Conduct of the New Diplomacy is by a seasoned academician with varied experience in Washington and abroad. Impressive authority is matched by lucidity, grace of style, and flashes of wit. Research there is, but more importantly, there is the fruit of long reflection.

The new diplomacy should "make things happen" and not simply react to events. This is the root of the distinction between foreign affairs ("policy is found in the cables") and foreign policy properly defined as an actively pursued goal. Foreign Service Officers, he asserts, are devoted to "routine," a word of extraordinarily broad interpretation. To control events it is necessary to cause desired things to happen. We should give up pretense and frankly intervene in the domestic affairs of other nations: "American officials need to help change other cultures if they are to succeed."

Coherent policy requires drastic reorganization of the entire executive department, beginning with the presidency itself. A new State Department will result from a sweeping realignment

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of functions, gathering into it all the full-time overseas activities from other Cabinet departments and "independent" agencies. Defense alone is excepted because the scope of its foreign policy role is too immense for even the new State Department to digest. He lays down clear and simple rules for the reorganized structure but never acknowledges that logic has only a limited scope in the organization of any government.

He would have the immediate staff of the President not only prepare issues for his consideration as they do now; they should reach decisions and act in his name. This proposal raises questions regarding their relationship with members of the Cabinet which are not satisfactorily answered.

Moreover, top officials like the President and Secretary of State almost never have had broad executive experience. Their background usually has been in politics, in legislative service, in law. To expect them totally to remold their habits of thought and work with those characteristic of executives vitiates much of his argument.

He admits that our "broad national traits inhibit reform. . . . Men who have strong and independent ideas are doomed to trouble." We have "too much confidence that pluralism, the incessant competition and resolution of interest, will produce the greatest justice for all, and that decisions reached as the conclusion of debate are the best because they are more democratic than decisions reached by one man on the weight of evidence." Moreover, we are "too tolerant of public officials and do not hold them strictly to account when they make mistakes." The key question is "whether the American executive can overcome the culture on this point."

His proposals cut across the structure of the committees and subcommittees of the Congress. He takes far too little account of the powers of Congress and the vested interests within Congress: "A strong President, by definition, is one who can get from Congress approval of all those measures that he thinks most important." No President ever succeeded in doing so.

He is convinced that we do unnecessary things. The validity of this judgment is impaired by failure to take account of the unique size of the United States and the tremendous scope of its responsibilities in the world. More particularly, it neglects the relationship of Congress to the expectations of constituents for kinds of service such as no member of Parliament or of the French National Assembly or of the German *Bundestag* faces.

One important thesis is that work overseas contrasts so sharply with work in Washington that it requires men with different traits, training, and abilities: "I think the main cause of confu-

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sion is our failure to recognize that work in a mission is different from work in the Department." This implies a return to the situation which existed in the far-off days of William Hunter and Alvee A. Adee. It rejects the experience of other great nations which discovered that separation produces a sense of alienation between the diplomats and the Foreign Offices. The United States was the last great power to unite its Foreign Service with its Foreign Office.

His proposals are not limited to administrative reform under strong executives. He would set up a small cadre of thinkers and planners, free of the pressures and confusions of current business, with time enough to take the far-sighted view. This was the idea behind the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State. It broke down because harried executives called for help on urgent matters. Will they not call again?

It seems extraordinary that a volume dated 1964 does not so much as mention the Herter Committee or the Perkins panel.

HENRY M. WRISTON

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Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. By DAVID GALULA. Foreword by Robert R. Bowie. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.—xiv, 143 pp. $4.50.

In the many books of the past two years on guerrilla warfare, from Mao Tse-tung's and Che Guevara's on through the list, emphasis has been on insurgency techniques, implying that successful counterinsurgency would follow the same principles and practices. A wholly different view is presented by David Galula, a former French military officer lately at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, where this study was written.

Rather, this persuasive author points out, the problems of insurgent and government are in many respects exactly opposite, and their treatments must also be unlike. It is the insurgent who has the initiative, who can act when and as he chooses. He is not confined to violence, but can make large and leisurely progress in a safe and legal manner by exploiting the always-present opposition to an existing government, and while his own strength is gathering he offers to the government no plain target for restraining action.

Government meantime has all the tangible assets of legitimate power, diplomatic recognition, industrial resources, transport, communications, information, police, and armed forces. They are not enough, for government also has a large liability—re-

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sponsibility for maintaining order, not in one or two spots but everywhere in the country, not against open operations but against treachery, assassination, sabotage, hit-and-run attacks by unknown individuals who melt back, unidentifiable, into their own village backgrounds where, even if known, they are protected by neighbors who also are "agin' the government."

Against this useful background Mr. Galula describes briefly the types of revolt and the conditions under which each one prospers in a post-1945 period when, as Robert R. Bowie points out in a foreword, the spectrum of force has enormously widened, ranging from unprecedented capacity to destroy to unprecedented frequency of low-grade violence in outbursts of nationalism or communist subversion or both together.

How does orderly government cope with the insurgent? The author warns against dreaming of sure, quick success, remarking that no chess player has ever found a sure way of winning by the first move. He warns, too, against thinking that all insurgencies can be conquered by any single method. Lest we rely on such a victory as in Greece, he notes that it was fated. The communist insurgents never had a "cause" appealing to the Greek population which had no large proletariat and no hopeless agrarian problem; the communists had no outside ally tolerable to the Greeks, and they strove in vain against the Greeks' actual pride in their shipping capitalists. China was something different; it offered "causes" in plenty, including a much-mouthed land reform, which the communists used successfully and then, the victory won, scuttled altogether.

The prescription Mr. Galula offers, with variations to suit local needs, includes military operations much like those on which the United States and South Vietnam jointly now are firmly embarked, but accompanied by that patient and determined "political" effort (that is, economic, medical, sanitary, road-building, market-creating aid and all-level administrative assistance) to which the United States is dedicating its civil-action activities. Both types, the author warns, must certainly be employed, but in a ratio of, say, twenty per cent military to eighty per cent political.

The world's revolutionary struggles, he warns, are very far from over, and they are far easier to start than to repress. And in most of them the West is automatically involved. These things being so, the Harvard-sponsored study is of great timeliness. It provides fact and conclusion in perspective on a problem with which we presumably will be grappling for decades.

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Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence. Edited by CYRIL E. BLACK and THOMAS P. THORNTON. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—ix, 467 pp. $10.00.

Books about communist strategy and tactics in various areas are becoming increasingly frequent. This one attempts to go farther, and to present a synthetic picture of the whole process of revolution in the world over the last half century, in the still wider context of "modernization," defined as the process of increasingly rapid economic and social change that began in Western Europe and America between the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. Such efforts at synthesis are indispensable if scholars and policy-makers are not to lose themselves in a forest of confusing details, but that of Professor Black and his colleagues cannot be regarded as an unqualified success.

The fifteen chapters in this book approach the problem of communist-led revolutions on three distinct levels. At one extreme are nine studies of concrete experience in a given region. At the opposite extreme are Professor Black's opening and closing chapters, in which he elaborates a theory of the relation between revolution and modernization. The intermediate level is represented by three chapters devoted to the analysis of communist theoretical and strategic concepts.

Of these three types of contributions, it is unquestionably those of the third type which are the weakest. Neither Mr. Thornton, who has produced two chapters dealing with the evolution of communist doctrine before and after the Second World War, nor Andrew Janos, who has written on "The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution," appears to have an adequate grasp of the fundamentals of Marxist theory, or an adequate familiarity with the writings of Marx and Lenin. Thus, the problem of the divorce, in communist theory and practice, between the working class and the party which is supposed to represent it, which is basic to the whole history of communism since Lenin, is merely evoked by Mr. Thornton in a footnote (p. 71), and is not referred to by Professor Janos at all. Moreover, the best peg he can find to hang this idea on is an East German historical work; neither he nor Professor Janos once refers to Lenin's *What is to Be Done?*, which marks the starting point of this whole development. The illustrative material in Mr. Thornton's very long chapter on the early history of communist strategy is almost wholly drawn from European experience; this is a bit paradoxical, in as much as three-fourths of the concrete material in the book pertains to the developing countries. Nor does he do adequate justice to the complexities

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of the Chinese position. His characterization of them as uninterested either in the bourgeoisie within the country, or in any save socialist countries without, (pp. 248, 251–52), is contradicted not merely by recent developments in foreign policy, but by the whole history of Mao's attempts to appeal to virtually the whole of the Chinese "people," including even big bourgeois and "patriotic gentry," which have recently led the Soviets to denounce him as a petty-bourgeois right-wing deviationist. (See Kuusinen's speech at the February 1964 Plenum of the Soviet Party.)

The problems dealt with in the factual chapters are too diverse to permit of discussion in a brief review. Two generalizations about the quality of the contributions can, however, be ventured. First, the examination of secondary accounts in periodicals, information bulletins, and such is no substitute for knowledge of the languages and history of the area in which one wishes to study communist influence. Secondly, it is only when such knowledge of a given country or area is completed by the talent—and the intellectual effort—necessary to single out the crucial factors and relate them significantly to one another that a really worthwhile contribution emerges. This is the case of R. V. Burks' chapter on Eastern Europe, of Glenn Paige's chapter on Korea, of Manfred Halpern's chapter on the Middle East, and above all of Ruth McVey's lucid and elegantly written comparative account of the armed revolts carried out by the Communists in 1948 in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Professor Black's theoretical framework is interesting, and will serve a useful purpose in drawing attention to the importance of comparative study of the industrialization of agrarian societies in various geographical and cultural areas and in various epochs. But in lumping together all of these highly disparate phenomena under the term "modernization," there is perhaps also a danger of losing sight of the immense difference between the problems raised by this process in European and non-European countries. However brutal the wrench caused by the industrial revolution in European society, Europeans did not suffer from the feeling, so prevalent throughout Asia and Africa, that this was something thrust upon them from the outside, by foreigners, something which called into question their whole tradition and threatened to replace it by ways and ideas completely alien. Nor was the process accompanied, in most cases, by the economic and political domination of more advanced states. Hence the virulent nationalism which the authors of this study, like so many of their predecessors, have

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analyzed as a basic factor in the politics of the developing countries. In the light of this, one may wonder whether the problems of the West in dealing with these countries can be solved, as Professor Black suggests, by "suggesting" to their leaders which variants of the methods of development that have been successful elsewhere can best be applied in each society, and even seeking out and recognizing alternative leaders in case those in power are not amenable to our suggestions (pp. 447–48). Laying down the political, economic, and cultural policy of another people is a delicate and hazardous undertaking; and it is not even certain that an effective synthesis between progress and traditional values can be devised except from within the traditional culture. But even if we cannot present ready-made solutions to our friends in Asia and Africa, it is certainly better, as Professor Black says, to apply our minds to these problems than to wait passively and then try to deal with each crisis on an *ad hoc* basis, instead of endeavoring to foresee the upheavals that are inevitable in the course of modernization.

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The Abolition of War. By WALTER MILLIS and JAMES REAL. New York, Macmillan, 1963.—xvii, 217 pp. $4.50.

This is a book to vex even the sympathetic reader. It has serious things to say about war and politics, but also foolish ones. It is hard to judge whether foolishness or sensibility finally comes out on top.

In any event, the thesis is this: "War" is one of man's most ancient institutions, along with Religion, Law, and Politics. It is both system and cultural behavior. In modern times, the "war system" has been vested within nation-states. Until the late eighteenth century (that is, before the coming of the totally mobilizable industrial state), it served as one device whereby the international system of Europe was governed. The war system comprises national institutions (weapons systems fused into military orders) juxtaposed *one to another;* each is buttressed by ancient "myths" which justify its retention. Such myths, so the argument goes, are neither more nor less intransigent than myths which justify any custom or social order. As other myths, once exposed, have been demolished, so can the war system together with its terrible social costs. The system in the past sometimes had its social uses (there is an ambivalence about this matter in this book, depending on what chapter, or possibly which

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co-author, one reads); but—according to one or both—since the nineteenth century, it no longer serves any rational purpose. War was irrational long before thermonuclear weapons made it suicidal.

Systems of organized violence—"murder systems," the authors occasionally call them—*require* other murder systems to exist, in order to be justified and useful. Each represents the other's target; if the target is not there, the individual system has no use, other than ornamental.

The Millis-Real "war system," abstracted from particular socio-political contexts, defies the talents for rational abstractness of other writers in the field such as Herman Kahn. It is their contention that the system *gives rise to* substantive international conflicts. The tragedy of the nineteen-thirties was a

> history of the *status-quo* powers endeavoring to defend their status by the *threat* of military action that they dared not relinquish but that they feared increasingly to use; and of the insurgent powers rising to claim "dominance" by exploiting that reluctance. Again, it was a fairly naked struggle for abstract power, neither side making it at all clear what it would do with its power, once achieved . . . (p. 54).

Conveniently disregarding such matters as Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, the authors argue further that "wars do not really proceed from 'disputes,' they proceed from underlying power issues that specific disputes do not do more than catalyze." Thus specific substantive issues of politics, once "war system" is exorcised, are not hard to solve. In Central Europe today, for instance, "the real 'cause' of war is not the Germanies [*sic*]; it is the armaments and military powers. It is not difficult to devise a rational and reasonably just solution for the problems of the Germans, or even of the Germans *vis-a-vis* the rest of Europe" (p. 102).

The authors' contention that military forces are useless unless confronted with "opposite numbers" leads them into curious strictures on the present strategies for disarmament. Since thermonuclear weapons systems today are strategically geared to deal with their opposite numbers, Millis and Real are under the impression that unilateral disarmament—although politically impracticable at this time—nevertheless "looks as though it really might work." Arms control measures on the other hand would serve only as stabilizing palliatives. "Assuming," they write,

> a Soviet Union armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons and confronting a Western and neutralist world that had divested itself of such "power" [*sic*]; what could the Soviet Union actually do with its armament? It could, of course, make demands and threats on

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> pain of nuclear extermination. But if the demands were simply rejected, could the power of extermination help them at all? (p. 101).

They do not answer this rhetorical question, which they describe as "suggestive"; although high Japanese officials in 1945 who had to deal concretely with exactly such a question could provide some advice on how to "simply" reject thermonuclear threats.

It is a "political act" to extract a social institution from its historical and cultural context and deal with it as a principle source of human woe. Following Millis and Real, in regarding war as an "institution" or "system" extractable from a real historical context, or from society and its problems, it is possible at a given moment to bare skeletal frameworks of impressive proportions—the American or Soviet military establishment, for instance. Such organizational systems—as Rand Corporation studies often show—can gestate their own internal intellectual logic, their abstract views of global strategic rationality. Fifty billion dollars spent per year in one country can go rather far to develop vested interests which might have trouble in finding gainful employment in a warless world; and in any event they bear watching. The "strategic necessities" of one camp's military organization can also bear a symbiotic relationship to those in another. Military definitions of "security," especially in thermonuclear conditions, can come to have an overly sensitive regard for their own survival-capacities even when their own "society" is unprotectable from certain forms of attack. There is the obvious risk, that the survival requirements of defense systems may become alien to the "real interests" of society, as Mr. Eisenhower himself inferentially pointed out, or may arrogate to themselves the power to decide what these might be.

But it is another matter to define international conflict as essentially "mythical," arising from the institutional and/or philosophic necessities of "war systems" imposed on "society." Millis and Real seem unable to make up their minds as to whether war is a frightful "reality" or a frightening "myth," Mars himself or a bogey-man. When it serves their argument, "great weapons systems" are as unreal as the mythical "hellfire" used by seventeenth-century preachers to cow ignorant peasants (p. 147). If one wanted to do away with them, one could simply consign them to Frazer's *Golden Bough,* in the quaint company of Potlatch and other such rituals. But while genuine hellfire has never authentically been experienced by anyone with clear credentials, war has been intimate to large numbers of people. It is no more a "myth" than the cancer of which Mary Baker

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Eddy died; nor can one exorcise it—as Schumpeter once tried to exorcise Imperialism—by labeling it a cultural atavism soon to be replaced by more genial progressive tendencies of mankind (capitalism, for instance).

No one would quarrel with the authors when they dwell upon the irrationalities of total thermonuclear war, which would be purposeless in the sense that its outcome would be wholly unpredictable. Certainly they are also arguing sensibly when they note that power is no longer a linear function of strength and that usable power may even decrease sharply with a gain in actual power (the overkill problem). The trouble arises when the authors move from this level of analysis to pronounce *all* contemporary and future wars as purposeless; a curious leap, since they are prepared to admit that some international wars in the past *have* been purposeful and since they exempt important modes of present-day conflict—guerrilla warfare, for instance—from the general condition of impotence, as well as wars of independence such as in Algeria. Logically, it would seem to follow that if thermonuclear and other mass-destruction systems were eliminated war's purposefulness might be resurrected! Another logical extension of their argument would appear to be that those nations which possess technologically impressive "murder systems" are the principal ones to whom their argument applies; conflict engaged in by others against others might still accomplish very important things. If power be instrumentally defined—as "power to attain ends"—then militarily "weak systems" can still be "powerful" in using organized violence. The authors suggest, but shun, this dreary avenue of thought, for it leads away from their main line of argument.

Millis and Real are on stronger ground when they move from theoretical analysis to describe the emerging structure of international politics of the nineteen-sixties. This, they argue, has important elements of stability and peace. Their point is that the states which have the big "murder systems," or the capabilities to construct them, happily also are states in effective control of their own societies; ideology aside, they have no overwhelming need to change the international *status quo,* except perhaps to augment their own security. Millis and Real would include China in this club; interestingly enough, this leads them back to the ancient (1945) doctrine which underlay the original Dumbarton Oaks United Nations: the "principal responsibility of the great powers to maintain international peace and security." " 'Power' is accumulating, and will continue to accumulate, in four or five great centers—the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China—each internally so well organ-

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ized and so nearly self-sufficient that there are really no power issues between them" (p. 220). A tacit or explicit acceptance of *cuius regio eius religio* among these states might become the basis of a durable order of things, requiring no really important structural changes in international politics other than reduction or renunciation of weapons systems. This reasonable hunch and prudent aspiration, however, is at odds with their main line of thought; for them to rely upon it as the principal condition for a "warless world" in our time would require severe modification of their central thesis, that "power" is a chimera with no relevance to modern international politics.

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The Economics of American Medicine. By SEYMOUR E. HARRIS. New York and London, Macmillan, 1964.—xv, 508 pp. $8.50.

Medical Care, Health Status, and Family Income. Washington, D. C., U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1964.—92 pp. .55.

In recent years there have been many publications on health and medical care, which reflect the growing awareness that, in spite of rising living standards, medical services in the United States leave much to be desired. To this array of books is now added another by Professor Harris, who has done considerable work in the field of social security and health insurance, and who in 1952 served as a consultant to the President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation.

The book, which represents several years of research, is a carefully documented work covering many facets such as expenditures for health, the price of medical services, the economics of drugs, medical personnel, manpower problems, hospitals, prepayment voluntary insurance, and compulsory programs. If one is looking for new evidence, a novel approach, or a clear-cut thesis for solving the shortcomings and problems that plague our medical program, one may be disappointed in this work, but it does represent a reasonably balanced treatment of the more pertinent facts together with pros and cons on controversial issues. The approach is scholarly, but the lack of a selective bibliography in the appendix is unfortunate. The use of a few graphs would be welcomed instead of the steady diet of tables and statistical data.

Since the author found space for two chapters on the British

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National Health Service, the treatment of which adds little if anything to what already has been published on the subject, it is regrettable that he could not have included reference to what the Scandinavian and some of the other European countries have done in meeting the health needs of their people, and what is being accomplished in Canada, a nation with conditions more similar to our own. A brief survey of the trends of the Western world toward government-administered medical care would have been helpful to the reader in broadening his horizon and giving him some understanding of the universality of the problem and what is being done on a wide front to solve it.

Professor Harris is effective in defining and clarifying the issues, and has sound proposals to offer in some areas. In coping with the excessive price of drugs, for example, he recommends taking measures to insure honest advertising, less generous patent rights, more careful scrutiny of new products, and greater consumption of standard rather than proprietary products. And in dealing with the shortage of doctors, his approach is realistic; but in achieving an equitable distribution of doctors and hospital beds, and providing medical care for the aged and other low-income groups, and furnishing adequate health care for everybody, he is somewhat diffuse and ambivalent. In this area, the most vital of all, the book may leave the reader with a feeling of deep frustration.

Once a strong advocate of a payroll levy under the OASI to finance medical expenses, Harris now appears to be lukewarm toward this approach. On page 305 he says the "NHI (National Health Insurance) seems to me to be largely dead, the major contribution to its demise having been the AMA" but on page 308 he declares that in "recent years the pressure for health insurance has greatly increased," which increase he attributes to the fact that "the people look increasingly to the Government for security." He seems to favor Medicare providing it is done "by steps over a few years." He leaves the impression that the rising per capita income and the expansion of voluntary insurance has diminshed the need for NHI, although in his concluding remarks he does not completely rule out federal and state subsidies to help low-income groups obtain comprehensive insurance.

If Harris appears indecisive and unclear as to a precise course of action, he is nevertheless aware that the present situation is quite unsatisfactory since only thirty per cent of medical costs in the United States are now financed through insurance benefits, and during the next ten years he does not envisage a rise in the coverage to more than forty-three per cent.

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In *Medical Care, Health Status and Family Income* published by the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, there is a wealth of statistical data for the period of 1962-63. Even the most cursory scrutiny of the figures and percentages will show how meager and totally inadequate is private health insurance for the lowest one-third income group, which represents all age categories and not just the elderly.

Fortunately there is a growing recognition that the health needs of the American people can no longer be left largely to free enterprise any more than could education. With the adoption of Medicare, it can be expected that popular pressure will cause the program to be broadened by stages until a comprehensive health service, financed by social security or some similar form of tax, will be achieved by the federal government for all citizens.

ALMONT LINDSEY

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Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States. By ROBERT E. LIPSEY. Princeton, Princeton University Press, for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963.—xviii, 487 pp. $10.00

Studies in United States Commercial Policy. Edited By WILLIAM B. KELLY JR. Chapel Hill, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press, 1963.—vi, 262 pp. $7.50.

As a result of Lipsey's mammoth undertaking to reconstruct the data prior to 1923, we now have available continuous annual and quarterly time series covering the totals and components of United States merchandise imports and exports from 1879 to 1960. Considering the sheer volume of data presented in his eight appendixes (334 pages) and in the text, Lipsey was of necessity rather selective in his analysis. But this is not meant as a criticism, for his analysis of long-term trends and his treatment of some methodological questions of index number construction represent important contributions.

Lipsey's data disclosed no long-term improvement in the net barter terms of trade of the United States between 1879 and 1960. This is a noteworthy finding because it is contrary to the widely held belief that the terms of trade of the developed countries, including the United States, have improved significantly since the latter part of the nineteenth century. His data further revealed no significant long-term worsening in the United States terms of trade of primary as opposed to manufactured products. In fact, prior to World War I the opposite was the case. Also of

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considerable interest was Lipsey's attempt to approximate the single and double factoral terms of trade between United States manufactured and agricultural exports. Here his analysis showed that productivity changes were of major importance in explaining long-term changes in relative prices, and therefore that even though increased productivity meant worsened terms of trade, it was nevertheless an important factor leading to competitive advantage and gains in economic welfare. This gives empirical content to ideas concerning productivity, which international trade theorists have often stressed in discussing the terms of trade. Another finding of importance was his questioning of the applicability to the United States of the Sombart thesis on the declining importance of foreign trade in the process of industrialization. Examination of the trade to output ratios in real terms showed no evidence of such a decline, especially for exports. Finally, Lipsey demonstrated that pre-World War I foreign demand for United States agricultural products was of great importance in the expansion of the agricultural sector and thus of the economy as a whole at that time.

In addition to the foregoing substantive findings, Lipsey presents interesting and highly useful discussions of: how his Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes can be used in the analysis of price and quantity changes; the relationships which existed between unit values and wholesale prices of traded goods; the sampling characteristics and accuracy of index numbers; and the differences between his own indexes constructed for 1879 to 1923 and those constructed by others for this period. Lipsey's book thus contains many items of interest to international trade theorists, economic historians, statisticians, and even policy-makers. Like other major studies of its kind, it will undoubtedly serve as a reference for many years to come and is bound to stimulate further work on long-term trends in foreign trade.

The book edited by Kelly draws upon a very different universe of discourse. It is a collection of five essays which deal, respectively, with the 1922–34 antecedents of present United States commercial policy, the legislative basis of this policy from 1934 to date, the place of the escape clause and peril points in the trade agreements program, the conflicts between international trade and domestic agricultural policy, and the problems posed by Great Britain's application to join the Common Market. While these studies do not break any new ground, the first four of them in particular can be especially recommended to specialists and to students new to the area, for they present a clear, comprehensive, and therefore highly useful review of the bases and current problems of United States commercial policy. The

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last essay dealing with Great Britain and the Common Market fits much less well into the collection, particularly in the light of the rejection of Britain's application for membership in early 1963. Perhaps a more suitable choice for a concluding essay would have been one dealing with United States policy with regard to tariff preferences and customs unions, with special reference to our official position during the formation and later development of the European Common Market.

ROBERT M. STERN

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Explanation in Social Science. By ROBERT BROWN. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1963.—viii, 198 pp. $5.00.

Three broad topics form the subject matter of Dr. Brown's book: the differences between reports and descriptions and between descriptions and explanations; the kinds of explanations social scientists actually employ; and the adequacy of these in the light of the method of explanation employed in the physical and biological sciences.

Part I consists of general chapters on social description, social observation, and social explanation, and exhibits the differences among them in terms of the activities of their respective practitioners, namely, historians and those who comment on the current scene, who describe; social observers or researchers, who, akin to natural historians of the bird-watching variety, observe; and social scientists proper, who, concerned less with statements about particular events and more with generalizations about classes of events, explain.

Part II covers three quarters of the book and analyzes seven methods of explanation in as many chapters. Three are devoted to methods which are limited to explaining actions, specifically, explanations in terms of intention (what an agent knowingly tries to do), in terms of disposition (a tendency to behave in a certain way), and in terms of reason (an argument on the part of the agent that his action is an appropriate means to an explicit goal). Although all three are prominent in common sense discourse, none, the author asserts, is particularly important in social science writings, mainly because social scientists seldom take the occurrence of one or another kind of action as theoretically problematic. In the light of the pervasive concern among American sociologists and social psychologists with theories of action and the empirical study of actions, this would seem to be a dubious generalization at best.

With respect to genetic explanation, which purports to ex-

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plain phenomena in terms of their origins or developmental sequences, Dr. Brown assumes the familiar position that these statements constitute only statements of initial conditions in arguments that require additional, "law-like statements" for their completion, that is, those that require general statements giving the necessary or sufficient conditions of the phenomena in question.

Law-like statements are also introduced into the chapter on "function explanations." These latter, he argues, can be valid explanations only if used to account for properties of systems that are known to be self-maintaining with respect to one or more properties. As he points out, virtually no functional explanation in social science meets this requirement, principally because in the writing that uses this method the presence of negative feedback mechanisms is never demonstrated.

The remaining two chapters, which analyze, respectively, explanations in terms of empirical generalizations and explanations in terms of theories, cover such topics as unobservable entities, ideal types, and reductionism, to name a few. Although social scientists are addicted to invalid arguments (in their functional explanations), vague formulations (in their empirical generalizations), and serious tactical mistakes (in their devotion to classificatory schema unconnected with explanatory problems), their work, he shows in some detail, contains many instances where the methods of explanation employed in the physical and biological sciences are also employed in the social sciences; and the question of whether such methods *can* be used in social science, therefore, is no more in doubt than an earlier generation's question of whether they *should* be.

This is a good book, well written, tightly argued, and frequently illuminating. It has its lapses—a substantive theory is incorrectly read, overly dense passages occasionally occur, extraneous considerations sometimes muddy the argument—but these do not detract substantially from the overall value of the work. Dr. Brown's book thus makes a welcome addition to the small list of studies devoted specifically to the methodologies with which practicing social scientists actually work, and it should prove highly useful both to the scientists themselves and to those in other fields who want a sympathetic observer's critical introduction to the logic of social enquiry as it is presently practiced.

TERENCE K. HOPKINS

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BOOK NOTES

J. Allen Broyles' *The John Birch Society, Anatomy of a Protest* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1964; 169 pp., $4.50) traces the efforts of former candy manufacturer Robert Welch to generate anti-Communist sentiment under the posthumous auspices of a fundamentalist missionary whose short career, begun with a heresy-hunt against his own professors at Mercer University, ended in a mysterious intelligence mission in China ten days after V-J Day. In a frankly unsympathetic but critically responsible study, Broyles examines both the alarmist dogmas that undergird the organization and the mixed zealots who stock the local chapters and upper echelons. As a sociologist, Broyles makes it clear that he is capable of observing the proper remove from his material; since he is a clergyman, too, he occasionally permits himself to speak out as one: "Religion, in short, has come to be something that they use for their *own* purpose rather than a relationship to a God who uses them for *His* purposes" (p. 122). Following surveys of the Society's growth and present structure, of its position on federal policies, and of its local operations in education, religion, civil rights, labor and business, and the press, Broyles contributes a painstaking analysis of the rudiments of Birch ideology, among which are the belief that our civilization is in almost irreversible decline, and that communism is the greatest evil faced by humanity today. The "central syllogism" linking measurable world-wide advances of communism and the Birch presumption of conscious collaboration by United States leadership is subjected to intense logical scrutiny. Regrettably, Broyles fails to relate the Birchers more than perfunctorily to previous extremist movements in American history. (His only other neglect is of the hero's indispensable name. John—crisply Anglo-Saxon; Birch—clean tall trees and the punitive rod.) Since the publication of this book Welch and his cohorts, among whom former California Congressman John Rousselot, now national director of public relations, is best known, have somewhat modified their crudest allegations of conspiracy involving major public figures. Also, the secretiveness documented in subsequent first-hand accounts has recently been underplayed, with the result that the Birchers have adopted a more candid Rotarian style in hopes of widening their appeal. To a surprising degree Broyles had the foresight to anticipate these changes, and his remarks about the membership's polemical tone and socio-economic makeup retain their usefulness. As the author himself points out, the Birch Society must ultimately be seen against the familiar background

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of status loss and the consequent search for a purely psychological "upward social mobility" by many disaffected elements of our population. These are the elements whose refusal to repudiate the Society at the 1964 Republican Convention in San Francisco brought it to the attention of additional millions. Now that the Birchers are not simply known, but notorious and, according to post-election reports, increasing in number and anticipating more influence, Broyles' book can serve as a guide to those in the citizenry who remain perplexed.—ANNETTE K. BAXTER, Barnard College.

José Martí, Cuban Patriot (Gainesville, Fla., University of Florida Press, 1962; xvii, 307 pp., $7.00) by Richard B. Gray partially fills a gap that has too long existed in English on the position of the "Apostle of Cuban Freedom" in the hearts and minds of the Cuban people. There are, it is true, translations of two good biographies of Martí (Jorge Mañach, *Martí: Apostle of Freedom* [New York, 1950] and Félix Lisaso, *Martí, Martyr of Cuban Independence* [Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1953]) but they make no attempt to explain to North Americans the image of Martí that exists in Cuban thinking or the cult that has grown up around his memory. And without this there is no possibility of understanding Cuba and its inhabitants. "El Apóstol" is quoted in support of every movement, idea, program, platform, and doctrine. At the end of a short but brilliant literary career as poet, essayist, political theorist, literary and art critic, novelist, and journalist (his reports on the United States from 1881 to 1892 are among the best by any foreign observer) Martí was killed in an early skirmish of Cuba's final war for independence (1895–98) of which he had been the chief organizer. A martyr's death helped to produce the cult which developed around him and lifted him to sainthood in the minds of many. Admirers have collected his writings into seventy-four volumes, and numerous shorter collections, anthologies, and selected writings have been published, while books, pamphlets, articles and orations on his life, writings, and ideas have multiplied almost without number. Martí is evoked on every occasion of any significance, and nothing happens but what Cubans ask themselves, "What would Martí think about this?" or "What would he do under these circumstances?" It is this permeation of the Martí image into every facet of Cuban life and thought that Mr. Gray has tried to fathom. This is the task of a lifetime of living among the Cuban people, and Mr. Gray had only twenty-two months at his disposal; nevertheless, he has almost accomplished the impossible.—DUVON C. CORBITT, Asbury College.

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A wide array of scholars—historians and political scientists as well as sociologists—will profit from reading Leila A. Sussman's pioneering venture in analysis of political letter writing—*Dear FDR: A Study of Political Letter-Writing* (Totowa, N.J., The Bedminster Press, 1963; xxv, 194 pp., $6.00). As Robert K. Merton points out in his introduction, the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, with which Dr. Sussman earlier was associated, has undertaken several studies of incoming mail received by political figures. Dr. Sussman was one of the co-authors of a monograph analyzing letters urging Dwight Eisenhower in 1948 to become a candidate for President, but Eisenhower refused to allow the study to be published. Hence, the present monograph is the first to appear. From among approximately fifteen million letters in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, Dr. Sussman has sampled mail received during the two campaign years 1932 and 1940. She has studied the contents of the letters and analyzed the background of the writers. The sheer quantity of letters reaching Roosevelt was startling. Partly because of the stimulation of mass communication media, especially the radio, and because of the depression, citizens began writing the President in unprecedented numbers. Before the stock market crash, Hoover received annually about 11.8 letters per ten thousand population; Roosevelt after his inauguration received 160, a figure tapering off to 111 late in the nineteen-thirties, but for subsequent presidents the figures have remained proportionately high. The letters were overwhelmingly favorable, but Roosevelt found them a useful source of intelligence. During the war, for example, he became disturbed by the number of letters from young men in the armed forces complaining that their hard-boiled instructors had no interest in seeing a better world emerge. In her concluding chapter, Dr. Sussman surveys attitudes of present-day politicians toward their mail and the uses they make of it. Altogether this monograph is meaty, thought-provoking, and far broader in range than the title might suggest. One of its special merits, as Merton suggests, is its search for "the missing link between the causation of public opinion and the social consequences of public opinion."—FRANK FREIDEL, Harvard University.

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

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

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